14 research outputs found
Secure Grouping Protocol Using a Deck of Cards
We consider a problem, which we call secure grouping, of dividing a number of
parties into some subsets (groups) in the following manner: Each party has to
know the other members of his/her group, while he/she may not know anything
about how the remaining parties are divided (except for certain public
predetermined constraints, such as the number of parties in each group). In
this paper, we construct an information-theoretically secure protocol using a
deck of physical cards to solve the problem, which is jointly executable by the
parties themselves without a trusted third party. Despite the non-triviality
and the potential usefulness of the secure grouping, our proposed protocol is
fairly simple to describe and execute. Our protocol is based on algebraic
properties of conjugate permutations. A key ingredient of our protocol is our
new techniques to apply multiplication and inverse operations to hidden
permutations (i.e., those encoded by using face-down cards), which would be of
independent interest and would have various potential applications
Generalized Related-Key Rectangle Attacks on Block Ciphers with Linear Key Schedule: Applications to SKINNY and GIFT
This paper gives a new generalized key-recovery model of related-key rectangle attacks on block ciphers with linear key schedules. The model is quite optimized and applicable to various block ciphers with linear key schedule. As a proof of work, we apply the new model to two very important block ciphers, i.e. SKINNY and GIFT, which are basic modules of many candidates of the Lightweight Cryptography (LWC) standardization project by NIST.
For SKINNY, we reduce the complexity of the best previous 27-round related-tweakey rectangle attack on SKINNY-128-384 from to . In addition, the first 28-round related-tweakey rectangle attack on SKINNY-128-384 is given, which gains one more round than before. For the case of GIFT-64, we give the first 24-round related-key rectangle attack with a time complexity , while the best previous attack on GIFT-64 only reaches 23 rounds at most
Optimal Collision Side-Channel Attacks
Collision side-channel attacks are efficient attacks against cryptographic implementations, however, optimal collision side-channel attacks and how to compute them efficiently is an open question. In this paper, we show that collision side-channel attacks can be derived using the maximum likelihood principle when the distribution of the values of the leakage function is known. This allows us to exhibit the optimal collision side-channel attack and its efficient computation. Finally, we are able to compute an upper bound for the success rate of the optimal post-processing strategy, and we show that our method and the optimal strategy have success rates close to each other. Attackers can benefit from our method as we present an efficient collision side-channel attack. Evaluators can benefit from our method as we present a tight upper bound for the success rate of the optimal strategy
How to Launch a Powerful Side-Channel Collision Attack?
Benefiting from its independence of leakage model, side-channel collision attack is one of the most common distinguishers and attracts wide attention. Although several improvements have been given, its performance on attacking a single collision value has not been significantly improved. Its optimization and efficiency is still an open problem. To solve this, we theoretically analyze the quantitative relationship between encryptions and collisions in this paper, and propose an efficient side-channel attack named Collision-Paired Correlation Attack (CPCA) for low noise scenarios to guarantee that the side with fewer samples in a collision to be detected is completely paired. This optimizes the inefficient utilization of collision information in the existing collision attacks. Moreover, to further exploit the collision information, we maximize the collision pairing, and this optimization significantly improves CPCA and extends our CPCA to large noise scenarios. Finally, to reduce computation complexity, we further optimize our CPCA to a CPA-like distinguisher. Our further theoretical study fully illustrates that our CPCA provides the upper security bound of CECA, and experimental results fully show its superiority
Snowball: Another View on Side-Channel Key Recovery Tools
The performance of Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs) decays rapidly when considering more sub-keys, making the full-key recovery a very challenging problem. Limited to independent collision information utilization, collision attacks establish the relationship among sub-keys but do not significantly slow down this trend. To solve it, we first exploit the samples from the previously attacked S-boxes to assist attacks on the targeted S-box under an assumption that similar leakage occurs in program loop or code reuse scenarios. The later considered S-boxes are easier to be recovered since more samples participate in this assist attack, which results in the ``snowball\u27\u27 effect. We name this scheme as Snowball, which significantly slows down the attenuation rate of attack performance. We further introduce confusion coefficient into the collision attack to construct collision confusion coefficient, and deduce its relationship with correlation coefficient. Based on this relationship, we give two optimizations on our Snowball exploiting the ``values\u27\u27 information and ``rankings\u27\u27 information of collision correlation coefficients named Least Deviation from Pearson correlation coefficient (PLD) and Least Deviation from confusion coefficient (CLD). Experiments show that the above optimizations significantly improve the performance of our Snowball
MILP-based Differential Attack on Round-reduced GIFT
At Asiacrypt 2014, Sun et al. proposed a MILP model to search for differential characteristics of bit-oriented block ciphers. In this paper, we improve this model to search for differential characteristics of GIFT, a new lightweight block cipher proposed at CHES 2017. GIFT has two versions, namely GIFT-64 and GIFT-128.
