84 research outputs found

    Metasemantics and fuzzy mathematics

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    The present thesis is an inquiry into the metasemantics of natural languages, with a particular focus on the philosophical motivations for countenancing degreed formal frameworks for both psychosemantics and truth-conditional semantics. Chapter 1 sets out to offer a bird's eye view of our overall research project and the key questions that we set out to address. Chapter 2 provides a self-contained overview of the main empirical findings in the cognitive science of concepts and categorisation. This scientific background is offered in light of the fact that most variants of psychologically-informed semantics see our network of concepts as providing the raw materials on which lexical and sentential meanings supervene. Consequently, the metaphysical study of internalistically-construed meanings and the empirical study of our mental categories are overlapping research projects. Chapter 3 closely investigates a selection of species of conceptual semantics, together with reasons for adopting or disavowing them. We note that our ultimate aim is not to defend these perspectives on the study of meaning, but to argue that the project of making them formally precise naturally invites the adoption of degreed mathematical frameworks (e.g. probabilistic or fuzzy). In Chapter 4, we switch to the orthodox framework of truth-conditional semantics, and we present the limitations of a philosophical position that we call "classicism about vagueness". In the process, we come up with an empirical hypothesis for the psychological pull of the inductive soritical premiss and we make an original objection against the epistemicist position, based on computability theory. Chapter 5 makes a different case for the adoption of degreed semantic frameworks, based on their (quasi-)superior treatments of the paradoxes of vagueness. Hence, the adoption of tools that allow for graded membership are well-motivated under both semantic internalism and semantic externalism. At the end of this chapter, we defend an unexplored view of vagueness that we call "practical fuzzicism". Chapter 6, viz. the final chapter, is a metamathematical enquiry into both the fuzzy model-theoretic semantics and the fuzzy Davidsonian semantics for formal languages of type-free truth in which precise truth-predications can be expressed

    Epistemic Modality, Mind, and Mathematics

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    This book concerns the foundations of epistemic modality. I examine the nature of epistemic modality, when the modal operator is interpreted as concerning both apriority and conceivability, as well as states of knowledge and belief. The book demonstrates how epistemic modality relates to the computational theory of mind; metaphysical modality; the types of mathematical modality; to the epistemic status of large cardinal axioms, undecidable propositions, and abstraction principles in the philosophy of mathematics; to the modal profile of rational intuition; and to the types of intention, when the latter is interpreted as a modal mental state. Chapter \textbf{2} argues for a novel type of expressivism based on the duality between the categories of coalgebras and algebras, and argues that the duality permits of the reconciliation between modal cognitivism and modal expressivism. Chapter \textbf{3} provides an abstraction principle for epistemic intensions. Chapter \textbf{4} advances a topic-sensitive two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, and provides three novel interpretations of the framework along with the epistemic and metasemantic. Chapter \textbf{5} applies the fixed points of the modal μ\mu-calculus in order to account for the iteration of epistemic states, by contrast to availing of modal axiom 4 (i.e. the KK principle). Chapter \textbf{6} advances a solution to the Julius Caesar problem based on Fine's "criterial" identity conditions which incorporate conditions on essentiality and grounding. Chapter \textbf{7} provides a ground-theoretic regimentation of the proposals in the metaphysics of consciousness and examines its bearing on the two-dimensional conceivability argument against physicalism. The topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapter \textbf{4} is availed of in order for epistemic states to be a guide to metaphysical states in the hyperintensional setting. Chapter \textbf{8} examines the modal commitments of abstractionism, in particular necessitism, and epistemic modality and the epistemology of abstraction. Chapter \textbf{9} examines the modal profile of Ω\Omega-logic in set theory. Chapter \textbf{10} examines the interaction between epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, epistemic set theory, and absolute decidability. Chapter \textbf{11} avails of modal coalgebraic automata to interpret the defining properties of indefinite extensibility, and avails of epistemic two-dimensional semantics in order to account for the interaction of the interpretational and objective modalities thereof. The hyperintensional, topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapter \textbf{2} is applied in chapters \textbf{7}, \textbf{8}, \textbf{10}, and \textbf{11}. Chapter \textbf{12} provides a modal logic for rational intuition and provides four models of hyperintensional semantics. Chapter \textbf{13} examines modal responses to the alethic paradoxes. Chapter \textbf{14} examines, finally, the modal semantics for the different types of intention and the relation of the latter to evidential decision theory

