19,890 research outputs found
Perfectly Secure Asynchronous Agreement on a Core Set in Constant Expected Time
A major challenge of any asynchronous MPC protocol is the need to reach agreement on the set of private inputs to be used as input for the MPC functionality. Ben-Or, Canetti and Goldreich [STOC 93] call this problem Agreement on a Core Set (ACS) and solve it by running parallel instances of asynchronous binary Byzantine agreements. To the best of our knowledge, all results in the perfect and statistical security setting used this same paradigm for solving ACS. This leads to a fundamental barrier of expected rounds for any asynchronous MPC protocol (even for constant depth circuits).
We provide a new solution for Agreement on a Core Set that runs in expected rounds, is perfectly secure, and resilient to corruptions. Our solution is based on a new notion of Asynchronously Validated Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement (AVABA) and new information theoretic analogs to techniques used in the authenticated model. We show a similar result with statistical security for
Complexity of Multi-Value Byzantine Agreement
In this paper, we consider the problem of maximizing the throughput of
Byzantine agreement, given that the sum capacity of all links in between nodes
in the system is finite. We have proposed a highly efficient Byzantine
agreement algorithm on values of length l>1 bits. This algorithm uses error
detecting network codes to ensure that fault-free nodes will never disagree,
and routing scheme that is adaptive to the result of error detection. Our
algorithm has a bit complexity of n(n-1)l/(n-t), which leads to a linear cost
(O(n)) per bit agreed upon, and overcomes the quadratic lower bound
(Omega(n^2)) in the literature. Such linear per bit complexity has only been
achieved in the literature by allowing a positive probability of error. Our
algorithm achieves the linear per bit complexity while guaranteeing agreement
is achieved correctly even in the worst case. We also conjecture that our
algorithm can be used to achieve agreement throughput arbitrarily close to the
agreement capacity of a network, when the sum capacity is given
Peer-to-Peer Secure Multi-Party Numerical Computation Facing Malicious Adversaries
We propose an efficient framework for enabling secure multi-party numerical
computations in a Peer-to-Peer network. This problem arises in a range of
applications such as collaborative filtering, distributed computation of trust
and reputation, monitoring and other tasks, where the computing nodes is
expected to preserve the privacy of their inputs while performing a joint
computation of a certain function. Although there is a rich literature in the
field of distributed systems security concerning secure multi-party
computation, in practice it is hard to deploy those methods in very large scale
Peer-to-Peer networks. In this work, we try to bridge the gap between
theoretical algorithms in the security domain, and a practical Peer-to-Peer
deployment.
We consider two security models. The first is the semi-honest model where
peers correctly follow the protocol, but try to reveal private information. We
provide three possible schemes for secure multi-party numerical computation for
this model and identify a single light-weight scheme which outperforms the
others. Using extensive simulation results over real Internet topologies, we
demonstrate that our scheme is scalable to very large networks, with up to
millions of nodes. The second model we consider is the malicious peers model,
where peers can behave arbitrarily, deliberately trying to affect the results
of the computation as well as compromising the privacy of other peers. For this
model we provide a fourth scheme to defend the execution of the computation
against the malicious peers. The proposed scheme has a higher complexity
relative to the semi-honest model. Overall, we provide the Peer-to-Peer network
designer a set of tools to choose from, based on the desired level of security.Comment: Submitted to Peer-to-Peer Networking and Applications Journal (PPNA)
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