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    Perfectly Secure Asynchronous Agreement on a Core Set in Constant Expected Time

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    A major challenge of any asynchronous MPC protocol is the need to reach agreement on the set of private inputs to be used as input for the MPC functionality. Ben-Or, Canetti and Goldreich [STOC 93] call this problem Agreement on a Core Set (ACS) and solve it by running nn parallel instances of asynchronous binary Byzantine agreements. To the best of our knowledge, all results in the perfect and statistical security setting used this same paradigm for solving ACS. This leads to a fundamental barrier of expected Ω(logn)\Omega(\log n) rounds for any asynchronous MPC protocol (even for constant depth circuits). We provide a new solution for Agreement on a Core Set that runs in expected O(1)O(1) rounds, is perfectly secure, and resilient to t<n4t<\frac{n}{4} corruptions. Our solution is based on a new notion of Asynchronously Validated Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement (AVABA) and new information theoretic analogs to techniques used in the authenticated model. We show a similar result with statistical security for t<n3t<\frac{n}{3}

    Complexity of Multi-Value Byzantine Agreement

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    In this paper, we consider the problem of maximizing the throughput of Byzantine agreement, given that the sum capacity of all links in between nodes in the system is finite. We have proposed a highly efficient Byzantine agreement algorithm on values of length l>1 bits. This algorithm uses error detecting network codes to ensure that fault-free nodes will never disagree, and routing scheme that is adaptive to the result of error detection. Our algorithm has a bit complexity of n(n-1)l/(n-t), which leads to a linear cost (O(n)) per bit agreed upon, and overcomes the quadratic lower bound (Omega(n^2)) in the literature. Such linear per bit complexity has only been achieved in the literature by allowing a positive probability of error. Our algorithm achieves the linear per bit complexity while guaranteeing agreement is achieved correctly even in the worst case. We also conjecture that our algorithm can be used to achieve agreement throughput arbitrarily close to the agreement capacity of a network, when the sum capacity is given

    Peer-to-Peer Secure Multi-Party Numerical Computation Facing Malicious Adversaries

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    We propose an efficient framework for enabling secure multi-party numerical computations in a Peer-to-Peer network. This problem arises in a range of applications such as collaborative filtering, distributed computation of trust and reputation, monitoring and other tasks, where the computing nodes is expected to preserve the privacy of their inputs while performing a joint computation of a certain function. Although there is a rich literature in the field of distributed systems security concerning secure multi-party computation, in practice it is hard to deploy those methods in very large scale Peer-to-Peer networks. In this work, we try to bridge the gap between theoretical algorithms in the security domain, and a practical Peer-to-Peer deployment. We consider two security models. The first is the semi-honest model where peers correctly follow the protocol, but try to reveal private information. We provide three possible schemes for secure multi-party numerical computation for this model and identify a single light-weight scheme which outperforms the others. Using extensive simulation results over real Internet topologies, we demonstrate that our scheme is scalable to very large networks, with up to millions of nodes. The second model we consider is the malicious peers model, where peers can behave arbitrarily, deliberately trying to affect the results of the computation as well as compromising the privacy of other peers. For this model we provide a fourth scheme to defend the execution of the computation against the malicious peers. The proposed scheme has a higher complexity relative to the semi-honest model. Overall, we provide the Peer-to-Peer network designer a set of tools to choose from, based on the desired level of security.Comment: Submitted to Peer-to-Peer Networking and Applications Journal (PPNA) 200
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