375 research outputs found
An Algebraic Approach to Maliciously Secure Private Set Intersection
Private set intersection is an important area of research and has been the focus of many works over the past decades. It describes the problem of finding an intersection between the input sets of at least two parties without revealing anything about the input sets apart from their intersection.
In this paper, we present a new approach to compute the intersection between sets based on a primitive called Oblivious Linear Function Evaluation (OLE). On an abstract level, we use this primitive to efficiently add two polynomials in a randomized way while preserving the roots of the added polynomials. Setting the roots of the input polynomials to be the elements of the input sets, this directly yields an intersection protocol with optimal asymptotic communication complexity . We highlight that the protocol is information-theoretically secure assuming OLE.
We also present a natural generalization of the 2-party protocol for the fully malicious multi-party case. Our protocol does away with expensive (homomorphic) threshold encryption and zero-knowledge proofs. Instead, we use simple combinatorial techniques to ensure the security. As a result we get a UC-secure protocol with asymptotically optimal communication complexity , where is the number of parties, is the set size and the security parameter. Apart from yielding an asymptotic improvement over previous works, our protocols are also conceptually simple and require only simple field arithmetic.
Along the way we develop tools that might be of independent interest
Multi-Party Private Set Intersection: A Circuit-Based Protocol with Jaccard Similarity for Secure and Efficient Anomaly Detection in Network Traffic
We present a new circuit-based protocol for multi-party private set
intersection (PSI) that allows m parties to compute the intersection of their
datasets without revealing any additional information about the items outside
the intersection. Building upon the two-party Sort-Compare-Shuffle (SCS)
protocol, we seamlessly extend it to a multi-party setting. Demonstrating its
practicality through implementation, our protocol exhibits acceptable
performance. Specifically, with 7 parties, each possessing a set size of
2^{12}, our protocol completes in just 19 seconds. Moreover, circuit-based
protocols like ours have an advantage over using custom protocols to perform
more complex computation. We substantiate this advantage by incorporating a
module for calculating the Jaccard similarity metric of the private sets which
can be used in the application domain of network traffic analysis for anomaly
detection. This extension showcases the versatility of our protocol beyond set
intersection computations, demonstrating its efficacy in preserving privacy
while efficiently identifying abnormal patterns in network flow
Polynomial Representation Is Tricky: Maliciously Secure Private Set Intersection Revisited
Private Set Intersection protocols (PSIs) allow parties to compute the intersection of their private sets, such that nothing about the sets’ elements beyond the intersection is revealed. PSIs have a variety of applications, primarily in efficiently supporting data sharing in a privacy-preserving manner. At Eurocrypt 2019, Ghosh and Nilges proposed three efficient PSIs based on the polynomial representation of sets and proved their security against active adversaries. In this work, we show that these three PSIs are susceptible to several serious attacks. The attacks let an adversary (1) learn the correct intersection while making its victim believe that the intersection is empty, (2) learn a certain element of its victim’s set beyond the intersection, and (3) delete multiple elements of its victim’s input set. We explain why the proofs did not identify these attacks and propose a set of mitigations
PSI from ring-OLE
Private set intersection (PSI) is one of the most extensively studied instances of secure computation. PSI allows two parties to compute the intersection of their input sets without revealing anything else. Other useful variants include PSI-Payload, where the output includes payloads associated with members of the intersection, and PSI-Sum, where the output includes the sum of the payloads instead of individual ones.
In this work, we make two related contributions. First, we construct simple and efficient protocols for PSI and PSI-Payload from a ring version of oblivious linear function evaluation (ring-OLE) that can be efficiently realized using recent ring-LPN based protocols. A standard OLE over a field F allows a sender with to deliver to a receiver who holds . Ring-OLE generalizes this to a ring , in particular, a polynomial ring over . Our second contribution is an efficient general reduction of a variant of PSI-Sum to PSI-Payload and secure inner product.
Our protocols have better communication cost than state-of-the-art PSI protocols, especially when requiring security against malicious parties and when allowing input-independent preprocessing. Compared to previous maliciously secure PSI protocols that have a similar com- putational cost, our online communication is 2x better for small sets (28 − 212 elements) and 20% better for large sets (220 − 224). Our protocol is also simpler to describe and implement. We obtain even bigger improvements over the state of the art (4-5x better running time) for our variant of PSI-Sum
Private Certifier Intersection
We initiate the study of Private Certifier Intersection (PCI), which allows mutually distrusting parties to establish a trust basis for cross-validation of claims if they have one or more trust authorities (certifiers) in common. This is one of the essential requirements for verifiable presentations in Web 3.0, since it provides additional privacy without compromising on decentralization. A PCI protocol allows two or more parties holding certificates to identify a common set of certifiers while additionally validating the certificates issued by such certifiers, without leaking any information about the certifiers not in the output intersection. In this paper, we formally define the notion of multi-party PCI in the Simplified-UC framework for two different settings depending on whether certificates are required for any of the claims (called PCI-Any) or all of the claims (called PCI-All). We then design and implement two provably secure and practically efficient PCI protocols supporting validation of digital signature-based certificates: a PCI-Any protocol for ECDSA-based certificates and a PCI-All protocol for BLS-based certificates. The technical centerpiece of our proposals is the first secretsharing-based MPC framework supporting efficient computation of elliptic curve-based arithmetic operations, including elliptic curve pairings, in a black-box way. We implement this framework by building on top of the well-known MP-SPDZ library using OpenSSL and RELIC for elliptic curve operations, and use this implementation to benchmark our proposed PCI protocols in the LAN and WAN settings. In an intercontinental WAN setup with parties located in different continents, our protocols execute in less than a minute on input sets of size 40, which demonstrates the practicality of our proposed solutions
Improved Private Set Intersection for Sets with Small Entries
We introduce new protocols for private set intersection (PSI), building upon recent constructions of pseudorandom correlation generators, such as vector-OLE and ring-OLE. Our new constructions improve over the state of the art on several aspects, and perform especially well in the setting where the parties have databases with small entries. We obtain three main contributions:
1. We introduce a new semi-honest PSI protocol that combines subfield vector-OLE with hash-based PSI. Our protocol is the first PSI protocol to achieve communication complexity independent of the computational security parameter κ, and has communication lower than all previous known protocols for input sizes ℓ below 70 bits.
