Controlled Matching Game for Resource Allocation and User Association in WLANs

In multi-rate IEEE 802.11 WLANs, the traditional user association based on the strongest received signal and the well known anomaly of the MAC protocol can lead to overloaded Access Points (APs), and poor or heterogeneous performance. Our goal is to propose an alternative game-theoretic approach for association. We model the joint resource allocation and user association as a matching game with complementarities and peer effects consisting of selfish players solely interested in their individual throughputs. Using recent game-theoretic results we first show that various resource sharing protocols actually fall in the scope of the set of stability-inducing resource allocation schemes. The game makes an extensive use of the Nash bargaining and some of its related properties that allow to control the incentives of the players. We show that the proposed mechanism can greatly improve the efficiency of 802.11 with heterogeneous nodes and reduce the negative impact of peer effects such as its MAC anomaly. The mechanism can be implemented as a virtual connectivity management layer to achieve efficient APs-user associations without modification of the MAC layer

Organizational Pay Mix: The Implications of Various Theoretical Perspectives for the Conceptualization and Measurement of Individual Pay Components

While pay mix is one of the most frequently used variables in recent compensation research, its theoretical relevance and measurement remains underdeveloped. There is little agreement among studies on the definitions of the various forms of pay that go into pay mix. Even studies that examine the same theories tend to overlook the implications of differences in the measures and meanings of pay mix used in other studies. Our study explores the meaning of pay mix using several theories commonly used in recent compensation research (agency, efficiency wage, expectancy, equity, and person-organization fit). Recent studies generally use a single measure of mix (e.g., bonus/base, or stock options/total, or benefits/base). We argue that to fully understand the effects of employee compensation, the multiple forms of compensation must be taken into account. Therefore, we derived pay mix measures from the theories commonly used in compensation research. We classified the pay mix policies of 478 firms using cluster-analytic techniques. We found that the classification of organizations based on their pay mix depends on the measures used. We suggest that as more realistic measures of pay mix leads to reinterpretation of compensation research and offers directions for theory development

Schools of Education, Theory Production, and Institutional Reform

The purpose of this brief study is to examine the constraints on theory production in schools of education, especially relative to Christian schools of education

On shoplifting and tax fraud: An action-theoretic analysis of crime

The article evaluates different theories of action in the area of crime research. A narrow version of rational choice theory assumes actors to choose in an instrumental, outcome-oriented way. It hypothesises that individuals weight the costs and benefits of criminal acts with subjective probabilities. In contrast, a wide version of the theory allows individuals to derive utility directly from choosing certain actions. Previous studies either do not directly test these theories or yield inconsistent results. We show that a meaningful test of these rival rational choice explanations can only be conducted if a broader view is adopted that takes into account the interplay of moral norms and instrumental incentives. Such a view can be derived from the Model of Frame Selection (Kroneberg 2005) and the Situational Action Theory of Crime Causation (Wikström 2004). Based on these theories, we analyze the willingness to engage in shoplifting and tax fraud in a sample of 2,130 adults from Dresden, Germany. In line with our theoretical expectations, we find that only respondents who do not feel bound by moral norms consider instrumental incentives. Where norms have been strongly internalised and in the absence of neutralisation techniques which legitimise norm-breaking, instrumental incentives are irrelevant.

Social Game for Building Energy Efficiency: Utility Learning, Simulation, and Analysis

We describe a social game that we designed for encouraging energy efficient behavior amongst building occupants with the aim of reducing overall energy consumption in the building. Occupants vote for their desired lighting level and win points which are used in a lottery based on how far their vote is from the maximum setting. We assume that the occupants are utility maximizers and that their utility functions capture the tradeoff between winning points and their comfort level. We model the occupants as non-cooperative agents in a continuous game and we characterize their play using the Nash equilibrium concept. Using occupant voting data, we parameterize their utility functions and use a convex optimization problem to estimate the parameters. We simulate the game defined by the estimated utility functions and show that the estimated model for occupant behavior is a good predictor of their actual behavior. In addition, we show that due to the social game, there is a significant reduction in energy consumption

Understanding and Managing Behavioural Risks -The Case of Food Risks Caused by Malpractice in Poultry Production

The probability that actors in economic relationships break rules increases with the profits they thus expect to earn. It decreases with the probability and level of short- and long-term losses resulting from disclosure. It also decreases with the level of social context factors and intrinsic values which shield actors from yielding to economic temptations. This paper assesses the relative merits of various scientific approaches concerned with risks in economic relationships and outlines their contribution to the study of opportunistic rule-breaking. Since the identification of (misdirected) economic incentives faced by firms and individuals represents the starting point for a systematic analysis of opportunism in any field, we also outline a microeconomic approach that systematically provides this crucial information. The approach is applied to the problem of food quality and safety threatened by opportunistic malpractice of food business operators. Its essentials are illustrated through a study which systematically searches for the temptations to break production-related rules in the poultry industries.asymmetric information, control theories, economic misconduct, game theory, moral hazard, principal-agent model, opportunism, protective factors, relational risks, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, A13, K32, K42,

Tuning the Diversity of Open-Ended Responses from the Crowd

Crowdsourcing can solve problems that current fully automated systems cannot. Its effectiveness depends on the reliability, accuracy, and speed of the crowd workers that drive it. These objectives are frequently at odds with one another. For instance, how much time should workers be given to discover and propose new solutions versus deliberate over those currently proposed? How do we determine if discovering a new answer is appropriate at all? And how do we manage workers who lack the expertise or attention needed to provide useful input to a given task? We present a mechanism that uses distinct payoffs for three possible worker actions---propose,vote, or abstain---to provide workers with the necessary incentives to guarantee an effective (or even optimal) balance between searching for new answers, assessing those currently available, and, when they have insufficient expertise or insight for the task at hand, abstaining. We provide a novel game theoretic analysis for this mechanism and test it experimentally on an image---labeling problem and show that it allows a system to reliably control the balance betweendiscovering new answers and converging to existing ones