Atlantic Salmon Fishery in the Baltic Sea – A Case of Trivial Cooperation

This paper analyses the management of the Atlantic salmon stocks in the Baltic Sea through a coalition game in the partition function form. The signs of economic and biological over-exploitation of these salmon stocks over the last two decades indicate that cooperation among the harvesting countries, under the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy, has been superficial. Combining a two-stage game of four asymmetric players with a comprehensive bioeconomic model, we conclude that cooperation under the Relative Stability Principle is not a stable outcome. In contrast, the equilibrium of the game is non-cooperation. The paper also addresses the possibility of enhancing cooperation through more flexible fishing strategies. The results indicate that partial cooperation is stable under a specific sharing scheme. It is also shown that substantial economic benefits could have been realised by reallocating the fishing effort.Atlantic salmon, bioeconomic model, coalition formation, partition function, sharing rules, stability analysis, Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies,

THE NORWEGIAN SPRING-SPAWNING HERRING FISHERY: A STYLIZED GAME MODEL

This paper presents an empirically based, game-theoretic model of the exploitation of the Norwegian spring-spawning herring stock, also known as the Atlanto-Scandian herring stock. The model involves five exploiters; Norway, Iceland, the Faroe Islands, the EU, and Russia and an explicit, stochastic migratory behavior of the stock. Under these conditions Markov Perfect (Nash) equilibrium game strategies are calculated and compared to the jointly optimal exploitation pattern. Not surprisingly, it turns out that the solution to the competitive game is hugely inefficient, leading very quickly to the virtual exhaustion of the resource. The scope for cooperative agreements involving the calculation of Shapley values is investigated. Although the grand coalition of all players maximizes overall benefits, such a coalition can hardly be stable over time unless side payments are possible.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Strategic Review of Tropical Fisheries Management

This project addresses the constraints to tropical fisheries development with sustainable exploitation through a strategic assessment of tropical fisheries management with the following purposes: (1) To evaluate relevant research methods for the development of assessment models appropriate to the circumstances of tropical coastal fisheries; and (2) To evaluate the utility of existing strategies for the implementation of management advice. The report consists of three substantive chapters. Chapter 2 contains a detailed socio-economic assessment of various instruments and implementation strategies applicable to tropical capture fisheries. In Chapter 3, a detailed assessment of the fisheries for tropical large marine ecosystems has been conducted using a technique developed by FAO (Granger & Garcia 1996). The data used were the FAO statistics published regularly by FAO. This analysis has been conducted for each of the tropical large marine ecosystems and indicates that there is the potential for increased fishing in a number of these ecosystems. One of the clear requirements identified in Chapter 2 and implicit in Chapter 3, is that there is a significant need for simple and robust fisheries assessment methods which can estimate the potential of a particular resource, its capacity in terms of the level of fishing effort and its current status ie whether it is currently exploited sustainably or not. In Chapter 4, these problems are addressed directly and, using two approaches, significant simplification of fishery methods is developed. In the first approach, simple empirical relationships between the life history parameters of a species are used to develop models of potential yield which can be determined by a simple assessment of fish growth. In the second approach, optimal life history theory is applied to the key demographic parameters of exploited fish populations and using estimates of the Beverton & Holt invariants a significant simplifying of the basic stock assessment equations is developed

The Incentive Structure of Impure Public Good Provision – The Case of International Fisheries

We argue that international fisheries are a prime example to study the impact of multiple characteristics on the incentive structure of impure public good provision. The degree of technical excludability is related to the pattern of fish migration, the degree of socially constructed excludability is captured by the design of international law and the degree of rivalry is reflected by the growth rate of the resource. We construct a bioeconomic model, including the high seas and exclusive economic zones in order to study the incentives to form stable fully or partially cooperative agreements. We show that the spatial allocation of property rights is crucial for the success of cooperation as long as technical excludability is sufficiently high. Moreover, we show how economic and ecological factors influence the success of cooperation.pure and impure public goods, technical and socially constructed nonexcludability, property rights, coalition formation, free-riding, bioeconomic model, shared fish stocks, regional fisheries management organizations.

