The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DoD’s Expanding Role

One of the most striking trends in U.S. foreign aid policy is the surging role of the Department of Defense (DoD). The Pentagon now accounts for over 20 percent of U.S. official development assistance (ODA). DoD has also expanded its provision of non-ODA assistance, including training and equipping of foreign military forces in fragile states. These trends raise concerns that U.S. foreign and development policies may become subordinated to a narrow, short-term security agenda at the expense of broader, longer-term diplomatic goals and institution-building efforts in the developing world. We find that the overwhelming bulk of ODA provided directly by DoD goes to Iraq and Afghanistan, which are violent environments that require the military to take a lead role through instruments like Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the use of Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds. This funding surge is in principle temporary and likely to disappear when the U.S. involvement in both wars ends. But beyond these two conflicts, DoD has expanded (or proposes to expand) its operations in the developing world to include a number of activities that might be more appropriately undertaken by the State Department, USAID and other civilian actors. These initiatives include: the use of “Section 1206” authorities to train and equip foreign security forces; the establishment of the new Combatant Command for Africa (AFRICOM); and the administration’s proposed Building Global Partnerships (BGP) Act, which would expand DoD’s assistance authorities. We attribute the Pentagon’s growing aid role to three factors: the Bush administration’s strategic focus on the “global war on terror”; the vacuum left by civilian agencies, which struggle to deploy adequate numbers of personnel and to deliver assistance in insecure environments; and chronic under-investment by the United States in non-military instruments of state-building. We believe that DoD’s growing aid role beyond our two theaters of war carries potentially significant risks, by threatening to displace or overshadow broader U.S. foreign policy and development objectives in target countries and exacerbating the longstanding imbalance between the military and civilian components of the U.S. approach to state-building.Department of Defense, development, foriegn aid

The Strategy - Ending Globalization Disorders

Scientifically, globalization is a pure-form or model that refers to a condition whereby a dominant state unilaterally or multilaterally maintains a balance of power to fail member states in the international system it dominates. Globalization can be implemented exclusively or inclusively under blocs (regional) or International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) as means of the balance of power for the failure of states. This is the theme that this article pursues to objectively examine the current globalization regime as the function of two arms of the balance of power applied to fail states in the international system. One arm of the current globalization regime applies interest-lending of the Bretton Woods institutions namely, International Bank for Reconstruction (IBRD)/World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). The other arm uses the strategy of resource wars. The problem is that interest charges of the World Bank and IMF have failed to cause real domestic growth in 185 states since the initial Ten/Five-year Development Plans, 1946/51-56. This is seen in the domestic and foreign debt burdens arising out of loan interests of the IBRD/World Bank and IMF. There have been more than 136 resource wars that have caused over 250 million deaths (market value loss of over USD 500 trillion) in the period 1946 to date. The unit of analysis of the paper is that the previous and current strategies of globalization have been illegitimate, severely violated fundamental human right, contravened business ethics and caused the failure states. Thus, the Bretton Woods system has not, and will not as it stands, benefit USA and her allied member states and the Third World inclusive. Legally and morally, Latin American states who signed the Bretton Woods Agreements in 1944 were not in-due-form: African, Asian and Eastern European states were not represented; and given the most compelling fact that others from Europe (e.g. Germany) and Japan agreed in the unique historical moment, the logical conclusion is that the liberty and fundamental freedoms and rights of member states have since been violated by the IBRD/World Bank and IMF interest-lending. (i) The paper recommends among others a new formula for the re-creation a humanistic international monetary authority that will benefit all stakeholders without interfering in the balance of power. To say the least, interest lending of the Bretton Woods systems was appropriated from the 1545 Act ("An Acte Agaynst Usurie", 37 H.viii 9), which must be replaced with the humanistic monetary formula that maintains the balance of power to the lender, and also agreeable with international business ethics and human rights. (ii) This will multiply earnings of the world bank group to over 150 %. (iii) Over 3 billion out of the 6,8 billion people who had abandoned or feared interest-lending of commercial banks will join the industry - hence pulling over 150 % earnings. (iv) Employment will increase to more than 60 %. (v) Inflation will fall to 3 %. (vi) Local and investor confidence will rise, hence enlarging the financial market. (vii) There is urgent need for creating new geographies of the peace by closing Western driven ethnic battle frontlines that emerged with Huntington's new pattern of conflict (1990s to date).globalisation, Africa, Bretton Woods system, international organisations

