A proportional approach to claims problems with a guaranteed minimum

In distribution problems, and specifically in bankruptcy issues, the Proportional (P) and the Egalitarian (EA) divisions are two of the most popular ways to resolve the conflict. Nonetheless, when using the egalitarian division, agents may receive more than her claim. We propose a compromise between the proportional and the egalitarian approaches by considering the restriction that no one receives more than her claim. We show that the most egalitarian compromise fulfilling this restriction ensures a minimum amount to each agent. We also show that this compromise can be interpreted as a process that works in two steps as follows: first, all agents receive an equal share up to the smallest claim if possible (egalitarian distribution), and then, the remaining estate (if any) is allocated proportionally to the remaining claims (proportional distribution). Finally, we obtain that the recursive application of this process finishes at the Constrained Equal Awards solution (CEA).Financial support from Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Banco Santander and Generalitat de Catalunya under Project 2011LINE-06 and the Barcelona GSE

Credit risk mitigation and SMEs bank financing in Basel II : the case of the Loan Guarantee Associations

The objective of this paper is to analyse the impact of the techniques foreseen in the Basel Agreement II (BII) for mitigating the risk of default on bank loans to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). In particular, we will conduct an analysis of the effect of the guarantees that the Loan Guarantee Association (LGA) offer to the SMEs on the assignment of capital requirements of the financial entities under BII. At the same time, the study will examine the effect of this guarantee on the credit risk premium that the financial entities should charge their clients, and whether this foreseeable decrease in the interest rates applicable to the SMEs is compensated by the cost of the guarantee. The results show that, considering that the cost of the LGA guarantee in Spain is around 0.68%, it will be advantageous for an SME with the annual sales of less than or equal to €5 million to request this guarantee whenever the probability of default (PD) of the LGA is <1.1%, if the approach utilised by the financial entity is the Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) and the SME is considered as corporate; however, if the SME is included in a regulatory retail portfolio, then the limit for the PD of the LGA decreases to 0.71%. On the other hand, when the approach utilised is the Standardised one, then will be profitable for an SME treated as retail to request this guarantee whenever the PD of the LGA is <3.35% (3.95% for corporate exposures)

Government guarantees on pension fund returns

This report reviews defined contribution pension return guarantees typically made by governments in connection with pension privatizations. Finance theory related to the pricing of options provides a unifying framework for evaluating the cost of these guarantees. The report considers two types of guarantees on the rate of return earned by an individual pension fund: a guarantee of a fixed minimum rate of return; and a guarantee of a minimum rate of return that is set relative to the performance of other pension funds. A minimum pension benefit guarantee for a participant in a mandatory defined contribution pension plan is also discussed. Costs for each of these guarantees are illustrated using typical parameter values.Banks&Banking Reform,Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Insurance Law,Economic Theory&Research,Economic Stabilization

Randomized Algorithms for the Loop Cutset Problem

We show how to find a minimum weight loop cutset in a Bayesian network with high probability. Finding such a loop cutset is the first step in the method of conditioning for inference. Our randomized algorithm for finding a loop cutset outputs a minimum loop cutset after O(c 6^k kn) steps with probability at least 1 - (1 - 1/(6^k))^c6^k, where c > 1 is a constant specified by the user, k is the minimal size of a minimum weight loop cutset, and n is the number of vertices. We also show empirically that a variant of this algorithm often finds a loop cutset that is closer to the minimum weight loop cutset than the ones found by the best deterministic algorithms known

Resolving bank failures in Argentina - recent developments and issues

Policies and procedures to resolve bank failures have evolved significantly in Argentina since the introduction of currency convertibility in 1991, and particularly in reaction to the 1995"tequila"crisis, which exposed the inadequacy of the bank exit framework in place then. The author reviews the institutional changes introduced in Argentina in 1995 to handle bank failures more effectively, particularly the creation of the deposit guarantee scheme and the procedural framework for resolving bank failures, embedded in Article 35 of the Financial Institutions Law. This framework enables the Central Bank to carve out the assets and"privileged"liabilities of the failing bank and transfer them to sound banks, thereby sending only a"residual"balance sheet to judicial liquidation. Subsequent refinements in the application of Article 35 procedures eventually led to current Argentine practice. The author examines this practice in detail by considering the handling of the recent failure of Banco Almafuerte. The author assesses a number of issues that arise from the Argentine model of bank failure resolution, taking into account both country-specific circumstances and more general concepts and concerns. He emphasizes the potential tradeoffs between reducing contagion risk, limiting moral hazard, and avoiding unnecessary destruction of asset value; the implications of priority-of-claims rules, and least-cost criteria; the pros and cons of alternative organizational and institutional arrangements; and the need for legal security. Finally, he outlines two prototypical approaches to striking a balance between rules and discretion, an issue underlying much of the ongoing policy discussion on alternative bank exit frameworks.Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Financial Intermediation,Economic Theory&Research,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism

Tax Aspects of Corporate Pension Funding Policy

This paper explores four models of firms' pension liabilities. All of the models yield the result that if it is the stockholders who gain or lose from a change in the market value of pension fund assets, a pension fund invested entirely in bonds will maximize that gain. If a firm's pension liabilities are considered to be no more than the present value of accrued benefits, then most plans for salaried employees would maximize the pension's value by having their assets entirely in bonds. However, for less well funded plans such as most union plans, holding both stocks and bonds or even all stocks may maximize the value of the firm.. Implicit contracts on the liability side of the pension balance sheet can encourage holding some stock, but implicit contracts on the asset side are likely to encourage increased bond holdings.

Viabilist and Tychastic Approaches to Guaranteed ALM Problem.

This study reconsiders the problem of hedging a liability by a portfolio made of a riskless asset and an underlying (underlying).Asset and Liability Management; Viability theory;

The Reality and Masquerade behind Bargaining over Welfare Pie Sizing, Delivery and Slicing.

The present analysis addresses the apparently critical issue of circulation of wealth in society. Three actors play the game of welfare-related taxation. The first actor, in the role of Negotiator No.1, stands up for citizens’ legal and moral rights to primary needs. The second actor, in the role of Negotiator No.2, proceeds in response to public will for the provision and delivery of public goods. Quite the opposite, the third actor, hereinafter named the Voter, who represents the taxpayers, prefers personal consumption to moral understanding and public activity. In fact, backed by electoral maneuvering, the Voter emanates a risk to break down negotiations. The result of the simulation provides an evidence for the claim that a 50% median income is close enough to be considered a realistic choice of poverty line within the variety or rules of the alternating-offers bargaining game and conditions for unanimous consent of voter-citizens.bargaining; policy; public goods; simulation; taxation; voting