Cost-sensitive Learning for Utility Optimization in Online Advertising Auctions

One of the most challenging problems in computational advertising is the prediction of click-through and conversion rates for bidding in online advertising auctions. An unaddressed problem in previous approaches is the existence of highly non-uniform misprediction costs. While for model evaluation these costs have been taken into account through recently proposed business-aware offline metrics -- such as the Utility metric which measures the impact on advertiser profit -- this is not the case when training the models themselves. In this paper, to bridge the gap, we formally analyze the relationship between optimizing the Utility metric and the log loss, which is considered as one of the state-of-the-art approaches in conversion modeling. Our analysis motivates the idea of weighting the log loss with the business value of the predicted outcome. We present and analyze a new cost weighting scheme and show that significant gains in offline and online performance can be achieved.Comment: First version of the paper was presented at NIPS 2015 Workshop on E-Commerce: https://sites.google.com/site/nips15ecommerce/papers Third version of the paper will be presented at AdKDD 2017 Workshop: adkdd17.wixsite.com/adkddtargetad201

Bid Optimization by Multivariable Control in Display Advertising

Real-Time Bidding (RTB) is an important paradigm in display advertising, where advertisers utilize extended information and algorithms served by Demand Side Platforms (DSPs) to improve advertising performance. A common problem for DSPs is to help advertisers gain as much value as possible with budget constraints. However, advertisers would routinely add certain key performance indicator (KPI) constraints that the advertising campaign must meet due to practical reasons. In this paper, we study the common case where advertisers aim to maximize the quantity of conversions, and set cost-per-click (CPC) as a KPI constraint. We convert such a problem into a linear programming problem and leverage the primal-dual method to derive the optimal bidding strategy. To address the applicability issue, we propose a feedback control-based solution and devise the multivariable control system. The empirical study based on real-word data from Taobao.com verifies the effectiveness and superiority of our approach compared with the state of the art in the industry practices

Lift-Based Bidding in Ad Selection

Real-time bidding (RTB) has become one of the largest online advertising markets in the world. Today the bid price per ad impression is typically decided by the expected value of how it can lead to a desired action event (e.g., registering an account or placing a purchase order) to the advertiser. However, this industry standard approach to decide the bid price does not consider the actual effect of the ad shown to the user, which should be measured based on the performance lift among users who have been or have not been exposed to a certain treatment of ads. In this paper, we propose a new bidding strategy and prove that if the bid price is decided based on the performance lift rather than absolute performance value, advertisers can actually gain more action events. We describe the modeling methodology to predict the performance lift and demonstrate the actual performance gain through blind A/B test with real ad campaigns in an industry-leading Demand-Side Platform (DSP). We also discuss the relationship between attribution models and bidding strategies. We prove that, to move the DSPs to bid based on performance lift, they should be rewarded according to the relative performance lift they contribute.Comment: AAAI 201

A Game-theoretic Machine Learning Approach for Revenue Maximization in Sponsored Search

Sponsored search is an important monetization channel for search engines, in which an auction mechanism is used to select the ads shown to users and determine the prices charged from advertisers. There have been several pieces of work in the literature that investigate how to design an auction mechanism in order to optimize the revenue of the search engine. However, due to some unrealistic assumptions used, the practical values of these studies are not very clear. In this paper, we propose a novel \emph{game-theoretic machine learning} approach, which naturally combines machine learning and game theory, and learns the auction mechanism using a bilevel optimization framework. In particular, we first learn a Markov model from historical data to describe how advertisers change their bids in response to an auction mechanism, and then for any given auction mechanism, we use the learnt model to predict its corresponding future bid sequences. Next we learn the auction mechanism through empirical revenue maximization on the predicted bid sequences. We show that the empirical revenue will converge when the prediction period approaches infinity, and a Genetic Programming algorithm can effectively optimize this empirical revenue. Our experiments indicate that the proposed approach is able to produce a much more effective auction mechanism than several baselines.Comment: Twenty-third International Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2013

Real-Time Bidding by Reinforcement Learning in Display Advertising

The majority of online display ads are served through real-time bidding (RTB) --- each ad display impression is auctioned off in real-time when it is just being generated from a user visit. To place an ad automatically and optimally, it is critical for advertisers to devise a learning algorithm to cleverly bid an ad impression in real-time. Most previous works consider the bid decision as a static optimization problem of either treating the value of each impression independently or setting a bid price to each segment of ad volume. However, the bidding for a given ad campaign would repeatedly happen during its life span before the budget runs out. As such, each bid is strategically correlated by the constrained budget and the overall effectiveness of the campaign (e.g., the rewards from generated clicks), which is only observed after the campaign has completed. Thus, it is of great interest to devise an optimal bidding strategy sequentially so that the campaign budget can be dynamically allocated across all the available impressions on the basis of both the immediate and future rewards. In this paper, we formulate the bid decision process as a reinforcement learning problem, where the state space is represented by the auction information and the campaign's real-time parameters, while an action is the bid price to set. By modeling the state transition via auction competition, we build a Markov Decision Process framework for learning the optimal bidding policy to optimize the advertising performance in the dynamic real-time bidding environment. Furthermore, the scalability problem from the large real-world auction volume and campaign budget is well handled by state value approximation using neural networks.Comment: WSDM 201