For GIFT-64, we find the best 12-round differential characteristic and a number of iterative 4-round differential characteristics with our MILP-based model. We give a key-recovery attack on 19-round GIFT-64.
For GIFT-128, we find a 18-round differential characteristic and give the first attack on 22-round GIFT-128
Improving the Rectangle Attack on GIFT-64
GIFT is a family of lightweight block ciphers based on SPN structure and composed of two versions named GIFT-64 and GIFT-128. In this paper, we reevaluate the security of GIFT-64 against the rectangle attack under the related-key setting. Investigating the previous rectangle key recovery attack on GIFT-64, we obtain the core idea of improving the attack——trading off the time complexity of each attack phase. We flexibly guess part of the involved subkey bits to balance the time cost of each phase so that the overall time complexity of the attack is reduced. Moreover, the reused subkey bits are identified according to the linear key schedule of GIFT-64 and bring additional advantages for our attacks. Furthermore, we incorporate the above ideas and propose a dedicated MILP model for finding the best rectangle key recovery attack on GIFT-64. As a result, we get the improved rectangle attacks on 26-round GIFT-64, which are the best attacks on it in terms of time complexity so far
CoTree: Push the Limits of Conquerable Space in Collision-Optimized Side-Channel Attacks
By introducing collision information into side-channel distinguishers, the existing collision-optimized attacks exploit collision detection algorithm to transform the original candidate space under consideration into a significantly smaller collision chain space, thus achieving more efficient key recovery. However, collision information is detected very repeatedly since collision chains are created from the same sub-chains, i.e., with the same candidates on their first several sub-keys. This aggravates when exploiting more collision information. The existing collision detection algorithms try to alleviate this, but the problem is still very serious. In this paper, we propose a highly-efficient detection algorithm named Collision Tree (CoTree) for collision-optimized attacks. CoTree exploits tree structure to store the chains creating from the same sub-chain on the same branch. It then exploits a top-down tree building procedure and traverses each node only once when detecting their collisions with a candidate of the sub-key currently under consideration. Finally, it launches a bottom-up branch removal procedure to remove the chains unsatisfying the collision conditions from the tree after traversing all candidates (within given threshold) of this sub-key, thus avoiding the traversal of the branches satisfying the collision condition. These strategies make our CoTree significantly alleviate the repetitive collision detection, and our experiments verify that it significantly outperforms the existing works
A Reaction Attack against Cryptosystems based on LRPC Codes
Rank metric is a very promising research direction for code-based cryptography. In fact, thanks to the high complexity of generic decoding attacks against codes in this metric, it is possible to easily select parameters that yield very small data sizes. In this paper we analyze cryptosystems based on Low-Rank Parity-Check (LRPC) codes, one of the classes of codes that are efficiently decodable in the rank metric. We show how to exploit the decoding failure rate, which is an inherent feature
of these codes, to devise a reaction attack aimed at recovering the private key. As a case study, we cryptanalyze the recent McNie submission to NIST’s Post-Quantum Standardization process. Additionally, we provide details of a simple implementation to validate our approach
Improved Attacks on GIFT-64
One of the well-known superiorities of GIFT-64 over PRESENT lies in the correction of the strong linear hull effect. However, apart from the investigation of the 9-round linear hull effect in the design document, we find no linear attack result on GIFT-64. Although we do not doubt the security of GIFT-64 regarding the linear cryptanalysis, the actual resistance of the cipher to the linear attack should be evaluated since it promotes a comprehensive perception of the soundness of GIFT-64. Motivated by this observation, we implement an automatic search and find a 12-round linear distinguisher whose dominating trail is an optimal linear characteristic. Following that, the first 19-round linear attack is launched by utilising the newly identified distinguisher. On the other side, we notice that the previous differential attack of GIFT-64 covering 20 rounds claims the entire codebook. To reduce the data complexity of the 20-round attack, we apply the automatic method to exhaustively check 13-round differential trails with probabilities no less than and identify multiple 13-round differentials facilitating 20-round attacks without using the full codebook. One of the candidate differentials with the maximum probability and the minimum number of guessed subkey bits is then employed to realise the first 20-round differential attack without relying on the complete codebook. Given the newly obtained results, we conjecture that the resistances of GIFT-64 against differential and linear attacks do not have a significant gap. Also, we note that the attack results in this paper are far from threatening the security of GIFT-64