145,717 research outputs found
Decentralized Protection Strategies against SIS Epidemics in Networks
Defining an optimal protection strategy against viruses, spam propagation or
any other kind of contamination process is an important feature for designing
new networks and architectures. In this work, we consider decentralized optimal
protection strategies when a virus is propagating over a network through a SIS
epidemic process. We assume that each node in the network can fully protect
itself from infection at a constant cost, or the node can use recovery
software, once it is infected.
We model our system using a game theoretic framework and find pure, mixed
equilibria, and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) in several network topologies.
Further, we propose both a decentralized algorithm and an iterative procedure
to compute a pure equilibrium in the general case of a multiple communities
network. Finally, we evaluate the algorithms and give numerical illustrations
of all our results.Comment: accepted for publication in IEEE Transactions on Control of Network
System
Controlled Matching Game for Resource Allocation and User Association in WLANs
In multi-rate IEEE 802.11 WLANs, the traditional user association based on
the strongest received signal and the well known anomaly of the MAC protocol
can lead to overloaded Access Points (APs), and poor or heterogeneous
performance. Our goal is to propose an alternative game-theoretic approach for
association. We model the joint resource allocation and user association as a
matching game with complementarities and peer effects consisting of selfish
players solely interested in their individual throughputs. Using recent
game-theoretic results we first show that various resource sharing protocols
actually fall in the scope of the set of stability-inducing resource allocation
schemes. The game makes an extensive use of the Nash bargaining and some of its
related properties that allow to control the incentives of the players. We show
that the proposed mechanism can greatly improve the efficiency of 802.11 with
heterogeneous nodes and reduce the negative impact of peer effects such as its
MAC anomaly. The mechanism can be implemented as a virtual connectivity
management layer to achieve efficient APs-user associations without
modification of the MAC layer
Spatial interactions in agent-based modeling
Agent Based Modeling (ABM) has become a widespread approach to model complex
interactions. In this chapter after briefly summarizing some features of ABM
the different approaches in modeling spatial interactions are discussed.
It is stressed that agents can interact either indirectly through a shared
environment and/or directly with each other. In such an approach, higher-order
variables such as commodity prices, population dynamics or even institutions,
are not exogenously specified but instead are seen as the results of
interactions. It is highlighted in the chapter that the understanding of
patterns emerging from such spatial interaction between agents is a key problem
as much as their description through analytical or simulation means.
The chapter reviews different approaches for modeling agents' behavior,
taking into account either explicit spatial (lattice based) structures or
networks. Some emphasis is placed on recent ABM as applied to the description
of the dynamics of the geographical distribution of economic activities, - out
of equilibrium. The Eurace@Unibi Model, an agent-based macroeconomic model with
spatial structure, is used to illustrate the potential of such an approach for
spatial policy analysis.Comment: 26 pages, 5 figures, 105 references; a chapter prepared for the book
"Complexity and Geographical Economics - Topics and Tools", P. Commendatore,
S.S. Kayam and I. Kubin, Eds. (Springer, in press, 2014
Dynamic Effects on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements
In terms of the number of signatories, one observes both large and small international environmental agreements. The theoretical literature, based on game theory, discusses different concepts and mechanisms for the stability of coalitions and has reached the conclusion that, under farsightedness, both large and small stable coalitions can occur. In the context of a repeated game, this implies that large stable coalitions can also be sustained over time by a simple trigger mechanism, for large enough discount factors. However, if changes in time implement changes in state, this conclusion does not hold anymore: only small stable coalitions can be sustained.IEAâs, Coalitional stability, Dynamics
When Europe encounters urban governance: Policy Types, Actor Games and Mechanisms of cites Europeanization
This paper examines European Union (EU) causal mechanisms and policy instruments affecting the urban domain throughout the lenses of the Europeanization approach. Instead of looking at EU instruments that are formally/legally consecrated to cities, we use theoretical public policy analysis to explore the arenas and the causal mechanisms that structure the encounters between the EU and urban systems of governance. Policy instruments are related to policy arenas and in turn to different mechanisms of transmission thus originating a typology of European Policy Modes. The paper focuses on four different EU instruments in the in the macro-area of sustainable development and proposes potential game-theoretical models for each of them.
In the conclusions we highlight the differences between this approach and the traditional analysis of EU urban policy, and suggest avenues for future empirical research based on typologies of policy instruments and modes of Europeanization
Delivering services by building and running virtual organisations
Non peer reviewedPostprin
- âŠ