Формирование стратегических альянсов в инновационном секторе экономики: подход опционных игр в биофармацевтической отрасли

Рассматривается кооперативная стратегическая модель взаимодействия фармацевтической компании и биофармацевтической, занимающейся разработкой инновационного препарата. Подчеркивается, что взаимовыгодные альянсы игроков помогут отрасли увеличить количество оригинальных лекарств и ускорить процессы их вывода на рынок. В качестве инструмента для изучения перспектив стратегических альянсов предлагается использовать теорию игр совместно с теорией реальных опционов, тем самым расширяя традиционные методы оценки. При построении кооперативной модели также описываются факторы, влияющие на время заключения альянс

The role of the abandonment option in strategic capital allocation: a review of selected literature

We review the most relevant contributions to the abandonment option since the late 1960s. We begin by approaching the contributions to the literature before the emergence of the real options approach to capital investment decisions, and thereafter, under a consistent real options approach, highlighting the interactions between the option to abandon and other types of options. We then identify the methodologies adopted, and the business sectors/ types of investment projects where the abandonment option is more frequently studied. We also debate the strategic role of the abandonment solution in corporate divestitures and under a game-theoretical approach. Finally, we present some concluding remarks and identify how certain gaps found in the literature may constitute opportunities for future research

Risky choices in strategic environments: An experimental investigation of a real options game

Managers frequently make decisions under conditions of fundamental uncertainty due the stochastic nature of the outcomes and competitive rivalry. In this study, we experimentally test a theoretical model under fundamental uncertainty and competitive rivalry by designing a sequential interaction game between two players. The first mover can decide either to choose a sure outcome that assigns a risky outcome to the second mover or to pass the decision to the second mover. If the second player gets the chance to decide, she can choose between a sure outcome, conditioned by the assignment of a risky payoff to the first mover, or the sharing of the risky outcome with the first mover. We then introduce the following experimental treatments: (i) relegating second-mover participants to a purely passive role and substituting them with a random device (absence of strategic uncertainty - that is, when the source of uncertainty is a human subject); (ii) providing information about the behaviour of second-mover counterparts; and (iii) completely removing the second-mover participant.We find that decision makers are sensitive to the presence or absence of strategic uncertainty; indeed, in the presence of strategic uncertainty, first movers more often diverge from the behaviour predicted by the model. Given our experimental results, the theoretical model needs to be revisited. The standard model of monetary payoff-maximizing agents should be substituted by one of decision makers who maximize a utility function which includes the psychological cost induced by strategic uncertainty. (C) 2019 Published by Elsevier B.V

A real options game of alliance timing decisions in biopharmaceutical research and development

In this article we examine the alliance timing trade-off facing both pharmaceutical and biotech firms in a stochastic and competitive environment. Specifically, we introduce a real options game (ROG), where a pharmaceutical company can choose between two competing biotech firms by sequentially offering a licensing deal early or late in the new drug development process. We find that, when the alliance raises the drug market value significantly, the agreement is signed late in the drug development process. This suggests that the postponement effect implied by the use of real options prevails over the biotech firms’ competition effect, which would instead play in favor of an early agreement for pre-emption reasons. When the alliance does not raise the drug market value significantly, the optimal timing depends on the level of royalties retained by the pharmaceutical company. In particular, an early agreement is signed in the presence of a low level of royalties. In this case, indeed, the competition effect becomes predominant because the pharmaceutical company can substantially reduce the upfront payment and thus the potential loss incurred if the biotech partner does not exercise her option to continue the new drug development process. We also show that the alliance timing outcomes of our real options game considerably differ from those obtained when both parties use the net present value (NPV) to assess their payoffs