2. We enhance the security of our protocol to the malicious setting, using two different approaches. In particular, we show that applying the dual execution technique yields a malicious PSI whose communication remains independent of κ, and improves over all known PSI protocols for small values of ℓ.
3. As most previous protocols, our above protocols are in the random oracle model. We introduce a third protocol which relies on subfield ring-OLE to achieve maliciously secure PSI in the standard model, under the ring-LPN assumption. Our protocol enjoys extremely low communication, reasonable computation, and standard model security. Furthermore, it is batchable: the message of a client can be reused to compute the intersection of their set with that of multiple servers, yielding further reduction in the overall amortized communication
Securely measuring the overlap between private datasets with cryptosets
Many scientific questions are best approached by sharing data--collected by different groups or across large collaborative networks--into a combined analysis. Unfortunately, some of the most interesting and powerful datasets--like health records, genetic data, and drug discovery data--cannot be freely shared because they contain sensitive information. In many situations, knowing if private datasets overlap determines if it is worthwhile to navigate the institutional, ethical, and legal barriers that govern access to sensitive, private data. We report the first method of publicly measuring the overlap between private datasets that is secure under a malicious model without relying on private protocols or message passing. This method uses a publicly shareable summary of a dataset's contents, its cryptoset, to estimate its overlap with other datasets. Cryptosets approach "information-theoretic" security, the strongest type of security possible in cryptography, which is not even crackable with infinite computing power. We empirically and theoretically assess both the accuracy of these estimates and the security of the approach, demonstrating that cryptosets are informative, with a stable accuracy, and secure
Mixed-Technique Multi-Party Computations Composed of Two-Party Computations
Protocols for secure multi-party computation are commonly composed
of different sub-protocols, combining techniques such as homomorphic
encryption, secret or Boolean sharing, and garbled circuits. In
this paper, we design a new class of multi-party computation
protocols which themselves are composed out of two-party protocols.
We integrate both types of compositions, compositions of fully
homomorphic encryption and garbled circuits with compositions of
multi-party protocols from two-party protocols. As a result, we can
construct communication-efficient protocols for special problems.
Furthermore, we show how to efficiently ensure the security of
composed protocols against malicious adversaries by proving in
zero-knowledge that conversions between individual techniques are
correct. To demonstrate the usefulness of this approach, we give an
example scheme for private set analytics, i.e., private set
disjointness. This scheme enjoys lower communication complexity
than a solution based on generic multi-party computation and lower
computation cost than fully homomorphic encryption. So, our design
is more suitable for deployments in wide-area networks, such as the
Internet, with many participants or problems with circuits of
moderate or high multiplicative depth
Public-Key Cryptography through the Lens of Monoid Actions
We show that key exchange and two-party computation are exactly equivalent to monoid actions with certain structural and hardness properties. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first natural characterization of the mathematical structure inherent to any key exchange or two-party computation protocol, and the first explicit proof of the necessity of mathematical structure for public-key cryptography. We then utilize these characterizations to show a new black-box separation result, while also achieving a simpler and more general version of an existing black-box separation result. Concretely, we obtain the following results:
- Two-Party Key Exchange. We show that that any two-party noninteractive key exchange protocol is equivalent to the existence of an abelian monoid equipped with a natural hardness property, namely (distributional) unpredictability. More generally, we show that any -round (two-party) key exchange protocol is essentially equivalent to the existence of a (distributional) unpredictable monoid with certain commutator-like properties. We then use a generic version of this primitive to show a simpler and more general version of Rudich\u27s (Crypto \u2791) black-box separation of -round and -round key exchange.
- Two-Party Computation. We show that any maliciously secure two-party computation protocol is also equivalent to a monoid action with commutator-like properties and certain hardness guarantees. We then use a generic version of this primitive to show a black-box separation between -round semi-honest secure two-party computation and -round maliciously secure two-party computation. This yields the first black-box separation (to our knowledge) between -round and -round maliciously secure two-party computation protocols.
We believe that modeling cryptographic primitives as mathematical objects (and our approach of using such modeling for black-box separations) may have many other potential applications and uses in understanding what sort of assumptions and mathematical structure are necessary for certain cryptoprimitives
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