60,453 research outputs found
Darwinian Adverse Selection
We develop a model to study the role of rationality in economics and biology.
The model's agents differ continuously in their ability to make rational
choices. The agents' objective is to ensure their individual survival over time
or, equivalently, to maximize profits. In equilibrium, however, rational agents
who maximize their objective survival probability are, individually and
collectively, eliminated by the forces of competition. Instead of rationality,
there emerges a unique distribution of irrational players who are individually
not fit for the struggle of survival. The selection of irrational players over
rational ones relies on the fact that all rational players coordinate on the
same optimal action, which leaves them collectively undiversified and thus
vulnerable to aggregate risks.Comment: Maximization, Rationality, Economics, Biology, Group Selectio
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Why do research on commercial property management? Somebody HAS to!
This paper identifies some significant gaps in our knowledge of the configuration and performance of the property asset management sector. It is argued that, as many leading academic property researchers have focussed on financial vehicles and modelling, in-depth analysis of property assets and their management has been neglected. In terms of potential for future in-depth research, three key broad preliminary research themes or questions are identified. First, how do the active management opportunities presented, costs of management and the key management tasks vary with market conditions, asset type and life-cycle stage? Second, how is property asset management delivered and what are the main costs and benefits of different models of procurement? Finally, what are the appropriate metrics for measuring the performance of different property managers and approaches to property management? It is concluded that the lack of published materials addressing these issues has implications for educating property students
Equilibrium Corporate Finance
We study a general equilibrium model with production where financial markets are incomplete. At a competitive equilibrium firms take their production and financial decisions so as to maximize their value. We show that shareholders unanimously support value maximization. Furthermore, competitive equilibria are constrained Pareto efficient. Finally the Modigliani-Miller theorem typically does not hold and the firmsâ corporate financing structure is determined at equilibrium. Such results extend to the case where informational asymmetries are present and contribute to determine the firmsâ capital structure.capital structure, competitive equilibria, incomplete markets, asymmetric information
Executive equity compensation and incentives: a survey
Stock and option compensation and the level of managerial equity incentives are aspects of corporate governance that are especially controversial to shareholders, institutional activists, and government regulators. Similar to much of the corporate finance and corporate governance literature, research on stock-based compensation and incentives has not only generated useful insights, but also produced many contradictory findings. Not surprisingly, many fundamental questions remain unanswered. In this study, the authors synthesize the broad literature on equity-based compensation and executive incentives and highlight topics that seem especially appropriate for future research.Executives ; Stockholders ; Corporate governance
Portfolio Choice when Managers Control Returns
This paper investigates the allocation decision of an investor with two projects. Separate managers control the mean return from each project, and the investor may or may not observe the managersâ actions. We show that the investorâs risk-return trade-off may be radically different from a standard portfolio choice setting, even if managersâ actions are observable and enforceable. In particular, feedback effects working through optimal contracts and effort levels imply that expected terminal wealth is nonlinear in initial wealth allocation. The optimal portfolio may involve very little diversification, despite projects that are highly symmetric in the underlying model. We also show that moral hazard in one of the projects need not imply lower allocation to that project. Expected returns are generally lower than under the first-best, but the optimal contract shifts more of the idiosyncratic risk in the hidden action project to the manager in charge of it. The minimum-variance position of the investorâs (net) terminal wealth would in most cases involve a portfolio shift towards the hidden action project, and there are plausible cases where this would dominate the overall effect on the second-best optimal portfolio when comparing with the first-best.Portfolio choice; diversification; optimal contracts
Contractual relations between European VC-funds and investors: the impact of reputation and bargaining power on contractual design
The paper explores factors that influence the design of financing contracts between venture capital investors and European venture capital funds. 122 Private Placement Memoranda and 46 Partnership Agreements are investigated in respect to the use of covenant restrictions and compensation schemes. The analysis focuses on the impact of two key factors: the reputation of VC-funds and changes in the overall demand for venture capital services. We find that established funds are more severely restricted by contractual covenants. This contradicts the conventional wisdom which assumes that established market participants care more about their reputation, have less incentive to behave opportunistically and therefore need less covenant restrictions. We also find that managers of established funds are more often obliged to invest own capital alongside with investors money. We interpret this as evidence that established funds have actually less reason to care about their reputation as compared to young funds. One reason for this surprising result could be that managers of established VC funds are older and closer to retirement and therefore put less weight on the effects of their actions on future business opportunities. We also explore the effects of venture capital supply on contract design. Gompers and Lerner (1996) show that VC-funds in the US are able to reduce the number of restrictive covenants in years with high supply of venture capital and interpret this as a result of increased bargaining power by VC-funds. We do not find similar evidence for Europe. Instead, we find that VC-funds receive less base compensation and higher performance related compensation in years with strong capital inflows into the VC industry. This may be interpreted as a signal of overconfidence: Strong investor demand seems to coincide with overoptimistic expectations by fund managers which make them willing to accept higher powered incentive schemes
Using Intelligent Agents to Manage Business Processes
This paper describes work undertaken in the ADEPT (Advanced Decision Environment for Process Tasks) project towards developing an agent-based infrastructure for managing business processes. We describe how the key technology of negotiating, service providing, autonomous agents was realised and demonstrate how this was applied to the BT business process of providing a customer quote for network services
The future of securitization
Securitization is a financial innovation that experiences a boom-bust cycle, as many other innovations before. This paper analyzes possible reasons for the breakdown of primary and secondary securitization markets, and argues that misaligned incentives along the value chain are the primary cause of the problems. The illiquidity of asset and interbank markets, in this view, is a market failure derived from ill-designed mechanisms of coordinating financial intermediaries and investors. Thus, illiquidity is closely related to the design of the financial chains. Our policy conclusions emphasize crisis prevention rather than crisis management, and the objective is to restore a âcomprehensive incentive alignmentâ. The toe-hold for strengthening regulation is surprisingly small. First, we emphasize the importance of equity piece retention for the long-term quality of the underlying asset pool. As a consequence, equity piece allocation needs to be publicly known, alleviating market pricing. Second, on a micro level, accountability of managers can be improved by compensation packages aiming at long term incentives, and penalizing policies with destabilizing effects on financial markets. Third, on a macro level, increased transparency relating to effective risk transfer, risk-related management compensation, and credible measurement of rating performance stabilizes the valuation of financial assets and, hence, improves the solvency of financial intermediaries. Fourth, financial intermediaries, whose risk is opaque, may be subjected to higher capital requirements
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