Evolutionary Game Theory

Articl

Riemannian game dynamics

We study a class of evolutionary game dynamics defined by balancing a gain determined by the game's payoffs against a cost of motion that captures the difficulty with which the population moves between states. Costs of motion are represented by a Riemannian metric, i.e., a state-dependent inner product on the set of population states. The replicator dynamics and the (Euclidean) projection dynamics are the archetypal examples of the class we study. Like these representative dynamics, all Riemannian game dynamics satisfy certain basic desiderata, including positive correlation and global convergence in potential games. Moreover, when the underlying Riemannian metric satisfies a Hessian integrability condition, the resulting dynamics preserve many further properties of the replicator and projection dynamics. We examine the close connections between Hessian game dynamics and reinforcement learning in normal form games, extending and elucidating a well-known link between the replicator dynamics and exponential reinforcement learning.Comment: 47 pages, 12 figures; added figures and further simplified the derivation of the dynamic

Selected topics on reaction-diffusion-advection models from spatial ecology

We discuss the effects of movement and spatial heterogeneity on population dynamics via reaction-diffusion-advection models, focusing on the persistence, competition, and evolution of organisms in spatially heterogeneous environments. Topics include Lokta-Volterra competition models, river models, evolution of biased movement, phytoplankton growth, and spatial spread of epidemic disease. Open problems and conjectures are presented