

Working Paper Number 131 November 2007

The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DoD's Expanding Role By Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown

Abstract

One of the most striking trends in U.S. foreign aid policy is the surging role of the Department of Defense (DoD). The Pentagon now accounts for over 20 percent of U.S. official development assistance (ODA). DoD has also expanded its provision of non-ODA assistance, including training and equipping of foreign military forces in fragile states. These trends raise concerns that U.S. foreign and development policies may become subordinated to a narrow, short-term security agenda at the expense of broader, longer-term diplomatic goals and institution-building efforts in the developing world. We find that the overwhelming bulk of ODA provided directly by DoD goes to Iraq and Afghanistan, which are violent environments that require the military to take a lead role through instruments like Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the use of Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds. This funding surge is in principle temporary and likely to disappear when the U.S. involvement in both wars ends. But beyond these two conflicts, DoD has expanded (or proposes to expand) its operations in the developing world to include a number of activities that might be more appropriately undertaken by the State Department, USAID and other civilian actors. These initiatives include: the use of "Section 1206" authorities to train and equip foreign security forces; the establishment of the new Combatant Command for Africa (AFRICOM); and the administration's proposed Building Global Partnerships (BGP) Act, which would expand DoD's assistance authorities.

We attribute the Pentagon's growing aid role to three factors: the Bush administration's strategic focus on the "global war on terror"; the vacuum left by civilian agencies, which struggle to deploy adequate numbers of personnel and to deliver assistance in insecure environments; and chronic under-investment by the United States in non-military instruments of state-building. We believe that DoD's growing aid role beyond our two theaters of war carries potentially significant risks, by threatening to displace or overshadow broader U.S. foreign policy and development objectives in target countries and exacerbating the longstanding imbalance between the military and civilian components of the U.S. approach to state-building.

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The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DoD's Expanding Role

Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown*

One of the most startling trends in U.S. development policy since September 11, 2001, is the growing involvement of the Department of Defense (DoD) in traditional development activities. Between 2002 and 2005, the share of U.S. official development assistance (ODA) channeled through the Pentagon budget surged from 5.6 percent to 21.7 percent, rising to \$5.5 billion.¹ At the same time, the Pentagon has also expanded its direct provision of non-ODA assistance, including for the training and equipping of foreign military forces, in numerous developing countries considered to be central battlegrounds in the "global war on terror." These trends have stimulated concerns that U.S. foreign and development policies may become subordinated to a narrow, short term security agenda -- at the expense of broader, longer-term diplomatic goals and institution building in the developing world -- and that U.S. soldiers may increasingly assume responsibility for activities more appropriately conducted by civilians skilled in development challenges.² To date, however, there has been little independent analysis of: (1) the driving forces behind these trends; (2) the scope and nature of DoD's expanding role; (3) the instruments through which the Pentagon is implementing this new vocation; and (4) the likely impact, both direct and indirect, on development outcomes and broader U.S. foreign policy goals in target countries.

This working paper attempts to start filling these knowledge gaps. We attribute growing U.S. reliance on the U.S. military to carry out reconstruction, development, and capacity-building activities to three factors: an overwhelming focus within the Bush administration on programs that can help in the global war on terror, particularly in unstable, conflict-prone, and post-conflict countries; the vacuum left by civilian agencies, which struggle to deploy adequate numbers of personnel and to deliver assistance in highly insecure environments; and a general failure on the part of the U.S. government to invest adequately in non-military instruments of global engagement, including by creating deployable U.S. civilian post-conflict capabilities. Looking at the numbers, we find that the overwhelming bulk of ODA provided directly by DoD goes to Iraq and Afghanistan, where violent operational environments often necessitate that the military take a lead role. This surge is in principle temporary, likely to disappear when the U.S. involvement in both wars ends. Beyond these two conflicts, however, DoD has expanded (or proposes to expand) its operations in fragile states to include a number of activities that might in principle be undertaken by the State Department, USAID and other civilian actors. These initiatives -including recent counter-terrorism programs, the new Africa Command (AFRICOM), and the proposed Building Global Partnerships Act - are liable to affect U.S. development policy, even where they involve non-ODA resources, by increasing DoD's influence over U.S. engagement with developing countries.

The Pentagon's growing commitment to addressing instability in fragile and post-conflict countries is a commendable response to demonstrable shortcomings in U.S. civilian agencies. Nevertheless, DoD's growing assistance role carries significant risks. If not carefully managed, it could displace or overshadow broader U.S. foreign policy and development objectives in target countries, as well as exacerbate the longstanding imbalance in the resources the United States currently budgets for military and civilian components of state-building. We offer several recommendations designed to mitigate these risks and foster a healthier balance in U.S. engagement with fragile and war-torn states.

^{*} Stewart Patrick is research fellow and Kaysie Brown is program associate at CGD. The authors thank Carol Lancaster, Sheila Herrling, Sarah Jane Hise, Steve Radelet and Gordon Adams for comments. They are grateful to Stephen J. Morrison and Kathleen Hicks of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, directors of the CSIS Task Force on DoD Non-Traditional Security Assistance, for insights into the Pentagon's growing aid role. They also thank the Carnegie Corporation and the Hewlett Foundation for supporting CGD's work in this area.

What's Driving These Trends?

The growing reliance on U.S. military forces to carry out ostensibly civilian tasks of reconstruction, development and capacity-building reflects a combination of three factors: the perceived security imperatives of the "global war on terrorism," including changing U.S. threat perceptions following 9/11 and the practical challenges of stabilizing and reconstructing Afghanistan and Iraq; the difficulties civilian actors confront in delivering aid in volatile contexts; and continued U.S. under-investment in U.S. civilian capabilities to advance security, good governance and prosperity in fragile and post-conflict states.

The Challenge of Fragile and War-Torn States

One of the major lessons of 9/11, as the President Bush enunciated in the *National Security Strategy* of 2002, was that the United States was "now more threatened by weak and failing states than we are by conquering ones."³ No longer could the nation look with indifference upon poor and poorly governed developing countries, nor allow failed and war-torn states to stew in their own juice. In the ensuing five years, the Bush Administration has launched several piecemeal initiatives to translate this insight into practical policy. Within the civilian side of government, notable steps have included the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) at the State Department (August 2004); the release of USAID's *Fragile States Strategy* (January 2005); designation of the State Department as the lead agency to coordinate post-conflict state-building efforts (December 2005); and the announcement of a "transformational diplomacy" agenda (January 2006), designed to promote the emergence of democratic, well-governed states in the developing world, accompanied by a bold plan to overhaul the architecture of U.S. foreign assistance on behalf of targeted strategic goals.⁴ Unfortunately, as detailed below, these strategic pronouncements and institutional innovations have not been accompanied by commensurate investments in civilian U.S. agencies charged with addressing these new priorities.⁵

The Department of Defense, meanwhile, has proven much more nimble in reorienting its focus toward weak, failing and war-torn states. Chastened by its failure to plan for postwar Iraq and the chaos that resulted, the Pentagon has cast off its former aversion to nation-building. This shift was cemented in November 2005 with the signing of DoD Directive 3000.05, which declared that the U.S. military would henceforth treat "Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations" as a core mission, on a par with combat operations.⁶ Decidedly broad in scope, this directive extends DoD's mandates and programs to a wide range of activities that are typically the province of civilian agencies, including reforming the security sector, establishing institutions of governance, reviving market activity and rebuilding infrastructure. While the directive openly recognizes that many of these tasks are more appropriately carried out by civilian actors and agencies, it also states that this may not always be possible in highly insecure environments or where such civilian capabilities do not yet exist.

