Design of a combinatorial double auction for local energy markets

International audienceLocal energy markets allow neighbours to exchange energy among them. Their traditional implementation using sequential auctions has proven to be inefficient and even counterproductive in some cases. In this paper we propose a combinatorial double auction for the exchange of energy for several time-slots simultaneously. We suppose that participants have a flexible demand; flexibility being obtained, for example, by the usage of a battery. We show the benefits of the approach and we provide an example of how it can improve the utility of all the participants in the market

Coordination of Distributed Energy Resource Agents

This article describes our research in technologies for the management and control of distributed energy resources. An agent-based management and control system is being developed to enable largescale deployment of distributed energy resources. Local intelligent agents will allow consumers who are connected at low levels in the distribution network to manage their energy requirements and participate in coordination responses to network stimuli. Such responses can be used to reduce the volatility of wholesale electricity prices and assist constrained networks during summer and winter demand peaks. In our system, the coordination of energy resources is decentralized. Energy resources coordinate each other to realize efficient autonomous matching of supply and demand in large power distribution networks. The information exchange is through indirect (or stigmergic) communications between agents. The coordination mechanism is asynchronous and adapts to change in an unsupervised manner, making it intrinsically scalable and robust

A Flexible model for Tree-Structured Multi-Commodity Markets

In this article we study tree-structured multi-commodity markets. The concept is a way to handle dependencies between commodities on the market in a tractable way. The winner determination problem of a general combinatorial market is well known to be NP-hard. It has been shown that on single-unit single-sided auctions with tree-structured bundles the problem can be computed in polynomial time. We show that it is possible to extend this to multi-unit double-sided markets. Further it is possible to handle the commodities of a bundle not only as complements but as perfect substitutes too. Under certain conditions the computation time is still polynomial