The institutional character of computerized information systems

We examine how important social and technical choices become part of the history of a computer-based information system (CB/SJ and embedded in the social structure which supports its development and use. These elements of a CBIS can be organized in specific ways to enhance its usability and performance. Paradoxically, they can also constrain future implementations and post-implementations.We argue that CBIS developed from complex, interdependent social and technical choices should be conceptualized in terms of their institutional characteristics, as well as their information-processing characteristics. The social system which supports the development and operation of a CBIS is one major element whose institutional characteristics can effectively support routine activities while impeding substantial innovation. Characterizing CBIS as institutions is important for several reasons: (1) the usability of CBIS is more critical than the abstract information-processing capabilities of the underlying technology; (2) CBIS that are well-used and have stable social structures are more difficult to replace than those with less developed social structures and fewer participants; (3) CBIS vary from one social setting to another according to the ways in which they are organized and embedded in organized social systems. These ideas are illustrated with the case study of a failed attempt to convert a complex inventory control system in a medium-sized manufacturing firm

MECHANISMS FOR ADDRESSING THIRD-PARTY IMPACTS RESULTING FROM VOLUNTARY WATER TRANSFERS

This research uses laboratory experiments to test alternative water market institutions designed to protect third-party interests. The institutions tested include taxing mechanisms that raise revenue to compensate affected third-parties, and a free market in which third-parties actively participate. We also discuss the likely implications of a command-and-control approach in which there are fixed limits on the volume of water that may be exported from a region. The results indicate that there are some important trade-offs in selecting a policy option. Although theoretically optimal, active third-party participation in the market is likely to result in free-riding that may erode some or all of the efficiency gains, and may introduce volatility into the market. Fixed limits on water exports are likely to result in a more stable market, but the constraints on exports will result in lower levels of social welfare. Taxing transfers and compensating third-parties offers a promising balance of efficiency, equity and market stability.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

The Allocation of a Shared Resource Within an Organization

Many resources such as supercomputers, legal advisors, and university classrooms are shared by many members of an organization. When the supply of shared resources is limited, conflict usually results between contending demanders. If these conflicts can be adequately resolved, then value is created for the organization. In this paper we use the methodology of applied mechanism design to examine alternative processes for the resolution of such conflicts for a particular class of scheduling problems. We construct a laboratory environment, within which we evaluate the outcomes of various allocation mechanisms. In particular, we are able to measure efficiency, the value attained by the resulting allocations as a percentage of the maximum possible value. Our choice of environment and parameters is guided by a specific application, the allocation of time on NASA's Deep Space Network, but the results also provide insights relevant to other scheduling and allocation applications. We find (1) experienced user committees using decision support algorithms produce reasonably efficient allocations in lower conflict situations but perform badly when there is a high level of conflict between demanders, (2) there is a mechanism, called the Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (AUSM) which charges users for time, which yields high efficiencies in high conflict situations but because of the prices paid, the net surplus available to the users is less than that resulting from the inefficient user committee (a reason why users may not appreciate "market solutions" to organization problems) and (3) there is a modification of AUSM in which tokens, or internal money, replaces real money, which results in highly efficient allocations without extracting any of the users' surplus. Although the distribution of surplus is still an issue, the significant increase in efficiency provides users with a strong incentive to replace inefficient user committees with the more efficient AUSM

Market-based Recommendation: Agents that Compete for Consumer Attention

The amount of attention space available for recommending suppliers to consumers on e-commerce sites is typically limited. We present a competitive distributed recommendation mechanism based on adaptive software agents for efficiently allocating the 'consumer attention space', or banners. In the example of an electronic shopping mall, the task is delegated to the individual shops, each of which evaluates the information that is available about the consumer and his or her interests (e.g. keywords, product queries, and available parts of a profile). Shops make a monetary bid in an auction where a limited amount of 'consumer attention space' for the arriving consumer is sold. Each shop is represented by a software agent that bids for each consumer. This allows shops to rapidly adapt their bidding strategy to focus on consumers interested in their offerings. For various basic and simple models for on-line consumers, shops, and profiles, we demonstrate the feasibility of our system by evolutionary simulations as in the field of agent-based computational economics (ACE). We also develop adaptive software agents that learn bidding strategies, based on neural networks and strategy exploration heuristics. Furthermore, we address the commercial and technological advantages of this distributed market-based approach. The mechanism we describe is not limited to the example of the electronic shopping mall, but can easily be extended to other domains

A theoretical and computational basis for CATNETS

The main content of this report is the identification and definition of market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. These build the theoretical foundation for the work within the following two years of the CATNETS project. --Grid Computing

Evaluation of Public Private Partnership Strategies on Concession Performance: Case of Rift Valley Railways Concession, Kenya.