Simultaneously, the Department of Defense is increasingly preoccupied with addressing the roots of instability and extremism in weak and failing states, and preventing their collapse into conflict. The intellectual rationale for this growing attention is spelled out in the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), released in early 2006. As the QDR explains, the United States is engaged in a "long war" on global terrorism, where ungoverned and poorly governed zones serve as potential havens for terrorists, criminals, and insurgents whose goals are antithetical to those of the United State and its allies. To combat these threats, the U.S. military must help developing nations build up their sovereign capacity (as well as will) to police their own borders and territories. These assumptions have inspired several DoD-led programs to build counterterrorism (CT) capabilities in developing countries, led by regional U.S. Combatant Commands (including several in Africa detailed below).

Filling the Civilian Void

DoD's increased involvement in post-conflict reconstruction, as well as the provision of counterterrorism and other non-traditional security assistance, reflects not only the perceived operational requirements of the global war on terrorism but also the shortcomings of U.S. civilian agencies, notably the State Department and USAID, to mobilize and deploy adequate resources and personnel to meet them, including in situations of high violence or requiring a rapid response. As Iraq and Afghanistan attest, civilian agencies find it difficult to operate in "non-permissive" environments, where their security cannot be guaranteed, particularly in situations of active insurgency. This dilemma is compounded, however, by the failure of the executive branch and Congress to invest adequately in civilian capabilities that could be usefully employed in many instances.

An obvious case in point is the disappointing fate of the S/CRS office. In late 2005, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization," which provided operational guidelines for the management of U.S. government interagency reconstruction and stabilization efforts. On paper, that directive gave S/CRS leadership within the executive branch for planning, preparing for, and running post-conflict operations. Practically speaking, however, S/CRS has been weakened by its failure to secure adequate resources to make a tangible difference on the ground in war-torn countries and to command respect within the U.S. government.⁷


Authorities versus Resources

This lack of adequate personnel and financial resources is not limited to S/CRS. More broadly, there is a fundamental mismatch between the authorities ostensibly granted to the State Department to lead the country's global engagement, including through the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), and the modest resources actually allocated to State (and other civilian agencies) to fulfill this mandate, particularly when compared to the gargantuan budget of the Department of Defense. This asymmetry in resources drastically limits the capability of the civilian branch to advance the cause of state-building in fragile and war-torn states. So long as this imbalance persists, DoD will inevitably be called upon to fill the vacuum, not only in Iraq and Afghanistan but in future contingencies.

Addressing the roots of instability and violence in fragile states, not to mention the practical challenges of post-conflict reconstruction, requires a "whole of government"⁸ approach among the State Department, Department of Defense, and USAID, with greater attention to building institutional capacities of partner governments in the developing world. Unfortunately, the current budgetary outlays pose a major obstacle to a balanced partnership among U.S. defense, diplomatic, and development assets (the so-called "3Ds"). Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen of the Australian Army, a senior advisor to General David Petraeus, commander of the Multinational Force in Iraq, puts the dilemma into stark relief:

At present, the U.S. defense budget accounts for approximately half of total global defense spending, while the U.S. armed forces employ about 1.68 million uniformed members. By comparison, the State Department employs about 6,000 Foreign Service officers, while the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has about 2,000. In other words, the Department of Defense is about 210 times larger than USAID and State combined—there are substantially more people employed as musicians in Defense bands than in the entire foreign service.⁹

The massive capabilities and resources of the Pentagon exert a constant pull, tugging at civilian leadership in U.S. foreign policy. Because there is little prospect State will get adequate funds in the right accounts, there is a natural temptation to go in the other direction, by providing DoD with new authority (albeit temporary and circumscribed authority, at least to date). This trend is already evident in the changing proportions of total U.S. official development assistance (ODA) being spent by the Department of Defense and USAID. Between 1998 and 2005, DoD's share of ODA increased from 3.5% to nearly 22%, whereas USAID's decreased from nearly 65% to less than 40% in the same period¹⁰ (See Table 1 below). These figures do not include other forms of DoD foreign assistance that are not ODA-eligible but have a development impact (and which are discussed later in this essay).



Source: OECD DAC Peer Review of the United States (2006)

The Pentagon and U.S. ODA: Where Does the Money Go?

No other ministry of defense within the donor community approaches the share of national ODA earmarked for the Pentagon. According to the OECD, DoD accounted for more than 20 percent of U.S. development assistance in 2005.¹¹ As Table 2 (below) illustrates, the Pentagon's involvement in ODA-eligible activities spans a number of distinct activities and challenges, from providing humanitarian relief to training and equipping border and customs services, and from HIV/AIDS programs for foreign militaries to technical assistance aimed at drug interdiction and counter-narcotics programs.

Appropriation Title	Commitments	Disbursements
Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund	3,056,698	4,232,749
Tsunami Relief and Reconstruction Funds	117,000	117,000
Global HIV/AIDS Initiative	12,119	12,119
Operation and Maintenance, Defense-wide	9,628	14,775
Drug Interdiction and Counter-drug Activities		
(in-country technical assistance only)	477,397	477,397
Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction	193,597	172,701
Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid	110,409	109,743
Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP)	844,756	844,756
TOTAL	4,821,604	5,981,240

Table 2. U.S. ODA Commitments and Disbursements	through DOD	(Thousands of dollars, 20	05)
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Big Numbers for Iraq and Afghanistan

The vast bulk of the recent growth in Pentagon spending on development-related activities can be attributed to U.S. counter-insurgency and nation-building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, where DoD has expanded its mandate from traditional combat operations to also include stabilization and reconstruction activities. Indeed, from 2004-2005, funds directed to Iraq and Afghanistan accounted for nearly 50 percent of all bilateral U.S. ODA.¹² Funds allocated to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund – including more than \$4 billion in disbursements -- constituted over two-thirds of DoD's ODA-eligible programs in 2005.¹³

The Commander's Emergency Response Program

One of the most visible expressions of the Pentagon's shift away from traditional combat activities has been the creation of the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP).¹⁴ CERP allows U.S. military commanders in the field to use funds in Iraq and Afghanistan to help meet urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs where military forces are operating. After the fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the U.S. military struggled to meet overwhelming emergency assistance demands in the country. These needs were extensive, ranging from trash removal to restoring basic sanitation, distributing rations, and repairing and rebuilding schools and hospitals. CERP funds allowed the military to perform these and similar functions, so long as they related to the building, repair, reconstitution and reestablishment of social and material infrastructure in Iraq.

