19 research outputs found
Bidder support in iterative, multiple-unit combinatorial auctions
Get PDFThis thesis is about supporting the bidders' decision making in iterative combinatorial auctions. A combinatorial auction refers to an auction with multiple (heterogeneous) items, in which bidders can submit bids on packages. Combinatorial auctions are challenging decision making environments for bidders, which hinders the adoption of combinatorial mechanisms into practice. Bidding is especially challenging in sealed-bid auctions. Bidders do not know the contents of other bidders' bids and hence cannot place bids that would team up with existing bids to become winners. The objective of this study is to develop and test support tools for bidders in semi-sealed-bid, iterative combinatorial auctions. The tools are designed for reverse auctions, but can easily be applied to a forward setting.
The Quantity Support Mechanism (QSM) is a support tool, which provides the bidders with a list of bid suggestions. The bid suggestions are such that if submitted, they would become provisional winners. The QSM benefits both bidders and the buyer, because it chooses suggestions that are most profitable for the bidders while decreasing the total cost to the buyer. The QSM is based on a mixed integer programming problem.
The QSM was tested in two simulation studies. The results of the studies indicated that the QSM works well - it is much better to use the QSM than no support - but that it does not necessarily guide the auctions to the efficient allocation. The QSM was also integrated into an online auctions system, and tested with human subjects. The results of the laboratory experiment showed that the performance of the QSM is dependent on the bidders' behavior and the kind of bids they place in the auction. The user interface of the auction was good. I also observed bidders' strategies, and could identify different bidder types corresponding to those reported in earlier studies. The experiment also showed the importance of experience in complex bidding environments.
The simulation studies and the laboratory experiment showed that the QSM is too dependent on the existing bids in the bid stream, which causes the auctions to end in inefficient allocations. In order to overcome this problem we designed another support tool, the Group Support Mechanism (GSM). The main logic in the GSM is similar to the QSM. The main difference is that instead of solving for one bid that complements existing bids to become a winner, the GSM can suggest several bids for different bidders. Together this set of bids would then become provisionally winning. The preliminary tests show significant improvement in the efficiency of the auction outcomes when the GSM was used instead of the QSM.
Future research includes the further development of the GSM and its testing with simulations and human subjects. Also, bidder behavior, bidder strategies and the effect of learning and experience in combinatorial auctions should be further studied. This is important because bidders' behavior in the auctions affects the auction design and the requirements for the user interface
Cost Allocation: Methods, Principles, Applications
Get PDFThis book provides a theoretical framework for systematically evaluating the "pros" and "cons" of various methods. It also includes a series of case studies in cost allocation to give a sense of the real problems encountered in implementation. Among the examples treated are telecommunications pricing, multipurpose reservoir charges, and airport landing fees. Finally several articles address the broader fairness issues inherent in the pricing of public services. The history of the notion of the "just price" from medieval to modern times is discussed, together with observations on what principles seem to guide decisions in telecommunications rate cases in the United States. The connections between cost allocation, efficiency, and entry in the telecommunications market are also examined in two different contexts: the U.S. and France.
The overall aim of the book is to provide theoretical foundations for using specific methods, to examine the distributional and fairness issues involved in cost allocation, and to give a sense of the practical problems encountered in implementation.
The book will appeal to practitioners interested in what allocation methods are available, and to theorists concerned with their axiomatic foundations
Advances in Computational Social Science and Social Simulation
Get PDFAquesta conferència és la celebració conjunta de la "10th Artificial Economics Conference AE", la "10th Conference of the European Social Simulation Association ESSA" i la "1st Simulating the Past to Understand Human History SPUHH".Conferència organitzada pel Laboratory for Socio-Historical Dynamics Simulation (LSDS-UAB) de la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.Readers will find results of recent research on computational social science and social simulation economics, management, sociology,and history written by leading experts in the field. SOCIAL SIMULATION (former ESSA) conferences constitute annual events which serve as an international platform for the exchange of ideas and discussion of cutting edge research in the field of social simulations, both from the theoretical as well as applied perspective, and the 2014 edition benefits from the cross-fertilization of three different research communities into one single event. The volume consists of 122 articles, corresponding to most of the contributions to the conferences, in three different formats: short abstracts (presentation of work-in-progress research), posters (presentation of models and results), and full papers (presentation of social simulation research including results and discussion). The compilation is completed with indexing lists to help finding articles by title, author and thematic content. We are convinced that this book will serve interested readers as a useful compendium which presents in a nutshell the most recent advances at the frontiers of computational social sciences and social simulation researc