Nations worldwide face fiscal constraints resulting to infrastructure deficits.  Kenya, like most of others has increasingly turned to PPP to cover infrastructure gap. PPPs encourage private initiative and benefit from the involvement of the private sector particularly in the designing, building, financing, operating and maintenance of infrastructure projects. Different types of PPPs have been practiced in worldwide infrastructure development with diverse results and a variety of problems have been encountered. As an urgent need to establish the strategies best suited to improve practices in future PPP projects and the performance of existing ones, as an important step toward the development of such a protocol this study set out to evaluate the PPP strategies deemed to have the highest impact on SSA railways on the performance of RVR concession in Kenya. It is based on Johnson and Scholes (1993) model of strategy evaluation i.e. suitability, acceptability and feasibility. The package contained four strategies; namely, Risk Allocation Strategy, Sound Finance Strategy, Strong Consortium Strategy and Technology Strategy. By employing descriptive research design, the study survey realized response rate was 76% and deemed viable for analysis. Mean score ranking gave the strategies in the following order of importance in their effect on RVR concession; (1) Strong Consortium Strategy (2) Sound Finance Strategy (3) Risk Allocation Strategy and (4) Technology Strategy. Cronbach's Alpha was 0.875, suggesting that the test scores had relatively high internal consistency and therefore reliable. Key Words: Public Private Partnership Strategies, Concession Performance, Rift Valley Railways

Internet Governance: the State of Play

The Global Forum on Internet Governance held by the UNICT Task Force in New York on 25-26 March concluded that Internet governance issues were many and complex. The Secretary-General's Working Group on Internet Governance will have to map out and navigate this complex terrain as it makes recommendations to the World Summit on an Information Society in 2005. To assist in this process, the Forum recommended, in the words of the Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations at the closing session, that a matrix be developed "of all issues of Internet governance addressed by multilateral institutions, including gaps and concerns, to assist the Secretary-General in moving forward the agenda on these issues." This paper takes up the Deputy Secretary-General's challenge. It is an analysis of the state of play in Internet governance in different forums, with a view to showing: (1) what issues are being addressed (2) by whom, (3) what are the types of consideration that these issues receive and (4) what issues are not adequately addressed

JOINT PUBLIC VENTURES COST ALLOCATION: ALTERNATIVE AND CONSEQUENCES

An in depth discussion of the nature, structure and financing of intergovernmental arrangements in the production of public services. Includes economic justification, methods of allocating costs and examples of joint ventures.Public Economics,

Essays on Bidding Behavior in Auctions

The following thesis presents the results of three experimental studies that investigate how changes in the auction environment or auction rules affect bidding behavior and the auction outcome in a variety of auctions. The first study is concerned with the impact of ambiguity about one’s competitiveness. In particular, bidders are either informed or not informed about the upper limit of the support of a uniform distribution from which their competitors’ bids are drawn. Their relative bid is found to decrease under ambiguity – an effect, which is not predicted by standard ambiguity theories alone. A combination of smooth ambiguity and nonlinear probability weighting is shown to organize the experimental results. The second study investigates how two forms of favoritism affect the auction outcome. In one of the treatments, an ex ante preferred bidder is given the right of first refusal. In the other treatment, the seller elicits the preferred bidder’s valuation with an incentive compatible transfer. The good is then sold to the non-preferred bidder(s) via an auction with a reserve price that optimizes the expected joint payoff of the seller and the preferred bidder. The formal analysis for risk-neutral bidders is based to a great extend on Burguet and Perry (2009). Observed behavior partly deviates from the theoretical predictions. In particular, the auction with an optimal reserve price does not maximize the joint payoff of the seller and the preferred bidder. Most of the deviations can be explained by accounting for risk aversion. The third study is concerned with multi-unit uniform-price auctions in the context of emission trading. It investigates the impact of auction frequency on the ability of the secondary market to achieve cost-efficient emission reduction. In the experiment, frequent auctioning does not increase the allocative efficiency (due to better information in later trading periods) but leads to higher price variability and thus higher total abatement costs