A two stage stochastic equilibrium model for electricity markets with two way contracts

This paper investigates generators’ strategic behaviors in contract signing in the forward market and power transaction in the electricity spot market. A stochastic equilibrium program with equilibrium constraints (SEPEC) model is proposed to characterize the interaction of generators’ competition in the two markets. The model is an extension of a similar model proposed by Gans et al. (Aust J Manage 23:83–96, 1998) for a duopoly market to an oligopoly market. The main results of the paper concern the structure of a Nash–Cournot equilibrium in the forward-spot market: first, we develop a result on the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in the spot market for every demand scenario. Then, we show the monotonicity and convexity of each generator’s dispatch quantity in the spot equilibrium by taking it as a function of the forward contracts. Finally, we establish some sufficient conditions for the existence of a local and global Nash equilibrium in the forward-spot markets. Numerical experiments are carried out to illustrate how the proposed SEPEC model can be used to analyze interactions of the market

An algorithm for the global resolution of linear stochastic bilevel programs

The aim of this thesis is to find a technique that allows for the use of decomposition methods known from stochastic programming in the framework of linear stochastic bilevel problems. The uncertainty is modeled as a discrete, finite distribution on some probability space. Two approaches are made, one using the optimal value function of the lower level, whereas the second technique uses the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the lower level. Using the latter approach, an integer-programming based algorithm for the global resolution of these problems is presented and evaluated