Overview and classification of coordination contracts within forward and reverse supply chains

Among coordination mechanisms, contracts are valuable tools used in both theory and practice to coordinate various supply chains. The focus of this paper is to present an overview of contracts and a classification of coordination contracts and contracting literature in the form of classification schemes. The two criteria used for contract classification, as resulted from contracting literature, are transfer payment contractual incentives and inventory risk sharing. The overview classification of the existing literature has as criteria the level of detail used in designing the coordination models with applicability on the forward and reverse supply chains.Coordination contracts; forward supply chain; reverse supply chain

The value of coordination in a two echelon supply chain: Sharing information, policies and parameters.

We study a coordination scheme in a two echelon supply chain. It involves sharing details of replenishment rules, lead-times, demand patterns and tuning the replenishment rules to exploit the supply chain's cost structure. We examine four different coordination strategies; naïve operation, local optimisation, global optimisation and altruistic behaviour on behalf of the retailer. We assume the retailer and the manufacturer use the Order-Up-To policy to determine replenishment orders and end consumers demand is a stationary i.i.d. random variable. We derive the variance of the retailer's order rate and inventory levels and the variance of the manufacturer's order rate and inventory levels. We initially assume that costs in the supply chain are directly proportional to these variances (and later the standard deviations) and investigate the options available to the supply chain members for minimising costs. Our results show that if the retailer takes responsibility for supply chain cost reduction and acts altruistically by dampening his order variability, then the performance enhancement is robust to both the actual costs in the supply chain and to a naïve or uncooperative manufacturer. Superior performance is achievable if firms coordinate their actions and if they find ways to re-allocate the supply chain gain.Bullwhip; Global optimisation; Inventory variance; Local optimisation; Supply chains; Studies; Coordination; Supply chain; IT; Replenishment rule; Rules; Demand; Patterns; Cost; Structure; Strategy; Retailer; Policy; Order; Variance; Inventory; Costs; Options; Variability; Performance; Performance enhancement; Firms;

Coordination mechanisms for inventory control in three-echelon serial and distribution systems

This paper is concerned with the coordination of inventory control in three-echelon serial and distribution systems under decentralized control. All installations in these supply chains track echelon inventories. Under decentralized control the installations will decide upon base stock levels that minimize their own inventory costs. In general these levels do not coincide with the optimal base stock levels in the global optimum of the chain under centralized control. Hence, the total cost under decentralized control is larger than under centralized control. \ud To remove this cost inefficiency, two simple coordination mechanisms are presented: one for serial systems and one for distribution systems. Both mechanisms are initiated by the most downstream installation(s). The upstream installation increases its base stock level while the downstream installation compensates the upstream one for the increase of costs and provides it with a part of its gain from coordination. It is shown that both coordination mechanisms result in the global optimum of the chain being the unique Nash equilibrium of the corresponding strategic game. Furthermore, all installations agree upon the use of these mechanisms because they result in lower costs per installation. The practical implementation of these mechanisms is discussed

The study of relationships between the collaboration for supply chain, supply chain capabilities and firm performance: A case of the Taiwan׳s TFT-LCD industry

[[abstract]]Academic and business fields have frequently examined the significance and influence of collaborative development interactions and feedback mechanisms for supply chain value innovation. Value co-creation and value constellations, which serve as innovation drivers in channel integration, are positively associated with supply chain performance. We investigated the relationships among collaborative supply chain value innovation (CSCVI), supply chain capabilities (SCCs), and firm performance by examining a case of the thin-film transistor liquid crystal display (TFT-LCD) industry in Taiwan.[[notice]]補正完畢[[incitationindex]]SSCI[[booktype]]紙

Game theoretic approach for coordinating unlimited multi echelon supply chains

In order to achieve the overall objectives of the supply chain (SC), there have been seen many contradictions between the components and different levels, and these disorders may result in decreased strength and competitiveness The main contradictions that are considered in this paper comprise inventory, pricing and marketing costs in an unlimited three echelon supply chain. The basics of the game theory make it a suitable and reliable tool for solving contradiction situations by considering all the levels and players’ goals. Initially, an unlimited three echelon supply chain, including S suppliers, M manufacturers, and K retailers, is considered in order to solve the aforementioned problem. Further on, a nonlinear mathematical cooperative model based on specific assumptions, game theory approach, Nash equilibrium definition, Pareto efficiency, and revenue sharing contract is proposed. Subsequently, the proposed model is employed in a numerical example, and the results are illustrated according to the genetic algorithm. Furthermore, the sensitivity of the proposed model is analysed using the design of experiment. Ultimately, the validation of the proposed cooperative model is assessed by the simulatio

Supply chain contracting coordination for fresh products with fresh-keeping effort

Purpose – Fresh product loss rates in supply chain operations are particularly high due to the nature of perishable products. This paper aims to maximize profit through the contract between retailer and supplier. The optimized prices for the retailer and the supplier, taking the fresh-keeping effort into consideration, are derived. Design/methodology/approach – To address this issue, we consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a retailer and a supplier (i.e., wholesaler) for two scenarios: centralized and decentralized decision-making. We start from investigating the optimal decision in the centralized supply chain and then comparing the results with those of the decentralized decision. Meanwhile, a fresh-keeping cost-sharing contract and a fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract are designed. Numerical examples are provided, and managerial insights are discussed at end. Findings – The results show that (a) the centralized decision is more profitable than the decentralized decision; (b) a fresh product supply chain can only be coordinated through a fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract; (c) the optimal retail price, wholesale price and fresh-keeping effort can all be achieved; (d) the profit of a fresh product supply chain is positively related to consumers’ sensitivity to freshness and negatively correlated with their sensitivity to price. Originality/value – Few studies have considered fresh-keeping effort as a decision variable in the modelling of supply chain. In this paper, a mathematical model for the fresh-keeping effort and for price decisions in a supply chain is developed. In particular, fresh-keeping cost sharing contract and revenue-sharing contract are examined simultaneously in the study of the supply chain coordination problem