Smart Power for Hard Problems: The Role of Special Operation Forces Strengthening the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Africa

This article will assess the roles and responsibilities of Special Operations Forces (SOF) within the newly created U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) as an active proponent of a so-called “smart power” national security strategy. In particular, it will outline the economic, political, and military challenges faced in Africa; specifically, how and why SOCAFRICA is the U.S. force of choice for promoting human rights and rule of law in Africa. With the goals of the U.S. military in mind, questions will necessarily arise as to “what success looks like” for both the U.S. and African nations, and the roles of each in joint and combined civil–military initiatives. The concluding comments reflect on how these forces must model “what right looks like,” and provide specific modeling failures, and the consequences when that modeling did not take place

The USA-Africa command and USA foreign policy on Africa

Research report submitted to the University of the Witwatersrand School of Governance, Johannesburg, in partial fulfilment for the Masters of Management (Public and Development Management). Masters of Management in Security March 2015The establishment of AFRICOM was met with a wave of criticism from African leaders as well as from members within the American government. Despite the seemingly lofty declarations by the USA about the purpose of AFRICOM, the enthusiasm was not shared by all African leaders. This study explored the reasons for the establishment of the USA-Africa Command, AFRICOM. In doing so, it also examined the reaction of African leaders after the announcement of the establishment of AFRICOM. The study further looked at the reasons behind the lack of appreciation by African leaders for a unilateral decision by the USA to establish a military Command on the African continent. This study further investigated whether the USA military footprint in Africa increased since the establishment of AFRICOM as well as the security implications for Africa since AFRICOM’s establishment. Thus the study confirmed an earlier assertion that AFRICOM needs to stabilise the African continent for USA’s economic onslaught. The initial fears of USA’s interference and dominance on the continent is thus far unfounded, as unified African opposition to AFRICOM forced the USA to change track regarding some of its plans regarding AFRICOM. An initial charge that AFRICOM is another form of colonisation of Africa by the USA cannot be borne out by this research. The study showed that significant developments took place in Africa in the last decade, changing it from a “hopeless” continent to a continent “rising”. This has focused the world’s attention, such as superpowers like USA and China, and emerging giants like Russia, Brazil and India, on Africa. This led to a dramatic shift in USA foreign policy towards Africa, giving rise to the birth of AFRICOM in 2007

The Effects of American Involvement in Northern Uganda\u27s Conflict with the Lord\u27s Resistance Army

This project explores the impact of American governmental and non-governmental actors in the Lord\u27s Resistance Army (LRA) conflict in northern Uganda and southern Sudan, particularly the U.S. military, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and various non-governmental organizations (NGOs). It also examines the efficacy of these various forms of intervention, specifically the deployment of U.S. Special Forces tracking the LRA, and the initiation of various soldier reintegration, governance, and sustainability programs organized by USAID and NGOs such as Invisible Children. Additionally, this project seeks to uncover underlying geopolitical objectives, such as gaining alliances in the \u27Global War on Terror\u27 and protecting regional oil interests, that have motivated these U.S. government policies. Overall, this project has sought to critically examine the impact of American involvement in the northern Uganda conflict, both positive and negative, and evaluate the human impact of these international geopolitical influences on the people of northern Uganda, southern Sudan, and beyond

Djibouti: changing influence in the Horn's strategic hub

Change in Djibouti’s economic and strategic options has been driven by four factors: the Ethiopian–Eritrean war of 1998–2000, the impact of Ethiopia's economic transformation and growth upon trade; shifts in US strategy since 9/11, and the upsurge in piracy along the Gulf of Aden and Somali coasts. With the expansion of the US AFRICOM base, the reconfiguration of France's military presence and the establishment of Japanese and other military facilities, Djibouti has become an international maritime and military laboratory where new forms of cooperation are being developed. Djibouti has accelerated plans for regional economic integration. Building on close ties with Ethiopia, existing port upgrades and electricity grid integration will be enhanced by the development of the northern port of Tadjourah. These strategic and economic shifts have yet to be matched by internal political reforms, and growth needs to be linked to strategies for job creation and a renewal of domestic political legitimacy

