31 research outputs found
Accountable Trapdoor Sanitizable Signatures
Abstract. Sanitizable signature (SS) allows a signer to partly delegate signing rights to a predeter-mined party, called sanitizer, who can later modify certain designated parts of a message originally signed by the signer and generate a new signature on the sanitized message without interacting with the signer. One of the important security requirements of sanitizable signatures is accountability, which allows the signer to prove, in case of dispute, to a third party that a message was modified by the sanitizer. Trapdoor sanitizable signature (TSS) enables a signer of a message to delegate the power of sanitization to any parties at anytime but at the expense of losing the accountability property. In this paper, we introduce the notion of accountable trapdoor sanitizable signature (ATSS) which lies between SS and TSS. As a building block for constructing ATSS, we also introduce the notion of accountable chameleon hash (ACH), which is an extension of chameleon hash (CH) and might be of independent interest. We propose a concrete construction of ACH and show how to use it to construct an ATSS scheme
Chameleon-Hashes with Dual Long-Term Trapdoors and Their Applications
A chameleon-hash behaves likes a standard collision-resistant hash function for outsiders. If, however, a trapdoor is known, arbitrary collisions can be found. Chameleon-hashes with ephemeral trapdoors (CHET; Camenisch et al., PKC ’17) allow prohibiting that the holder of the long-term trapdoor can find collisions by introducing a second, ephemeral, trapdoor. However, this ephemeral trapdoor is required to be chosen freshly for each hash. We extend these ideas and introduce the notion of chameleon-hashes with dual long-term trapdoors (CHDLTT). Here, the second trapdoor is not chosen freshly for each new hash; Rather, the hashing party can decide if it wants to generate a fresh second trapdoor or use an existing one. This primitive generalizes CHETs, extends their applicability and enables some appealing new use-cases, including three-party sanitizable signatures, group-level selectively revocable signatures and break-the-glass signatures. We present two provably secure constructions and an implementation which demonstrates that this extended primitive is efficient enough for use in practice
Rethinking Privacy for Extended Sanitizable Signatures and a Black-Box Construction of Strongly Private Schemes
Sanitizable signatures, introduced by Ateniese et al. at ESORICS\u2705, allow to issue a signature on a message where certain predefined message blocks may later be changed (sanitized) by some dedicated party (the sanitizer) without invalidating the original signature. With sanitizable signatures, replacements for modifiable (admissible) message blocks can be chosen arbitrarily by the sanitizer. However, in various scenarios this makes sanitizers too powerful. To reduce the sanitizers power, Klonowski and Lauks at ICISC\u2706 proposed (among others) an extension that enables the signer to limit the allowed modifications per admissible block to a well defined set each. At CT-RSA\u2710 Canard and Jambert then extended the formal model of Brzuska et al. from PKC\u2709 to additionally include the aforementioned and other extensions. We, however, observe that the privacy guarantees of their model do not capture privacy in the sense of the original definition of sanitizable signatures. That is, if a scheme is private in this model it is not guaranteed that the sets of allowed modifications remain concealed. To this end, we review a stronger notion of privacy, i.e., (strong) unlinkability (defined by Brzuska et al. at EuroPKI\u2713), in this context. While unlinkability fixes this problem, no efficient unlinkable scheme supporting the aforementioned extensions exists and it seems to be hard to construct such schemes. As a remedy, in this paper, we propose a notion stronger than privacy, but weaker than unlinkability, which captures privacy in the original sense. Moreover, it allows to easily construct efficient schemes satisfying our notion from secure existing schemes in a black-box fashion
Chameleon-Hashes with Ephemeral Trapdoors And Applications to Invisible Sanitizable Signatures
A chameleon-hash function is a hash function that involves a trapdoor the knowledge of which allows one to find arbitrary collisions in the domain of the function. In this paper, we introduce the notion of chameleon-hash functions with ephemeral trapdoors. Such hash functions feature additional, i.e., ephemeral, trapdoors which are chosen by the party computing a hash value. The holder of the main trapdoor is then unable to find a second pre-image of a hash value unless also provided with the ephemeral trapdoor used to compute the hash value. We present a formal security model for this new primitive as well as provably secure instantiations. The first instantiation is a generic black-box construction from any secure chameleon-hash function. We further provide three direct constructions based on standard assumptions. Our new primitive has some appealing use-cases, including a solution to the long-standing open problem of invisible sanitizable signatures, which we also present
Unlinkable Policy-based Sanitizable Signatures