By most accounts, CERP has been fairly successful, insofar as it has given military commanders the ability to take individual initiative to finance a wide range of emergency relief and rehabilitation activities in volatile settings where winning the political support of the local population is crucial, and where (for security reasons) the presence of U.S. civilian actors may be marginal and/or civilian funding (through USAID, for example) may be overly bureaucratic. Within the first three months of the program in Iraq, for example, some 11,000 projects were completed, including repairing hundreds of broken generators, cleaning streets, and the (re)construction of jails and police stations throughout Baghdad. Similar projects, totaling over \$400 million, have been initiated with CERP funds in Afghanistan since it was introduced there in January 2004.¹⁵

At the same time, there is recognition that CERP is an imperfect instrument. As a streamlined and highly decentralized program, it is highly dependent for its effectiveness on the judgment and initiative of the local commander, and it has occasionally been vulnerable to fraud and abuse. More generally, as a GAO report stated, "the projects are determined by the tactical need to obtain the support of the populace and are primarily tools for achieving U.S. security objectives."¹⁶ In other words, CERP is designed to buy short-term local support, rather than to lay the foundations for accountable governance and sustainable development. While security imperatives will inevitably continue to dominate the use of such funds, the United States could improve its long-term effectiveness by involving governance and development professionals from USAID and the State Department in the design of specific CERP projects and in the evaluation of CERP impacts on security, political stability and economic recovery.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams

Besides creating more flexible financial instruments for field commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Pentagon has also pioneered an innovative new institutional vehicle to promote greater integration of U.S.-government-wide stabilization and reconstruction efforts in those countries, called Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). First established in Afghanistan in 2002, PRTs were intended to address the vicious cycle in which the lack of security and the lack of reconstruction fed into each other to

exacerbate instability.¹⁷ The idea was to create small teams comprised of the military and civilian agencies that would provide security while running quick-impact projects (QIPs) that would win the hearts and minds of the local population. The mandate for PRTs was to improve local security, facilitate reconstruction, and strengthen the presence of the central government.¹⁸ These teams contributed to favorable effects in disarming militias, training police forces, building roads, and supporting elections.

Although touted as a marriage of equals between civilian and military actors, PRTs in Afghanistan are overwhelmingly military in scope and operation.¹⁹ The typical PRT consists of 80-100 soldiers, under the direct command of a military officer, focused heavily on force protection and security assistance. These figures dwarf the handful of individual representatives from State, USAID and the Department of Agriculture. More problematic than this imbalance in numbers is the generally poor development practice of PRTs and the relative lack of attention to promoting good governance and the rule of law. Where reconstruction activities have occurred, QIPs have often failed to take the longer term development implications and sustainability questions into account. This led to instances where, according to the U.S. interagency assessment of PRTs, "schools were built without teachers and clinics without doctors."²⁰

PRTs were extended to Iraq in 2005 in an effort to provide security and capacity-building programs outside of Baghdad. In a change from the Afghan programs, PRTs in Iraq were led by a senior State Department official and staffed more heavily with civilian officers. Security was provided by U.S. military and/or commercial contractors. The mandates of PRTs in Iraq were to "assist Iraq's provincial governments with developing a transparent and sustained capacity to govern, promoting security and the rule of law, promoting political and economic development, and providing provincial administration necessary to meet the basic needs of its population."²¹ Since then, the program's mandate has broadened to include five daunting goals: bolstering moderates, promoting reconciliation, supporting counterinsurgency operations, fostering economic growth and developing capacity.

Many of the problems encountered in Afghanistan have been replicated in Iraq. These include unclear mandates, an overly-militarized focus, the absence of inter-agency doctrine, inadequate civilian resources and personnel, no baseline assessments, meager strategic planning, and few metrics for assessing the impact of activities (as opposed to inputs or outputs of U.S. aid). If anything, the problems in Iraq are even more intractable, given a parlous serious security situation which often prevents civilian PRT members from being able to go out and do their job. As in Afghanistan, the PRT emphasis on speed has sometimes led to unsustainable projects, with compromised long term viability. Given the emphasis placed on rapidly winning the hearts and minds of local populations, some trade-offs with institution-building may be inevitable. Still, the performance of PRTs could certainly be improved. Critical steps should include clarifying PRT mandates; conducting joint civilian-military needs assessments; expanding pre-deployment training of inter-agency teams; creating a larger cadre of deployable State and USAID technical experts; and committing to robust monitoring and evaluation of PRT impacts.

Other ODA Outlays from DoD

Beyond its nation-building and counter-insurgency activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, DoD spending that qualifies as ODA falls into four main categories.²² On balance, we do not regard DoD's involvement in these spheres of activity as a significant infringement on traditional mandates of development actors.

Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities. The Defense Department has taken on increasing responsibility for drug interdiction and counter-drug programs and training efforts around the globe, including providing training, technical assistance, and infrastructure improvements to address drug production and trafficking within foreign countries and emerging threats related to narco-terrorism. In 2005 DoD funding for such

activities totaled nearly \$500 million, and projected levels for FY 2006 have risen to more than \$900 million.²³ In FY05, such funds were used in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Albania, Azerbaijan, Niger, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, El Salvador, and several Caribbean nations.²⁴

Humanitarian Assistance and Tsunami Relief. While the U.S. military has long been involved in providing humanitarian relief around the world, it is also increasingly active in drawn-out internal conflicts and in fragile and failed states. Thanks to its logistical assets and global deployment, the Pentagon has unparalleled capacity to respond quickly to natural disasters and to meet emergency relief needs in strife-torn countries. In 2005, DoD received supplemental funding from Congress to cover contingency operations in support of relief for the Indian Ocean tsunami. More generally, the Pentagon receives an annual appropriation for its Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) account, which allows Combatant Commanders to deploy rapid, non-combat assistance to respond to specific emergency and civic needs in the aftermath of natural disasters and violent conflict, including the provision of life-saving food, shelter and health services; repair of infrastructure likes schools, roads, and clinics; and humanitarian mine action. Unlike traditional relief agencies, which focus on neutrality and impartiality, the Pentagon views such activities through a strategic as well as humanitarian prism, as a way to establish long-term positive relationships with recipients, mitigate terrorist influence and prevent conflict. However, DoD's clear preference is to defer to non-military relief agencies except where US military forces are involved or when there are no alternatives -- as in the early stages of a humanitarian emergency.

Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction. As part of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, the Pentagon provides ODA-eligible assistance to help certain countries of the former Soviet Union address environmental and proliferation concerns related to nuclear and biological material, as well as to refocus military-focused scientific and industrial infrastructure on civilian commercial activities. This program is winding down and is unlikely to represent a significant slice of ODA in coming years.²⁵

Global HIV/AIDS Prevention. Finally, as part of the Pentagon's global efforts to train and equip foreign military forces, DoD is involved in providing HIV/AIDS education and prevention services to militaries in the developing world, with a focus on sub-Saharan Africa. Working under the auspices of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and alongside the State Department, USAID and other U.S. agencies, DoD's involvement has included efforts to reduce the incidence of HIV infection among uniformed personnel through communication and coordination campaigns, disbursing HIV test kits, and in setting up counseling centers.²⁶ The Pentagon's efforts in this sphere are modest (\$10 million) but potentially high-impact. The cohort that participates in these programs is at high risk of infection and frequently deploys to UN and AU-led peace operations around the continent. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that the decision of the well-respected U.S. military to prioritize this program sends a strong signal to African militaries to treat the issue with seriousness.

Beyond ODA: Counter-Terrorism and Capacity Building Programs

Looking beyond official development assistance (ODA), the Department of Defense has been at the forefront of a number of other aid programs and initiatives related to the "Global War on Terrorism" that have implications for global development broadly conceived. Perhaps most significant is the Pentagon's entrée into pre-conflict, "shaping" activities that are designed to eliminate the sources of extremism and instability overseas and to improve the capability of foreign governments to cope with the terrorist threat.²⁷ Since 9/11, the various components of the U.S. national security apparatus have struggled to adapt and integrate their respective missions, roles, capabilities, and assistance streams to the perceived needs of what the Bush administration has termed a "generational" struggle against radical Islamic terrorism. DoD has been at the forefront of this process, expanding its mission not only in

building the operational capability of foreign security forces but also in seeking to promote improvements in local governance, infrastructure, and livelihoods. This new role has occasionally taken the Pentagon quite far from its core mandate, as in constructing schools in coastal Kenya, as part of the U.S. effort to win "hearts and minds" among Muslim majority populations.²⁸ Some on Capitol Hill and elsewhere have expressed concern about the implications of this expanding mission for State Department leadership in foreign affairs, as well as the authority of U.S. Chiefs of Mission in host countries.²⁹

Recent DoD initiatives that have potential implications for global development include:

- The creation of so-called "Section 1206" funds, allowing the Pentagon to use its own funds in building counter-terrorist capabilities around the world;
- DoD-led programs to build the capacity of African countries, including the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA); Trans Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI);
- The recent of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).
- The proposed Building Global Partnerships Act, submitted by the Bush Administration for consideration by Congress

The following sections review the status and implications of these initiatives.

Section 1206 Funds

One of the main DoD instruments to fund "capacity-building" programs around the world has been the so-called Section 1206 Funds. Named for a provision of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act (or NDAA), this program permits the Pentagon to use up to \$300 million in its normal operations and maintenance (O&M) funds in any calendar year to enhance the capacities of partner countries by training and equipping foreign military forces involved in counterterrorism and stability operations around the world. Section 1206 Funds are intended to create a pool of one year contingency funds to cover urgent, unmet needs that will be terminated, transitioned to regular Foreign Military Financing (FMF) through State Department authorities, or shifted to host country funding.

The most innovative and controversial aspect of Section 1206 funding is the flexibility that it gives the Secretary of Defense-in the form of a waiver to Title 22 of the U.S. Code (the Foreign Assistance Act)-to use DoD's own funds to respond to urgent needs to train foreign security forces. Although this authority is limited by the necessity for "concurrence" from the Secretary of State and State Department input into proposed projects, there have been concerns raised on Capitol Hill and within the broader foreign policy and development community that such provisions infringe on the Secretary of State's traditional leadership in U.S. foreign assistance policy and might counter to broader U.S. foreign policy goals in particular target countries (particularly given the potential magnitude of DoD resources compared to other U.S. aid streams and forms of engagement). These misgivings were reinforced in the program's first year (FY06), when some projects were created without sufficient input from U.S. embassies, while others did not qualify as addressing time-sensitive, emerging threats and opportunities (as required by law).³⁰ However, implementation has gone much more smoothly in the past two years, and the program enjoys interagency support within the Bush administration. The administration's proposed Building Global Partnerships (BGP) Act, discussed below, would increase funding to \$750 million to provide DoD with permanent, expanded and flexible authority to train, equip and work with security forces.

Counter-Terrorism Programs in Africa

The Department of Defense plays an increasingly important role in U.S. government-wide counterterrorism strategies and programs throughout the world. As part of this effort, DoD has enhanced its level of engagement with many African governments in support of the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.*³¹ Two cornerstones of this strategy are expanding the capacity of foreign partners to combat terrorism and reducing ideological support for terrorism. This strategy is based on the view that the United States must help African governments provide viable social and economic opportunities to their people in order to win the hearts of minds of potentially disaffected populations. Three major interagency CT efforts, in which the military plays a prominent role, are the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), the Trans Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI).³²

CJTF-HOA was created in direct response to the terrorist attacks in 2001 as a US Marine Corps mission intended to break up terrorism throughout the Horn of Africa (including Somalia, Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti, as well as Yemen). Its stated mission is to "…prevent conflict, promote regional stability and protect Coalition interests in east Africa and Yemen through humanitarian assistance."³³ Counter-terrorist operations would involve denying safe havens, external support and material assistance to would-be terrorists, as well as countering the re-emergence of transnational terrorist cells in the region. These operations include civil-military operations and support of non-government organization to enhance long-term stability in the region, as well as military-military training of counter-terrorist capabilities. CJTF-HOA is comprised of over 1,500 personnel including soldiers, marines, civilians and officials within partner nations. These special operations forces have conducted a range of anti-terrorist activities, such as the provision of support to the Ethiopian army's recent actions against the Union of Islamic Courts in Somalia.³⁴