Smart Power for Hard Problems: The Role of Special Operation Forces Strengthening the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Africa

This article will assess the roles and responsibilities of Special Operations Forces (SOF) within the newly created U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) as an active proponent of a so-called “smart power” national security strategy. In particular, it will outline the economic, political, and military challenges faced in Africa; specifically, how and why SOCAFRICA is the U.S. force of choice for promoting human rights and rule of law in Africa. With the goals of the U.S. military in mind, questions will necessarily arise as to “what success looks like” for both the U.S. and African nations, and the roles of each in joint and combined civil–military initiatives. The concluding comments reflect on how these forces must model “what right looks like,” and provide specific modeling failures, and the consequences when that modeling did not take place

Redesigning the Senior Leader Engagement Program of the United States Africa Command

AFRICOM conducts hundreds of senior leader engagements (SLEs) each year throughout the African continent in order to create strategic partnerships and military relationships that preserve American interests abroad. While AFRICOM has been planning and executing these engagements since the inception of the organization in 2008, it lacks a well-defined method to systemize its SLE process. As a result, SLE development is largely ad hoc, potentially decreasing the strategic effectiveness of the engagements and increasing their cost. This paper delineates a decision-making framework to redesign and enhance AFRICOM’s SLE program. In particular, it posits a multiple objective decision analysis model that quantifies key stakeholder values and develops several alternatives for future evaluation. Of note, potential solutions imagine a more expansive system where subsets of Senior Leaders (SLs) are assigned to clusters of African countries based on the SLs’ similarity to countries within each cluster, providing a basis for relationship ownership and mutual trust

AFRICOM at 5 Years: The Maturation of a New U.S. Combatant Command

View the Executive SummaryThe U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), newest of the six U.S. Department of Defense geographic combatant commands (CCMDs), was created in 2007 amid great controversy in both Africa and the United States over its location and mission. Over the last 5 years, AFRICOM has matured greatly, overcoming much of the initial resistance from African stakeholders through careful public messaging, and by addressing most of the U.S. interagency concerns about the Command’s size and proper role within the U.S. national security/foreign policy community. This Letort Paper describes the geostrategic, operational, and intellectual changes that explain why AFRICOM was created, and debunks three myths about AFRICOM: that it was created to “exploit” Africa\u27s oil and gas riches, “blocks” China’s rise in Africa, and that France “opposes” AFRICOM. The author concludes by raising five issues that are important to AFRICOM’s future: 1) allocated forces to carry out short-term training engagements in Africa; 2) preference to emerging democracies in the selection of the Command’s partner-nations; 3) the desirability of regional approaches in Africa, including helping the African Union and its Regional Economic Communities to establish standby brigades; 4) the location of the Command’s headquarters, which should remain in Stuttgart, Germany, for operational efficiency; and, 5) the need to carry out a top-down “right-sizing” exercise at AFRICOM during a time of severe budget constraints and a real risk for the United States of “strategic insolvency.”https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1319/thumbnail.jp

AFRICOM\u27s Impact on International and Human Security: A Case Study of Tanzania

The expansion of U.S. military engagement in Africa is based on American national security interests. The objective of this research was to add to existing evaluations of the U.S. Combatant Command for Africa (AFRICOM) by taking an in-depth look at its impact through a case study of Tanzania and sought to answer three questions: What is the impact of AFRICOM on executing U.S. national security policy in Tanzania? To what extent has AFRICOM addressed the conditions of human insecurity in Tanzania? What is the public perception about AFRICOM among the Tanzanian public? To answer these questions this assessment utilized secondary source materials, content analysis of Tanzanian newspapers and an online discussion forum, and interviews with U.S. officials. This analysis found that AFRICOM is more of a traditional combatant command than the whole of government command articulated at its inception, and primarily emphasizes military-to-military partner capacity building. The evidence shows that AFRICOM has a positive impact on U.S. national security policy in Tanzania, but fails to address human security matters, and the Tanzanian public has a largely negative view of the U.S. military organization. These findings suggest a closer look at policy implications for American relations with other states in the region