Temporalized logics and automata for time granularity

Suitable extensions of the monadic second-order theory of k successors have been proposed in the literature to capture the notion of time granularity. In this paper, we provide the monadic second-order theories of downward unbounded layered structures, which are infinitely refinable structures consisting of a coarsest domain and an infinite number of finer and finer domains, and of upward unbounded layered structures, which consist of a finest domain and an infinite number of coarser and coarser domains, with expressively complete and elementarily decidable temporal logic counterparts. We obtain such a result in two steps. First, we define a new class of combined automata, called temporalized automata, which can be proved to be the automata-theoretic counterpart of temporalized logics, and show that relevant properties, such as closure under Boolean operations, decidability, and expressive equivalence with respect to temporal logics, transfer from component automata to temporalized ones. Then, we exploit the correspondence between temporalized logics and automata to reduce the task of finding the temporal logic counterparts of the given theories of time granularity to the easier one of finding temporalized automata counterparts of them.Comment: Journal: Theory and Practice of Logic Programming Journal Acronym: TPLP Category: Paper for Special Issue (Verification and Computational Logic) Submitted: 18 March 2002, revised: 14 Januari 2003, accepted: 5 September 200

Computabilities of Validity and Satisfiability in Probability Logics over Finite and Countable Models

The $\epsilon$-logic (which is called $\epsilon$E-logic in this paper) of Kuyper and Terwijn is a variant of first order logic with the same syntax, in which the models are equipped with probability measures and in which the $\forall x$ quantifier is interpreted as "there exists a set $A$ of measure $\ge 1 - \epsilon$ such that for each $x \in A$, ...." Previously, Kuyper and Terwijn proved that the general satisfiability and validity problems for this logic are, i) for rational $\epsilon \in (0, 1)$, respectively $\Sigma^1_1$-complete and $\Pi^1_1$-hard, and ii) for $\epsilon = 0$, respectively decidable and $\Sigma^0_1$-complete. The adjective "general" here means "uniformly over all languages." We extend these results in the scenario of finite models. In particular, we show that the problems of satisfiability by and validity over finite models in $\epsilon$E-logic are, i) for rational $\epsilon \in (0, 1)$, respectively $\Sigma^0_1$- and $\Pi^0_1$-complete, and ii) for $\epsilon = 0$, respectively decidable and $\Pi^0_1$-complete. Although partial results toward the countable case are also achieved, the computability of $\epsilon$E-logic over countable models still remains largely unsolved. In addition, most of the results, of this paper and of Kuyper and Terwijn, do not apply to individual languages with a finite number of unary predicates. Reducing this requirement continues to be a major point of research. On the positive side, we derive the decidability of the corresponding problems for monadic relational languages --- equality- and function-free languages with finitely many unary and zero other predicates. This result holds for all three of the unrestricted, the countable, and the finite model cases. Applications in computational learning theory, weighted graphs, and neural networks are discussed in the context of these decidability and undecidability results.Comment: 47 pages, 4 tables. Comments welcome. Fixed errors found by Rutger Kuype

Lewis meets Brouwer: constructive strict implication

C. I. Lewis invented modern modal logic as a theory of "strict implication". Over the classical propositional calculus one can as well work with the unary box connective. Intuitionistically, however, the strict implication has greater expressive power than the box and allows to make distinctions invisible in the ordinary syntax. In particular, the logic determined by the most popular semantics of intuitionistic K becomes a proper extension of the minimal normal logic of the binary connective. Even an extension of this minimal logic with the "strength" axiom, classically near-trivial, preserves the distinction between the binary and the unary setting. In fact, this distinction and the strong constructive strict implication itself has been also discovered by the functional programming community in their study of "arrows" as contrasted with "idioms". Our particular focus is on arithmetical interpretations of the intuitionistic strict implication in terms of preservativity in extensions of Heyting's Arithmetic.Comment: Our invited contribution to the collection "L.E.J. Brouwer, 50 years later

Logic and Topology for Knowledge, Knowability, and Belief - Extended Abstract

In recent work, Stalnaker proposes a logical framework in which belief is realized as a weakened form of knowledge. Building on Stalnaker's core insights, and using frameworks developed by Bjorndahl and Baltag et al., we employ topological tools to refine and, we argue, improve on this analysis. The structure of topological subset spaces allows for a natural distinction between what is known and (roughly speaking) what is knowable; we argue that the foundational axioms of Stalnaker's system rely intuitively on both of these notions. More precisely, we argue that the plausibility of the principles Stalnaker proposes relating knowledge and belief relies on a subtle equivocation between an "evidence-in-hand" conception of knowledge and a weaker "evidence-out-there" notion of what could come to be known. Our analysis leads to a trimodal logic of knowledge, knowability, and belief interpreted in topological subset spaces in which belief is definable in terms of knowledge and knowability. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for this logic as well as its uni-modal belief fragment. We then consider weaker logics that preserve suitable translations of Stalnaker's postulates, yet do not allow for any reduction of belief. We propose novel topological semantics for these irreducible notions of belief, generalizing our previous semantics, and provide sound and complete axiomatizations for the corresponding logics.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2017, arXiv:1707.08250. The full version of this paper, including the longer proofs, is at arXiv:1612.0205

Critical analysis of the Carmo-Jones system of Contrary-to-Duty obligations

We offer a technical analysis of the contrary to duty system proposed in Carmo-Jones. We offer analysis/simplification/repair of their system and compare it with our own related system