While the bulk of CJTF-HOA activities have been military, over the past few years U.S. civil affairs teams have also implemented hundreds of humanitarian and small-scale development projects -- including digging wells, repairing schools, clinics and hospitals, and conducting medical and veterinary clinics -- all designed to eliminate the "root causes of terrorism."³⁵ From September 2003-March 2005, for example, CJTF-HOA projects renovated 33 schools, 8 clinics and 5 hospitals, dug 11 wells and conducted nearly 40 medical visits.³⁶ While CTJF-HOA military personnel coordinate with USAID, there have been some grumblings from development professionals that the military is getting involved in activities for which it has little competence, and which might more appropriately be conducted by USAID or non-governmental organizations with a long track record in the region.³⁷ As in Afghanistan, the result has sometimes been schools built without, or hospitals with no nurses.³⁸ Concerns have also been raised about whether the task force's primary focus on stability and the elimination of terrorists and extremists – including air strikes and operations by U.S. Special Forces -- will override longer-term efforts to enhance good governance and development, in part by encouraging the United States to cozy up to African strongmen like Ethiopia's Meles Zanawi.³⁹

A similar initiative, the TSCTP, aims to reduce the strength of terrorist organization in North Africa and the Sahel by "building up regional counterterrorism capabilities, enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the region's security forces, promoting democratic governance, discrediting terrorist ideology, and reinforcing bilateral military ties with the United States."⁴⁰ Involving interagency cooperation among DoD, the Department of State, and USAID, TSCTP aims to deter and weaken terrorists throughout the pan-Sahel (including Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad, as well as Nigeria and Senegal) and to facilitate cooperation between those countries and countries in the Maghreb, including Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, using a combination of military training programs and development assistance projects to address social and economic grievances.

TSCTP was developed as an extension of an earlier project, the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), which began in 2003 with a two year budget of \$7.75 million provided by the State Department to conduct training and capacity building in Niger, Mali, Chad and Mauritania.⁴¹ Deemed promising, PSI was expanded to include additional countries and was given more resources—roughly \$100 million a year for the next seven years. Funding for the program is comprised of earmarks from the Department of State, USAID and DoD. Like CJTF-HOA, a large proportion of the budget for TSCTP was to be spent on development initiatives, including efforts to improve health and education, build community centers, provide vocational training, and promote transparency in governance.⁴² As the acting coordinator for Counter-Terrorism testified in March 2005, "The TSCTI concept would look beyond simply the provision of training and equipment for counter-terrorism units, but also would consider development assistance, expanded public diplomacy campaigns and other elements as part of an overall CT strategy."⁴³

Notwithstanding this rhetorical commitment to a holistic, integrated response that takes account of the economic, social and political sources of instability in the region, the program to date has been dominated by military considerations. Although U.S. government players agree that the CT strategy should focus eighty percent on development and governance activities, and only twenty percent on military effort, actual budgets have been closer to the reverse, making it difficult for the program to address underlying, chronic sources of underdevelopment and poor governance. (Indeed, the program could even undermine U.S. objectives, if by strengthening the capabilities of local security services it gives undemocratic regimes a tool to quell domestic political opposition).

The EACTI was announced by President Bush in 2003 as a multi-year CT initiative totaling \$100million, and it has devoted sizeable resources to improving broad CT capabilities in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia. The wide spectrum of this CT assistance ranged from military training for coastal and border security, programs to strengthen control over the movement of people and goods across frontiers, capacity building for aviation security, training to combat terrorist financing and money laundering, law enforcement training, the formation of joint counter-terrorism task forces, expanded educational programs for marginalized communities at risk of extremist influences, and public diplomacy. Because success in this effort requires not only short-term responses but "longer-term strategies to address the factors that create an environment more conducive for terrorism -- poverty, intolerance, political alienation, and corruption,"⁴⁴ the Bush administration has endorsed an interagency approach to this struggle. As in the TSCTP experience, however, the effort to date has remained largely focused on the security realm, as opposed to broader governance and development concerns.

The Creation of Africa Command (AFRICOM)

Additionally, under the rationale of the "long war," against terrorism, the U.S. military is further expanding its reach into Africa. A centerpiece for this strategy is the newly announced Africa Command (AFRICOM), which came into existence in October 2007 and will become a fully fledged Combatant Command in October 2008. The creation of AFRICOM is a welcome development that reflects Africa's growing importance in the U.S. national security discourse. It also constitutes a sensible attempt to streamline DoD's fractured lines of responsibility for Africa. To date, and unlike the State Department (which relies on country-level embassies), U.S. military involvement on the continent has been divided among three different commands: Central Command (CENTCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM) and European Command (EUCOM). AFRICOM is intended to consolidate these efforts under one roof. It also extends beyond the military to include inter-agency staff, operations and programs. Although the

commander will be a four-star general, one of his deputies is a senior U.S. Foreign Service Officer, and the command is intended to include personnel from U.S. civilian agencies, including USAID.

According to DoD, the new command's primary mission will be "shaping" activities, designed to ameliorate troubling trends in the region by helping to eliminate the roots of extremism, terrorism and violent conflict before they reach a crisis, rather than traditional operations involving the use of force. To this end, AFRICOM seeks to "promote U.S. strategic objectives by working with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen stability and security in the region through improved capability, military professionalization and accountable governance."⁴⁵ The explicit rationale for this approach is that greater U.S. attention to pre-conflict states throughout Africa should pay huge dividends in the future, through successful prevention exercises and in deterring would-be terrorists. The Pentagon hopes that a robust civilian agency presence will provide the Command with the technical knowledge and regional expertise it needs for effective preventive action.

The Pentagon's new focus on conflict prevention and its commitment to U.S.-government-wide policy planning and implementation are to be welcomed. What has not yet been satisfactorily explained is how AFRICOM's interagency process will interact with other U.S. programs and activities – and how DoD will ensure that its military activities do not compete with, undermine, or overshadow U.S. development and diplomatic objectives throughout the continent. The risks, which are both symbolic and practical, will need to be carefully managed. From a public diplomacy perspective, the elevation of AFRICOM to a position of apparent leadership in integrating U.S. policy toward Africa may create the damaging impression (or allow U.S. adversaries to argue) that the United States has a militarized approach to the continent.⁴⁶ More substantively, the enormous asymmetry between the resources available to the Pentagon, on the one hand, and the State Department, USAID and other civilian agencies, on the other, raises the danger that any "shaping" activities that emerge from AFRICOM will be dominated by U.S. defense priorities – such as enhancing the operational capacity of local security forces – while giving short shrift to broader political and developmental considerations, (including the democratic accountability of those same security forces).