In CT-RSA 2020, P3S was proposed as the first policy-based sanitizable signature scheme which allows the signer to designate future message sanitizers by defining an access policy relative to their attributes rather than their keys. However, since P3S utilizes a policy-based chameleon hash (PCH), it does not achieve unlinkability which is a required notion in privacy-preserving applications. Moreover, P3S requires running a procedure to share the secret trapdoor information for PCH with each new sanitizer before sanitizing a new message. We further observe that in order to maintain the transparency in P3S’s multiple-sanitizers setting, the signature size should grow linearly with the number of sanitizers. In this work, we propose an unlinkable policy-based sanitizable signature scheme (UP3S) where we employ a rerandomizable digital signature scheme and a traceable attribute-based signature scheme as its building blocks. Compared to P3S, UP3S achieves unlinkability, does not require new secrets to be shared with future sanitizers prior to sanitizing each message, and has a fixed signature size for a given sanitization policy. We define and formally prove the security notions of the generic scheme, propose an instantiation of UP3S utilizing the Pointcheval-Sanders rerandomizable signature scheme and DTABS traceable attribute-based signature scheme, and analyze its efficiency. Finally, we compare UP3S with P3S in terms of the features of the procedures, scalability, and security models
Policy-Based Sanitizable Signatures
Sanitizable signatures are a variant of signatures which allow a single, and signer-defined, sanitizer to modify signed messages in a controlled way without invalidating the respective signature. They turned out to be a versatile primitive, proven by different variants and extensions, e.g., allowing multiple sanitizers or adding
new sanitizers one-by-one. However, existing constructions are very restricted regarding their flexibility in specifying potential sanitizers.
We propose a different and more powerful approach: Instead of using sanitizers\u27 public keys directly,
we assign attributes to them. Sanitizing is then based on policies, i.e., access structures defined over attributes.
A sanitizer can sanitize, if, and only if, it holds a secret key to attributes satisfying the policy associated to a signature,
while offering full-scale accountability
Stronger Security for Sanitizable Signatures
Sanitizable signature schemes (SSS) enable a designated party (called the sanitizer ) to alter admissible
blocks of a signed message. This primitive can be used to remove or alter sensitive data from already signed
messages without involvement of the original signer.
Current state-of-the-art security definitions of SSSs only dene a \weak form of security. Namely, the unforgeability,
accountability and transparency definitions are not strong enough to be meaningful in certain use-cases. We
identify some of these use-cases, close this gap by introducing stronger definitions, and show how to alter an
existing construction to meet our desired security level. Moreover, we clarify a small yet important detail in the
state-of-the-art privacy definition. Our work allows to deploy this primitive in more and different scenarios
Practical Strongly Invisible and Strongly Accountable Sanitizable Signatures
Sanitizable signatures are a variant of digital signatures where a designated party (the sanitizer) can
update admissible parts of a signed message. At PKC’17, Camenisch et al. introduced the notion of invisible
sanitizable signatures that hides from an outsider which parts of a message are admissible. Their security definition of
invisibility, however, does not consider dishonest signers. Along the same lines, their signer-accountability definition
does not prevent the signer from falsely accusing the sanitizer of having issued a signature on a sanitized message
by exploiting the malleability of the signature itself. Both issues may limit the usefulness of their scheme in certain
applications.
We revise their definitional framework, and present a new construction eliminating these shortcomings. In contrast
to Camenisch et al.’s construction, ours requires only standard building blocks instead of chameleon hashes with
ephemeral trapdoors. This makes this, now even stronger, primitive more attractive for practical use. We underpin
the practical efficiency of our scheme by concrete benchmarks of a prototype implementation
Protean Signature Schemes
We introduce the notion of Protean Signature schemes. This novel type of signature scheme allows to
remove and edit signer-chosen parts of signed messages by a semi-trusted third party simultaneously. In existing
work, one is either allowed to remove or edit parts of signed messages, but not both at the same time. Which and
how parts of the signed messages can be modified is chosen by the signer. Thus, our new primitive generalizes both
redactable (Steinfeld et al., ICISC \u2701, Johnson et al., CT-RSA \u2702 & Brzuska et al., ACNS\u2710) and sanitizable
signatures schemes (Ateniese et al., ESORICS \u2705 & Brzuska et al., PKC\u2709). We showcase a scenario where either
primitive alone is not sufficient. Our provably secure construction (offering both strong notions of transparency and
invisibility) makes only black-box access to sanitizable and redactable signature schemes, which can be considered
standard tools nowadays. Finally, we have implemented our scheme; Our evaluation shows that the performance is
reasonable