789 research outputs found
A Survey on Wireless Security: Technical Challenges, Recent Advances and Future Trends
This paper examines the security vulnerabilities and threats imposed by the
inherent open nature of wireless communications and to devise efficient defense
mechanisms for improving the wireless network security. We first summarize the
security requirements of wireless networks, including their authenticity,
confidentiality, integrity and availability issues. Next, a comprehensive
overview of security attacks encountered in wireless networks is presented in
view of the network protocol architecture, where the potential security threats
are discussed at each protocol layer. We also provide a survey of the existing
security protocols and algorithms that are adopted in the existing wireless
network standards, such as the Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, WiMAX, and the long-term
evolution (LTE) systems. Then, we discuss the state-of-the-art in
physical-layer security, which is an emerging technique of securing the open
communications environment against eavesdropping attacks at the physical layer.
We also introduce the family of various jamming attacks and their
counter-measures, including the constant jammer, intermittent jammer, reactive
jammer, adaptive jammer and intelligent jammer. Additionally, we discuss the
integration of physical-layer security into existing authentication and
cryptography mechanisms for further securing wireless networks. Finally, some
technical challenges which remain unresolved at the time of writing are
summarized and the future trends in wireless security are discussed.Comment: 36 pages. Accepted to Appear in Proceedings of the IEEE, 201
Security analysis of JXME-Proxyless version
JXME es la especificación de JXTA para dispositivos móviles con J2ME. Hay dos versiones diferentes de la aplicación JXME disponibles, cada una específica para un determinado conjunto de dispositivos, de acuerdo con sus capacidades. El principal valor de JXME es su simplicidad para crear peer-to-peer (P2P) en dispositivos limitados. Además de evaluar las funciones JXME, también es importante tener en cuenta el nivel de seguridad por defecto que se proporciona. Este artículo presenta un breve análisis de la situación actual de la seguridad en JXME, centrándose en la versión JXME-Proxyless, identifica las vulnerabilidades existentes y propone mejoras en este campo.JXME és l'especificació de JXTA per a dispositius mòbils amb J2ME. Hi ha dues versions diferents de l'aplicació JXME disponibles, cada una d'específica per a un determinat conjunt de dispositius, d'acord amb les seves capacitats. El principal valor de JXME és la seva simplicitat per crear peer-to-peer (P2P) en dispositius limitats. A més d'avaluar les funcions JXME, també és important tenir en compte el nivell de seguretat per defecte que es proporciona. Aquest article presenta un breu anàlisis de la situació actual de la seguretat en JXME, centrant-se en la versió JXME-Proxyless, identifica les vulnerabilitats existents i proposa millores en aquest camp.JXME is the JXTA specification for mobile devices using J2ME. Two different flavors of JXME implementation are available, each one specific for a particular set of devices, according to their capabilities. The main value of JXME is its simplicity to create peer-to-peer (P2P) applications in limited devices. In addition to assessing JXME functionalities, it is also important to realize the default security level provided. This paper presents a brief analysis of the current state of security in JXME, focusing on the JXME-Proxyless version, identifies existing vulnerabilities and proposes further improvements in this field
Survey and Systematization of Secure Device Pairing
Secure Device Pairing (SDP) schemes have been developed to facilitate secure
communications among smart devices, both personal mobile devices and Internet
of Things (IoT) devices. Comparison and assessment of SDP schemes is
troublesome, because each scheme makes different assumptions about out-of-band
channels and adversary models, and are driven by their particular use-cases. A
conceptual model that facilitates meaningful comparison among SDP schemes is
missing. We provide such a model. In this article, we survey and analyze a wide
range of SDP schemes that are described in the literature, including a number
that have been adopted as standards. A system model and consistent terminology
for SDP schemes are built on the foundation of this survey, which are then used
to classify existing SDP schemes into a taxonomy that, for the first time,
enables their meaningful comparison and analysis.The existing SDP schemes are
analyzed using this model, revealing common systemic security weaknesses among
the surveyed SDP schemes that should become priority areas for future SDP
research, such as improving the integration of privacy requirements into the
design of SDP schemes. Our results allow SDP scheme designers to create schemes
that are more easily comparable with one another, and to assist the prevention
of persisting the weaknesses common to the current generation of SDP schemes.Comment: 34 pages, 5 figures, 3 tables, accepted at IEEE Communications
Surveys & Tutorials 2017 (Volume: PP, Issue: 99
Attack Resilience and Recovery using Physical Challenge Response Authentication for Active Sensors Under Integrity Attacks
Embedded sensing systems are pervasively used in life- and security-critical
systems such as those found in airplanes, automobiles, and healthcare.
Traditional security mechanisms for these sensors focus on data encryption and
other post-processing techniques, but the sensors themselves often remain
vulnerable to attacks in the physical/analog domain. If an adversary
manipulates a physical/analog signal prior to digitization, no amount of
digital security mechanisms after the fact can help. Fortunately, nature
imposes fundamental constraints on how these analog signals can behave. This
work presents PyCRA, a physical challenge-response authentication scheme
designed to protect active sensing systems against physical attacks occurring
in the analog domain. PyCRA provides security for active sensors by continually
challenging the surrounding environment via random but deliberate physical
probes. By analyzing the responses to these probes, and by using the fact that
the adversary cannot change the underlying laws of physics, we provide an
authentication mechanism that not only detects malicious attacks but provides
resilience against them. We demonstrate the effectiveness of PyCRA through
several case studies using two sensing systems: (1) magnetic sensors like those
found wheel speed sensors in robotics and automotive, and (2) commercial RFID
tags used in many security-critical applications. Finally, we outline methods
and theoretical proofs for further enhancing the resilience of PyCRA to active
attacks by means of a confusion phase---a period of low signal to noise ratio
that makes it more difficult for an attacker to correctly identify and respond
to PyCRA's physical challenges. In doing so, we evaluate both the robustness
and the limitations of PyCRA, concluding by outlining practical considerations
as well as further applications for the proposed authentication mechanism.Comment: Shorter version appeared in ACM ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications (CCS) 201
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