This would be unfortunate, since the mandate that DoD has given AFRICOM is a sweeping one that goes far beyond the competencies of the Pentagon to implement. In a recent briefing, the head of the AFRICOM Transition Team, Rear Admiral Robert Moeller, declared that "Strategic Success" for the new command would include the achievement of the following goals:

- An African continent that knows liberty, peace, stability, and increasing prosperity
- Fragile states strengthened; decreased likelihood of failed states; all territory under the control of effective democracies
- Economic development and democratic governance allow African states to take the lead in addressing African challenges
- Africans possess stronger capabilities; increased regional capacity to support post-conflict transformations and conduct peacekeeping/disaster response operations
- Adversaries deterred or defeated; terrorism defeated throughout Africa and its ideology rejected and opposed by Africans
- Regional access assured; lines of cooperation remain open; flow of strategic resources unimpeded
- Vital interests and key infrastructure of US/partner nations protected; attacks against US and partner nations prevented.⁴⁷

What is impressive about these strategic objectives – beyond their breadth -- is how few lend themselves to DoD leadership. Generally speaking, the U.S. military is not well-equipped, by its mandate and personnel, to expertly address the structural sources of underdevelopment, alienation and instability in target countries. Although requisite skills can sometimes be found within the civil affairs component of the U.S. Army, few soldiers possess deep expertise on matters of governance, development, and the rule of law. The U.S. military understands this, of course, which is why it is looking for partners. As Rear Admiral Moeller noted in June 2007, "We've understood for a long time that the challenges of Africa cannot be solved by the military alone. Economic development, responsive governance, health, crime and poverty are all pieces of the security environment."⁴⁸

Still, questions remain as to whether AFRICOM – or any Regional Combatant Command – provides a promising platform for bringing the "3Ds" of U.S. defense, diplomacy, and development policy into harmonious balance. Time frame is one concern: Any serious effort to ameliorate state weakness and advance stability on the African continent will necessarily require a patient, decades-long approach to institution-building, rather than quick fixes. AFRICOM's regional approach is another worry: unless handled carefully, the command could undermine so-called "chief of mission authority," which gives U.S. ambassadors the lead in coordinating and ensuring the coherence of U.S. engagement with host countries. There is also concern that AFRICOM's focus on the GWOT could embroil the United States in internal conflicts framed by African regimes as "terrorist" threats. Finally, a number of European officials have expressed misgivings about the integration of U.S. counter-terrorism and development agendas, suggesting that the new command could complicate common approaches to Africa within the donor community. How the Bush Administration addresses these dilemmas will determine whether AFRICOM is truly a "wolf in sheep's clothing,"⁴⁹ as its more pointed critics attest, or in fact proves to be the reverse, a sheep in wolf's clothing.

We believe that AFRICOM represents a potentially useful platform for addressing the underlying sources of instability in Africa. Realizing this potential, however, will require tempering the sweeping rhetoric and expectations DoD officials have sometimes used to describe the command's mandate, while placing its activities firmly in the context of broader U.S. foreign policy and development goals on the continent. To ensure a balanced U.S. approach to stability in Africa, the White House and Congress should insist that any policy integration that occurs at AFRICOM should reflect the firm leadership of the National Security Council (NSC) and a more adequately resourced State Department, supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development and U.S. embassies and USAID missions on the ground – and with the U.S. military playing a supporting role.

The Building Global Partnerships Act

Beyond these specific initiatives, the White House has recently asked Congress to expand the legislative authorities granted to the Pentagon to provide security assistance to partner nations in the global war on terrorism. These proposed changes originated in DoD, which has for some time sought legislative relief from what it considers outdated security assistance authorities inherited from the Cold War. In late 2006, the Pentagon began circulating for interagency consideration a proposed "Building Global Partnership Act"⁵⁰ requesting sixteen changes to the legal authorities contained in Titles 10 (Department of Defense) and 22 (Foreign Assistance Act) of the U.S. Code. The BGP Act was designed to expand DoD's role as a direct provider of security assistance, in some cases making global or permanent the temporary authorities that DoD has enjoyed in Afghanistan and Iraq. Notwithstanding significant initial reservations from the Department of State, which feared infringement on the Secretary of State's foreign assistance and on chief of mission authorities, State and Defense reconciled their outstanding differences in May 2008, and the White House transmitted its proposed legislative changes to Congress.

If ratified, the BGP Act would have given U.S. Combatant Commanders greater flexibility to use DoD's own resources to promote the domestic capacities of security forces and other governmental agencies in developing countries, as well as to meet urgent humanitarian and stabilization needs. This would include making "permanent and global" both Section 1206 authority and CERP. The former provision would expand the potential beneficiaries of 1206 by allowing DoD to use up to \$750 million in DoD funds in any one fiscal year to train, equip and work with not only the military but also other security forces (e.g., paramilitary, counter-terrorist forces, coast guards, and border police). The latter would permit the Secretary of Defense to authorize U.S. commanders to use DoD funds to meet urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs of local populations anywhere U.S. forces are operating.

In Congress, the general attitude toward the proposed BGP legislation remains one of caution -- and with good reason. While legislators support temporary authorities granted to DoD for Iraq and Afghanistan, they are understandably wary about giving DoD any "permanent and global authorities" that might infringe on the Secretary of State's prerogatives under the FAA and expand the military's direct security assistance role, with uncertain implications for broader U.S. bilateral engagement with target countries. This wariness spans both parties and houses. In general, legislators find the rationale for direct DoD assistance authorities to be much more compelling in "hot," insecure environments than in more steady-state, permissive ones. Accordingly, they have resisted the notion of "global" CERP, without greater information from DoD about where it intends to use such funds. Similarly, it insists that 1206 funds should be limited to time-sensitive, emerging threats, and restricted to its current pilot basis.⁵¹

The BGP legislation represents an understandable Pentagon response to the disjunction between the foreign assistance authorities currently granted the State Department and the massive resources available to the Pentagon. The proposed solution of expanding DoD authorities, however, may create as many problems as it resolves, by undermining State Department leadership in foreign affairs. Going forward, the White House and Congress should seek to redress the misalignment between resources and authorities by going in the other direction: by increasing funding for the State Department, USAID and other civilian agencies to meet these urgent needs. In principle, for example, there is no reason that the gaps the BGP seeks to address could not be met through greater (or more flexible) funding within existing State Department aid windows, such as Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Peacekeeping PKO) or USAID Transition Initiatives (OTI) programs.

