A Portable Active Binocular Robot Vision Architecture for Scene Exploration

We present a portable active binocular robot vision archi- tecture that integrates a number of visual behaviours. This vision archi- tecture inherits the abilities of vergence, localisation, recognition and si- multaneous identification of multiple target object instances. To demon- strate the portability of our vision architecture, we carry out qualitative and comparative analysis under two different hardware robotic settings, feature extraction techniques and viewpoints. Our portable active binoc- ular robot vision architecture achieved average recognition rates of 93.5% for fronto-parallel viewpoints and, 83% percentage for anthropomorphic viewpoints, respectively

Change blindness: eradication of gestalt strategies

Arrays of eight, texture-defined rectangles were used as stimuli in a one-shot change blindness (CB) task where there was a 50% chance that one rectangle would change orientation between two successive presentations separated by an interval. CB was eliminated by cueing the target rectangle in the first stimulus, reduced by cueing in the interval and unaffected by cueing in the second presentation. This supports the idea that a representation was formed that persisted through the interval before being 'overwritten' by the second presentation (Landman et al, 2003 Vision Research 43149–164]. Another possibility is that participants used some kind of grouping or Gestalt strategy. To test this we changed the spatial position of the rectangles in the second presentation by shifting them along imaginary spokes (by ±1 degree) emanating from the central fixation point. There was no significant difference seen in performance between this and the standard task [F(1,4)=2.565, p=0.185]. This may suggest two things: (i) Gestalt grouping is not used as a strategy in these tasks, and (ii) it gives further weight to the argument that objects may be stored and retrieved from a pre-attentional store during this task

Binocular fusion and invariant category learning due to predictive remapping during scanning of a depthful scene with eye movements

How does the brain maintain stable fusion of 3D scenes when the eyes move? Every eye movement causes each retinal position to process a different set of scenic features, and thus the brain needs to binocularly fuse new combinations of features at each position after an eye movement. Despite these breaks in retinotopic fusion due to each movement, previously fused representations of a scene in depth often appear stable. The 3D ARTSCAN neural model proposes how the brain does this by unifying concepts about how multiple cortical areas in the What and Where cortical streams interact to coordinate processes of 3D boundary and surface perception, spatial attention, invariant object category learning, predictive remapping, eye movement control, and learned coordinate transformations. The model explains data from single neuron and psychophysical studies of covert visual attention shifts prior to eye movements. The model further clarifies how perceptual, attentional, and cognitive interactions among multiple brain regions (LGN, V1, V2, V3A, V4, MT, MST, PPC, LIP, ITp, ITa, SC) may accomplish predictive remapping as part of the process whereby view-invariant object categories are learned. These results build upon earlier neural models of 3D vision and figure-ground separation and the learning of invariant object categories as the eyes freely scan a scene. A key process concerns how an object's surface representation generates a form-fitting distribution of spatial attention, or attentional shroud, in parietal cortex that helps maintain the stability of multiple perceptual and cognitive processes. Predictive eye movement signals maintain the stability of the shroud, as well as of binocularly fused perceptual boundaries and surface representations.Published versio

Vision, Action, and Make-Perceive

In this paper, I critically assess the enactive account of visual perception recently defended by Alva Noë (2004). I argue inter alia that the enactive account falsely identifies an object’s apparent shape with its 2D perspectival shape; that it mistakenly assimilates visual shape perception and volumetric object recognition; and that it seriously misrepresents the constitutive role of bodily action in visual awareness. I argue further that noticing an object’s perspectival shape involves a hybrid experience combining both perceptual and imaginative elements – an act of what I call ‘make-perceive.

Seeing the invisible: The scope and limits of unconscious processing in binocular rivalry

When an image is presented to one eye and a very different image is presented to the corresponding location of the other eye, they compete for conscious representation, such that only one image is visible at a time while the other is suppressed. Called binocular rivalry, this phenomenon and its deviants have been extensively exploited to study the mechanism and neural correlates of consciousness. In this paper, we propose a framework, the unconscious binding hypothesis, to distinguish unconscious processing from conscious processing. According to this framework, the unconscious mind not only encodes individual features but also temporally binds distributed features to give rise to cortical representation, but unlike conscious binding, such unconscious binding is fragile. Under this framework, we review evidence from psychophysical and neuroimaging studies, which suggests that: (1) for invisible low level features, prolonged exposure to visual pattern and simple translational motion can alter the appearance of subsequent visible features (i.e. adaptation); for invisible high level features, although complex spiral motion cannot produce adaptation, nor can objects/words enhance subsequent processing of related stimuli (i.e. priming), images of tools can nevertheless activate the dorsal pathway; and (2) although invisible central cues cannot orient attention, invisible erotic pictures in the periphery can nevertheless guide attention, likely through emotional arousal; reciprocally, the processing of invisible information can be modulated by attention at perceptual and neural levels

Robust visual servoing in 3d reaching tasks

This paper describes a novel approach to the problem of reaching an object in space under visual guidance. The approach is characterized by a great robustness to calibration errors, such that virtually no calibration is required. Servoing is based on binocular vision: a continuous measure of the end-effector motion field, derived from real-time computation of the binocular optical flow over the stereo images, is compared with the actual position of the target and the relative error in the end-effector trajectory is continuously corrected. The paper outlines the general framework of the approach, shows how visual measures are obtained and discusses the synthesis of the controller along with its stability analysis. Real-time experiments are presented to show the applicability of the approach in real 3-D applications

Egocentric Spatial Representation in Action and Perception

Neuropsychological findings used to motivate the “two visual systems” hypothesis have been taken to endanger a pair of widely accepted claims about spatial representation in visual experience. The first is the claim that visual experience represents 3-D space around the perceiver using an egocentric frame of reference. The second is the claim that there is a constitutive link between the spatial contents of visual experience and the perceiver’s bodily actions. In this paper, I carefully assess three main sources of evidence for the two visual systems hypothesis and argue that the best interpretation of the evidence is in fact consistent with both claims. I conclude with some brief remarks on the relation between visual consciousness and rational agency