15 research outputs found

    A note on the equivalence of IND-CCA & INT-PTXT and IND-CCA & INT-CTXT

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    The security for authenticated encryption schemes is often captured by demanding CCA security (IND-CCA) and integrity of plaintexts (INT-PTXT). In this short note, we prove that this implies in particular integrity of ciphertexts, i.e., INT-CTXT. Hence, the two sets of requirements mentioned in the title are equivalent

    TR-31 and AS 2805 (Non)equivalence report

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    We examine the security of the Australian card payment system by analysing existing cryptographic protocols in this analysis. We compare current Australian cryptographic methods with their international counterparts, such as the ANSI TR-31 methods. Then, finally, we formulate a formal difference between the two schemes using security proofs

    Authenticated Encryption: Relations among notions and analysis of the generic composition paradigm

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    An authenticated encryption scheme is a symmetric encryption scheme whose goal is to provide both privacy and integrity. We consider two possible notions of authenticity for such schemes, namely integrity of plaintexts and integrity of ciphertexts, and relate them (when coupled with IND-CPA) to the standard notions of privacy (IND-CCA, NM-CPA) by presenting implications and separations between all notions considered. We then analyze the security of authenticated encryption schemes designed by ``generic composition,\u27\u27 meaning making black-box use of a given symmetric encryption scheme and a given MAC. Three composition methods are considered, namely Encrypt-and-MAC, MAC-then-encrypt, and Encrypt-then-MAC. For each of these, and for each notion of security, we indicate whether or not the resulting scheme meets the notion in question assuming the given symmetric encryption scheme is secure against chosen-plaintext attack and the given MAC is unforgeable under chosen-message attack. We provide proofs for the cases where the answer is ``yes\u27\u27 and counter-examples for the cases where the answer is ``no.\u27\u2

    The Direction of Updatable Encryption does not Matter Much

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    Updatable encryption schemes allow for key rotation on ciphertexts. A client outsourcing storage of encrypted data to a cloud server can change its encryption key. The cloud server can update the stored ciphertexts to the new key using only a token provided by the client. This paper solves two open problems in updatable encryption, that of uni-directional vs. bi-directional updates, and post-quantum security. The main result in this paper is to analyze the security notions based on uni- and bi-directional updates. Surprisingly, we prove that uni- and bi-directional variants of each security notion are equivalent. The second result in this paper is to provide a new and efficient updatable encryption scheme based on the Decisional Learning with Error assumption. This gives us post-quantum security. Our scheme is bi-directional, but because of our main result, this is sufficient

    (R)CCA Secure Updatable Encryption with Integrity Protection

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    An updatable encryption scheme allows a data host to update ciphertexts of a client from an old to a new key, given so-called update tokens from the client. Rotation of the encryption key is a common requirement in practice in order to mitigate the impact of key compromises over time. There are two incarnations of updatable encryption: One is ciphertext-dependent, i.e. the data owner has to (partially) download all of his data and derive a dedicated token per ciphertext. Everspaugh et al. (CRYPTO\u2717) proposed CCA and CTXT secure schemes in this setting. The other, more convenient variant is ciphertext-independent, i.e., it allows a single token to update all ciphertexts. However, so far, the broader functionality of tokens in this setting comes at the price of considerably weaker security: the existing schemes by Boneh et al. (CRYPTO\u2713) and Lehmann and Tackmann (EUROCRYPT\u2718) only achieve CPA security and provide no integrity protection. Arguably, when targeting the scenario of outsourcing data to an untrusted host, plaintext integrity should be a minimal security requirement. Otherwise, the data host may alter or inject ciphertexts arbitrarily. Indeed, the schemes from BLMR13 and LT18 suffer from this weakness, and even EPRS17 only provides integrity against adversaries which cannot arbitrarily inject ciphertexts. In this work, we provide the first ciphertext-independent updatable encryption schemes with security beyond \CPA, in particular providing strong integrity protection. Our constructions and security proofs of updatable encryption schemes are surprisingly modular. We give a generic transformation that allows key-rotation and confidentiality/integrity of the scheme to be treated almost separately, i.e., security of the updatable scheme is derived from simple properties of its static building blocks. An interesting side effect of our generic approach is that it immediately implies the unlinkability of ciphertext updates that was introduced as an essential additional property of updatable encryption by EPRS17 and LT18

    Authenticated Encryption in Theory and in Practice

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    The Direction of Updatable Encryption Does Matter

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    We introduce a new definition for key updates, called backward-leak uni-directional key updates, in updatable encryption (UE). This notion is a variant of uni-directional key updates for UE. We show that existing secure UE schemes in the bi-directional key updates setting are not secure in the backward-leak uni-directional key updates setting. Thus, security in the backward-leak uni-directional key updates setting is strictly stronger than security in the bi-directional key updates setting. This result is in sharp contrast to the equivalence theorem by Jiang (Asiacrypt 2020), which says security in the bi-directional key updates setting is equivalent to security in the existing uni-directional key updates setting. We call the existing uni-directional key updates ``forward-leak uni-directional\u27\u27 key updates to distinguish two types of uni-directional key updates in this paper. We also present two UE schemes with the following features. - The first scheme is post-quantum secure in the backward-leak uni-directional key updates setting under the learning with errors assumption. - The second scheme is secure in the no-directional key updates setting and based on indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way functions. This result solves the open problem left by Jiang (Asiacrypt 2020)

    Data Is a Stream: Security of Stream-Based Channels

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    The common approach to defining secure channels in the literature is to consider transportation of discrete messages provided via atomic encryption and decryption interfaces. This, however, ignores that many practical protocols (including TLS, SSH, and QUIC) offer streaming interfaces instead, moreover with the complexity that the network (possibly under adversarial control) may deliver arbitrary fragments of ciphertexts to the receiver. To address this deficiency, we initiate the study of stream-based channels and their security. We present notions of confidentiality and integrity for such channels, akin to the notions for atomic channels, but taking the peculiarities of streams into account. We provide a composition result for our setting, saying that combining chosen-plaintext confidentiality with integrity of the transmitted ciphertext stream lifts confidentiality of the channel to chosen-ciphertext security. Notably, for our proof of this theorem in the streaming setting we need an additional property, called error predictability. We give an AEAD-based construction that achieves our notion of a secure stream-based channel. The construction matches rather well the one used in TLS, providing validation of that protocol\u27s design. Finally, we study how applications that actually aim at transporting atomic messages can do so safely over a stream-based channel. We provide corresponding security notions and a generic and secure \u27encode-then-stream\u27 paradigm

    Cryptographic Security of SSH Encryption Schemes

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    Access Control in Publicly Verifiable Outsourced Computation

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    Publicly Verifiable Outsourced Computation (PVC) allows devices with restricted re-sources to delegate expensive computations to more powerful external servers, and to verify the correctness of results. Whilst highlybeneficial in many situations, this increases the visi-bility and availability of potentially sensitive data, so we may wish to limit the sets of entities that can view input data and results. Additionally, it is highly unlikely that all users have identical and uncontrolled access to all functionality within an organization. Thus there is a need for access control mechanisms in PVC environments. In this work, we define a new framework for Publicly Verifiable Outsourced Computation with Access Control (PVC-AC). We formally define algorithms to provide different PVC functionality for each entity within a large outsourced computation environment, and discuss the forms of access control policies that are applicable, and necessary, in such environments, as well as formally modelling the resulting security properties. Finally, we give an example instantiation that (in a black-box and generic fashion) combines existing PVC schemes with symmetric Key Assignment Schemes to cryptographically enforce the policies of interest.
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