Implications of Recent Trends for U.S. Foreign Policy and Global Development

The recent surge in Pentagon provision of ODA has not gone unnoticed within the international donor community. In its recent peer review of the United States, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD remarked on the "rapidly growing ODA role of the Department of Defense, particularly in insecure environments. The donor group reminded the United States that it was important "to maintain policies based on development experience and good practice and which avoid risks of prejudicing achievement of sustainable and broad based development in the recipient countries. This should apply equally to implementation of development action by military institutions."⁵²

As discussed, the budgetary numbers indicate that, at least for the time being, the vast majority of DoDled ODA programs are earmarked for the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. In light of the well-known security challenges inherent in providing development assistance in both countries, and the lack of civilian capacity to operate in such insecure environments, the preeminent role of DoD in these two states is in large part a tailored response to immediate needs, rather than a long-term structural realignment in the direct provision of ODA by the Pentagon. It is important, moreover, for the development community to acknowledge that in situations of extreme violence, as in the ongoing insurgency in Iraq, some normal development practices will inevitably take a back seat to operational realities. Certain development "best practices" may still be applicable – for instance, relying as much as possible on local labor and contractors. But at other times it may be simply impossible to reconcile the winning of "hearts and minds" – which may require targeting aid to critical constituencies or holding off on downsizing a bloated civil service – with standard developmental approaches appropriate to more settled situations.

Outside these two theaters of war, however, DoD's enhanced "shaping" mission—focused on capacitybuilding and other initiatives designed as to reduce instability and extremism in fragile states and prevent the spread of terrorism throughout the developing world—has significant implications for broader U.S. foreign policy and development objectives and programs. Given the resource imbalance between the U.S. military, on the one hand, and the State Department, USAID and other civilian agencies, on the other, there is some risk that the aid activities of the Pentagon and its Regional Combatant Commands could come to overshadow both symbolically and substantively the non-military aspects of U.S. engagement in the developing world. The resultant over-emphasis on short-term military dimensions of the global war on terrorism -- as opposed to a more comprehensive strategy to addressing the long-term root causes of poor governance, instability and extremism in countries at risk -- could have unintended consequences similar to those that arose during the Cold War, when the United States often purchased short-term acquiescence at the expense of long-term stability and sustained development.

While the Pentagon can hardly be expected to subordinate pressing security concerns to development goals, its relatively narrow focus makes the DoD ill-suited to the role of generalized development agency. Going forward, a priority for the White House and Congress should be to foster greater symmetry and coherence between the military and civilian dimensions of U.S. engagement with fragile states. The goal should be to balance short-term, DoD-led counter-terrorist and stabilization efforts with the longer-term enterprise of helping to (re)build effective and accountable institutions of governance, which are the ultimate requirements of enduring security, stability, and economic growth. Fortunately, the prospects for such "unity of effort" are not as distant as they might seem, given growing recognition within and outside government of the urgent need for a more multi-faceted, "smart power" approach to the developing world.⁵³ Ironically, perhaps the biggest champion of more robust civilian capacities for engaging fragile states is the Pentagon itself, which increasingly recognizes the limits of what soldiers can do to build enduring institutions in unstable environments.

Over the past two years, DoD has embraced the mission of "capacity building" in developing countries, appointing Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy to implement this vision. In fragile states, this mission focuses primarily on building the operational capabilities of foreign security forces, with the aim of promoting internal control of the territory and borders of fragile states against transnational terrorists, criminals and insurgents whose aims are antithetical to U.S. interests. In post-conflict countries, it seeks to create a permissive operational environment for U.S. soldiers, by winning the support or at least acquiescence of host populations. By their very nature, however, these DoD programs tend to focus on quick results. And, as Pentagon officials are all too well aware, its aid efforts leave unaddressed the structural sources of grinding poverty of grinding poverty, political alienation and instability in the world's fragile states.

The development community may have something to teach the Pentagon about how to think about the "capacity building" mission. Among development professionals, the phrase has long denoted not only the transfer of skills but the building of effective and enduring local institutions that permit the state and society to realize long-term broadly shared economic growth, participatory governance, and social welfare. While the Pentagon conducts training programs to promote professionalism and civilian control

of these foreign militaries, it gives relatively less attention to broader security sector reform (SSR) – including the effort to ensure that military, police, and intelligence services and ministries are accountable to democratically-elected governments. One of the priorities for DoD should be to work with the State Department, USAID, and other U.S. government agencies to develop an integrated, strategic approach to SSR in fragile and war-torn states.

Recommendations

More broadly, the Bush Administration and its successor must work with Congress to ensure that the State Department, USAID, and other U.S. civilian agencies are credible partners with DoD in addressing the challenges of weak and war-torn states, capable of relieving some of the burden currently placed on U.S. war-fighters and of lending significant resources and technical skills to the long-term process of fostering security, governance, and growth in some of the most volatile corners of the world. The following steps will be critical going forward:

- Adopt a strategic, integrated approach to fragile and war-torn states. The starting point must be for the Bush administration (or its successor) to formulate, and Congress to bless, an integrated U.S. government strategy for fragile and war-torn states. Current U.S. documents and strategies (including NSPD-44, DoD Directive 3000.05, and U.S. foreign aid reform) have failed to provide the basis for integrated, U.S. government-wide country plans and resource allocations, both in preventing fragile states from collapsing into conflict or helping ensure their recovery from it. To draft and implement this strategy, the President should appoint a new Deputy National Security Advisor for Conflict Prevention and Response.
- *Clarify agency roles and responsibilities in carrying out this agenda.* Generally speaking, the justification for a lead DoD role in providing foreign assistance varies directly with the permissiveness of the operating environment. In highly insecure settings, such as ongoing insurgencies, U.S. soldiers may be the only actors capable of providing urgent aid. The rationale for DoD leadership is far less compelling in more steady-state contexts, where the State Department, USAID, and civilian agencies which have both the mandate and skills -- should be in the forefront. The White House and Congress should thus resist expanding DoD's security assistance authorities, while increasing investments in relevant civilian capabilities.
- Provide civilian agencies with the tools they need to do the job. The Pentagon's increased role in providing aid in both post-conflict and preventive settings reflects not only the permissiveness of the operating environment but chronic U.S. failure to invest in critical civilian dimensions of state-building, which has left DoD and its Combatant Commands to fill the void. Restoring balance to U.S. engagement with fragile and war-torn states will require increasing the so-called 150 Account to build up relevant capabilities and expertise within the State Department, USAID, and other civilian agencies, including by fully funding the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) at the State Department and creating and fully funding a Civilian Reserve Corps, as proposed by President Bush in his State of the Union Address of January 2007.
- Integrate development perspectives and expertise in DoD-led CT and post-conflict initiatives. The Pentagon's efforts to win "hearts and minds" may sometimes run at cross-purposes with the development agenda. However, our brief survey of DoD-led initiatives -- whether PRTs, CERP funds, Section 1206, CJTF-HOA or AFRICOM suggests that their ultimate success (both in reducing sources of terrorism and building sustainable institutions) may also be undercut by the

failure to incorporate the knowledge and insights of development and governance professionals. To mitigate these risks, as well as the danger that these initiatives will undercut the broader aims of U.S. foreign policy, the NSC and Congress should mandate closer involvement of the State Department and USAID (and concurrence by the Secretary of State) in the uses of DoD assistance streams.

