Near-Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design for Covering Problems with Correlated Players

We consider the problem of designing incentive-compatible, ex-post individually rational (IR) mechanisms for covering problems in the Bayesian setting, where players' types are drawn from an underlying distribution and may be correlated, and the goal is to minimize the expected total payment made by the mechanism. We formulate a notion of incentive compatibility (IC) that we call {\em support-based IC} that is substantially more robust than Bayesian IC, and develop black-box reductions from support-based-IC mechanism design to algorithm design. For single-dimensional settings, this black-box reduction applies even when we only have an LP-relative {\em approximation algorithm} for the algorithmic problem. Thus, we obtain near-optimal mechanisms for various covering settings including single-dimensional covering problems, multi-item procurement auctions, and multidimensional facility location.Comment: Major changes compared to the previous version. Please consult this versio

Online Multistage Subset Maximization Problems

Numerous combinatorial optimization problems (knapsack, maximum-weight matching, etc.) can be expressed as subset maximization problems: One is given a ground set N={1,...,n}, a collection F subseteq 2^N of subsets thereof such that the empty set is in F, and an objective (profit) function p: F -> R_+. The task is to choose a set S in F that maximizes p(S). We consider the multistage version (Eisenstat et al., Gupta et al., both ICALP 2014) of such problems: The profit function p_t (and possibly the set of feasible solutions F_t) may change over time. Since in many applications changing the solution is costly, the task becomes to find a sequence of solutions that optimizes the trade-off between good per-time solutions and stable solutions taking into account an additional similarity bonus. As similarity measure for two consecutive solutions, we consider either the size of the intersection of the two solutions or the difference of n and the Hamming distance between the two characteristic vectors. We study multistage subset maximization problems in the online setting, that is, p_t (along with possibly F_t) only arrive one by one and, upon such an arrival, the online algorithm has to output the corresponding solution without knowledge of the future. We develop general techniques for online multistage subset maximization and thereby characterize those models (given by the type of data evolution and the type of similarity measure) that admit a constant-competitive online algorithm. When no constant competitive ratio is possible, we employ lookahead to circumvent this issue. When a constant competitive ratio is possible, we provide almost matching lower and upper bounds on the best achievable one

A new approximation algorithm for the multilevel facility location problem

In this paper we propose a new integer programming formulation for the multi-level facility location problem and a novel 3-approximation algorithm based on LP rounding. The linear program we are using has a polynomial number of variables and constraints, being thus more efficient than the one commonly used in the approximation algorithms for this type of problems

Improved approximation algorithm for k-level UFL with penalties, a simplistic view on randomizing the scaling parameter

The state of the art in approximation algorithms for facility location problems are complicated combinations of various techniques. In particular, the currently best 1.488-approximation algorithm for the uncapacitated facility location (UFL) problem by Shi Li is presented as a result of a non-trivial randomization of a certain scaling parameter in the LP-rounding algorithm by Chudak and Shmoys combined with a primal-dual algorithm of Jain et al. In this paper we first give a simple interpretation of this randomization process in terms of solving an aux- iliary (factor revealing) LP. Then, armed with this simple view point, Abstract. we exercise the randomization on a more complicated algorithm for the k-level version of the problem with penalties in which the planner has the option to pay a penalty instead of connecting chosen clients, which results in an improved approximation algorithm

On the Public Provision of the Performing Arts

In this paper, we present a model in which the performing arts are modelled as congestible public goods. In accordance with empirical evidence, the production of seat capacity is assumed to be subject to fixed costs. We estimate the parameters of the model?s demand and cost functions using German data. Using these estimates in a subsequent social choice analysis, we show that the current situation in the German performing arts sector is best described by a directorship that under the influence of a selfish theater lobby maximizes only the welfare of the spectators. Such an equilibrium, characterized by too low ticket prices and too large capacity, is most likely to establish if citizens have a very positive ex ante notion of the performing arts. --Performing Arts,Public Facilities,Congestion

Multicriteria ranking using weights which minimize the score range

Various schemes have been proposed for generating a set of non-subjective weights when aggregating multiple criteria for the purposes of ranking or selecting alternatives. The maximin approach chooses the weights which maximise the lowest score (assuming there is an upper bound to scores). This is equivalent to finding the weights which minimize the maximum deviation, or range, between the worst and best scores (minimax). At first glance this seems to be an equitable way of apportioning weight, and the Rawlsian theory of justice has been cited in its support.We draw a distinction between using the maximin rule for the purpose of assessing performance, and using it for allocating resources amongst the alternatives. We demonstrate that it has a number of drawbacks which make it inappropriate for the assessment of performance. Specifically, it is tantamount to allowing the worst performers to decide the worth of the criteria so as to maximise their overall score. Furthermore, when making a selection from a list of alternatives, the final choice is highly sensitive to the removal or inclusion of alternatives whose performance is so poor that they are clearly irrelevant to the choice at hand