Regional Fishery Management Organization as Games in Coalitional Form

This paper examines how a Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO) might successfully achieve effective control of a high seas fishery in the context of partial cooperation. We analyse the feasible allocations of property rights among members of a given RFMO and coalitions of potential entrants. We demonstrate that the modified Shapley value is an appropriate device for the division of the gains from both partial and full cooperations.international fisheries, overexploitation, partial cooperation, games in partition function form, competitive equilibrium, modified Shapley value, Agribusiness, Crop Production/Industries, Environmental Economics and Policy, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Cooperative game theory and its application to natural, environmental, and water resource issues : 2. application to natural and environmental resources

This paper provides a review of various applications of cooperative game theory (CGT) to issues of natural and environmental resources. With an increase in the level of competition over environmental and natural resources, the incidents of disputes have been at the center of allocation agreements. The paper reviews the cases of common pool resources such as fisheries and forests, and cases of environmental pollution such as acid rain, flow, and stock pollution. In addition to providing examples of cooperative solutions to allocation problems, the conclusion from this review suggests that cooperation over scarce environmental and natural resources is possible under a variety of physical conditions and institutional arrangements. CGT applications to international fishery disputes are especially useful in that they have been making headway in policy-related agreements among states and regions of the world. Forest applications are more local in nature, but of great relevance in solving disputes among communities and various levels of governments.Environmental Economics&Policies,Fisheries&Aquaculture,Common Property Resource Development,Economic Theory&Research,Ecosystems and Natural Habitats

ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND GLOBALIZATION IN THE COASTAL FISHERY

Most coastal fisheries in the U.S. and other developed economies are going through a major transition. On the one hand, new technologies such as electronic enhancement to assist trawling have led to a decline in the unit cost of fishing, making it more economically efficient. On the other hand, this improved efficiency has possibly led to increased environmental damage. This has led to conflicts between fishermen and conservation groups. In the past, the main policy issue confronting fishery managers was the task of ensuring that stocks were managed at levels that sustained employment and profits in the fishing industry. However, in recent years, the dynamics of the coastal fishery has changed dramatically. More and more affluent people have settled into coastal areas. Recreational demand has increased faster than demand for commercial fish. Environmental concerns have often become more important than the matter of providing fish at reasonable prices to the urban consumer. This trend has been exacerbated by the globalization of the world fish industry, so that cheaper imports from overseas can now compete with higher cost domestic fish. The paper addresses this problem by developing a simple spatial model of the coastal fishery with two fleets, a traditional higher cost fleet which is environmentally less damaging (e.g., castnetting), and a modern lower cost fleet (trawling) which may have negative environmental effects. As fish move away from inshore breeding grounds to areas offshore, they grow bigger in size, attracting a price premium. The model tries to answer the question: which fleet should fish in what location? This depends on various cost and demand parameters. The optimal spatial allocation of fishing effort is derived when fleets have harvest and capacity constraints. The effect of regulation, for example to preserve inshore fishing grounds for the traditional fleet or imposing environmental taxes on the modern fleet are examined. The effect of imports on effort allocation is discussed. The paper concludes with a case study discussion of the southeastern U.S. shrimp fishery.Environmental Economics and Policy,

Are Marine Protected Areas in the Turks and Caicos Islands ecologically or economically valuable?

Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) are often advocated by ecologists as a method of conserving valuable fish stocks while ensuring the integrity of ecological processes in the face of increasing anthropogenic disturbance. In the Turks and Caicos Islands there is little evidence that current MPAs are ecologically beneficial but there are indications that boundary changes may enhance queen conch and finfish production. Implementing boundary changes usually requires political will and, hence, quantifiable economic benefits. Assessing the value of reef fish is particularly important because they are potentially valuable for consumptive and nonconsumptive purposes. We demonstrate the nonconsumptive economic value of increased Nassau grouper size and abundance to the dive tourism industry through a paired comparison conjoint survey of visiting divers. Our results suggest that accounting for the non-consumptive economic value of increased Nassau grouper abundance and size may have a large impact on the economic viability of ecologically functional MPAs