By taking these steps, the United States can help ensure a more balanced and effective U.S. response to failing and war torn states and reduce the chance that the Pentagon's admirable willingness to step into the breach does not have unfortunate, unanticipated consequences.

Notes

² Walter Pincus, "Taking Defense's Hand out of State's Pocket," *Washington Post* (July 9, 2007), A13.

¹¹ OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), *Peer Review of the United States*, 2006.

¹² DAC Peer Review of the United States (2006).

¹⁴ CERP was created to provide US commanders in Iraq with an instrument to help bring stability to Iraq after the US-led invasion, by providing tangible benefits to the Iraqi people. The initial funding for the program came from the hundreds of millions of dollars in cash discovered by the 3rd Infantry Division and other US forces in the vaults of Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist Party.

¹⁵ United States Government Accountability Office, *Securing, Stabilizing and Reconstructing Afghanistan Key Issues for Congressional Oversight*, Report No. 07-801SP (May 2007).

¹⁶ United States Government Accountability Office, *Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress, Deteriorating Security and other Obstacles Continue to Threaten Achievements of US Goals,* Report No. 05-742 (July 2005).

¹⁸ Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment, Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction; Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction and Stabilization; DoD, Joint Center for Operational Analysis/US Joint Forces Command; US Agency for International Development, Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination (June 2006).

¹⁹ Michael J. McNerney, "Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?" *Parameters*, US Army War College Quarterly, Winter 2005-2006.

²⁰ United States Government, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment* (June 2006), p.10.

¹ This is in addition to the billions of dollars in conventional security assistance DoD provides U.S. allies, either directly through the Arms Control and Export Act (Article 10 of the U.S. Code) or in implementing programs under authority vested in the Secretary of State by the Foreign Assistance Act (Article 22 of the U.S. Code).

³ White House, *National Security Strategy*, 2002.Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security, *On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. National Security* (Washington: Center for Global Development, 2004).

⁴ Stewart Patrick, "U.S. Foreign Aid Reform: Will It Fix What Is Broken?" *CGD Essay* (September 2006), http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/10497

⁵ Stewart Patrick, "The U.S. Response to Precarious States: Tentative Progress and Remaining Obstacles to Coherence," *CGD Essay* (July 20, 2007), <u>http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/14093</u>

⁶ Directive 3000.05. "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations", November 28, 2005. http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/300005.htm

⁷ For more detail, see Stewart Patrick, "The U.S. Response to Precarious States."

⁸ Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, Greater than the Sum of Its Parts? Assessing 'Whole of Government'

Approaches to Fragile States (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007)

⁹ <u>http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0507/ijpe/kilcullen.htm</u>

¹⁰ Of course, the decline in USAID's relative share may be partly a function of the creation of two large new U.S. aid windows, the Millennium Challenge Account and the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).

¹³ DAC Peer Review of the United States (2006). 2006 figures are scheduled to be available to the public in October 2007.

¹⁷ Barnett R. Rubin, Humayan Hamidzada, Abby Stoddard, "Afghanistan 2005 and Beyond: Prospects of Improved Stability Reference Document," Netherlands Institute of International Relations (April 2005).

²¹ http://www.ncciraq.org/spip.php?article574

²² A fifth category not elaborated here, "Operation and Maintenance, Defense Wide," provides Eastern European and former Soviet Union Countries training and equipping to border and customs services to protect natural resources and deter illegal migration.

²³ Restructuring U.S. Foreign Aid: The Role of the Director of Foreign Assistance, Congressional Research Service, June 16, 2006.

²⁴ Defense Department Foreign Counter Drug Activity Report, June 19, 2006, archived at

http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/060628dod.pdf. Aid to fight transshipment to the U.S. is excluded from ODA eligibility, as is equipment given to recipient countries due to the potential use by the foreign military other than for counter-drug activities.

²⁵ See http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ctr

²⁶ "Pentagon Helping Other Militaries Build AIDS Prevention Programs" US State Department Info, 17 February 2004. See also: http://www.state.gov/s/gac/

²⁷ For background, see *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (March 2005), archived at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/DoDDoDDoD/nds-usa mar2005.htm; and the

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²⁹ Senator Richard G. Lugar, *Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign*, report to Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 109th Session, December 15, 2006. See also NGO coalition letter to Senate, "Reject the Global Partnerships Act of 2007,"

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³¹ Online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006.

³² Jessica R. Piombo, "Terrorism and U.S. Counterterrorism Programs in Africa: An Overview," Strategic Insights 6, 1 (January 2007) http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Jan/piomboJan07.asp#references

³³ See: http://www.hoa.centcom.mil/

³⁴ US News and World Report. September 28, 2003.

³⁵ Ginny Hill, "Military Focuses on Development in Africa," Christian Science Monitor, June 2, 2007,

http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0622/p07s02-woaf.html?page=3. See also Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, Global Security.org.

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Sarah Lischer, Winning hearts and minds in the horn of Africa (Harvard International Review 2003-2007).

³⁹ Scott Johnson, "The Next Battlefront," Newsweek International, September 17, 2007,

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20657234/site/newsweek/page/0/

http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82730.htm

⁴¹ Donna Miles, "New Counterterrorism Initiative to Focus on Saharan Africa," American Forces Press Service (May 16, 2005). ⁴² "Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or Fiction?" Africa Report No.92 (march 31, 2005), International Crisis

Group.

⁴³ Statement of William P. Pope, Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism, US Department of State, before the Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Non-Proliferation and Human Rights of the U.S. House of Representatives, March 10, 2005.

⁴⁴ William Pope, Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism, US Department of State, opening remarks at the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative Conference, Kampala, Uganda, April 21, 2004.

⁴⁵ Congressional Research Service, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa (May 16, 2007).

⁴⁶ Walter Pincus, "U.S. Africa Command Brings New Concerns," *Washington Post*, May 28, 2007, p. A13.

⁴⁹ "AFRICOM: A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?" Testimony by Mark Malan, Refugees International, before The Subcommittee on African Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, at the hearing entitled "Exploring the U.S. Africa Command and a New Strategic Relationship with Africa," August 01, 2007

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⁵² DAC Peer Review of the United States (2006).

⁵³ See Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., chairs, *CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America*, November 6, 2007, <u>http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071106_csissmartpowerreport.pdf</u>

⁴⁷ Rear Admiral Bob Moeller, AFRICOM Transition Team, "U.S. Africa Command...Moving Forward Together," briefing of September 23, 2007.

⁴⁸ Hill, "Military Focuses on Development in Africa"

⁵¹ Interviews with Senate and House legislative staff, summer and autumn 2007.