    The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience

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    Philosoph

    Attentional actions - An Ecological-Enactive account of utterances of concrete words

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    This paper proposes an ecological-enactive account of utterances of concrete words-words used to indicate observable situations, events, objects, or characteristics. Building on the education of attention model of learning, utterances of concrete words are defined as attentional actions: A repeatable form of behaviour performed by a person to indicate (i.e. point out) a particular aspect of the current situation to someone in order to achieve something. Based on recent empirical evidence on categorical colour perception, attentional actions are proposed to constrain the ongoing phenotypic reorganisation of persons into task-specific devices. The paper ends by situating the proposed account in a wider theoretical perspective on language. This paper serves two purposes: First, it undermines the scope objection against the ecological-enactive approach, and second, it provides a novel explanation for recent empirical evidence with respect to the role of language in categorical colour perception

    An Analysis of the Suitability of Philosophy as a Core K-12 Public School Subject

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    In 2005 Michael Katz invited philosophers of education to reinvigorate the inquiry into what is required to provide a proper education for everyone to lead a productive life. In the literature review, I analyze the suitability of philosophy in teaching K-12 students how to think and reason logically—essential abilities for a productive life. I also examine the educational landscape through the philosophy of Nicholas Rescher’s Cognitive-Values Theory and address the value of learning philosophy. I present a Philosophical Dialectic that shows how epistemic diversity (aporetic clusters) justifies making philosophy a K-12 core subject while analyzing philosophers’ reasons for including philosophy as a core K-12 public school subject. Finally, I assess the Philosophical Dialectic by applying the Heuristic-Systematic Model. Because cognition and metacognition require training the mind, I show how philosophy is most suited to provide this systematically. I assess how Artificial Intelligence (general and generative) is interrupting pedagogy and how a K-12 philosophy curriculum can both mitigate and harness this positively. I demonstrate the importance of neuroscientific research and why this must inform curriculum construction. In Chapter Three, I provide a Scope and Sequence for a Philosophy K-12 curriculum to demonstrate how logic, reasoning, and critical thinking develop students’ cognition and metacognition. I present reasons why philosophy has become the elephant in the room, even though it is the subject best suited to teach children systematically how to think well. I present a rationale for why colleges of education must recruit trainee teachers educated in philosophy to be trained as philosophy teachers and why philosophy should be a core K-12 subject

    An Access theory of self-control: Essays on self-control, ADHD, and stimulant medication

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    This dissertation consists of four articles and an introductory essay, the overarching aim of which is to investigate the nature of self-control and its implications. I defend a value-deflationist definition of self-control, according to which self-control is that which is enacted to align one’s behaviour with intention in the face of competing motivation. This radical revision of the concept of self-control, which under its received denotation is associated with motivational hierarchies under various guises, allows for a conception of self-control that is consistent even in the absence of clear value hierarchies. For my account, self-control is defined by its behavioural function, not by its reliance on any specific cognitive or neural process. As a result, self-control can be realized by a large range of functionally equivalent processes. Some such processes are intrapsychic, such as inhibition, rehearsal of reasons, and construal. Others are situational, such as environmental selection and modification as well as social processes of self-control. Not all self-control processes are equally available for all agents, however. Some processes that are heavily reliant on executive functioning, such as inhibition and rehearsal of reasons, are unavailable for agents with executive dysfunction. For other self-control processes, social and economic constraints delimit their availability. It then becomes of utmost importance that agents are aware of such means of self-control that are a good fit for the agent and her situation. In this dissertation I analyse individual differences in self-control in terms of differences in access to self-control behaviours, articulating criteria for access to self-control and demonstrating how epistemic and practical constraints contingently modulate access to self-control in a manner that results in aggravated individual differences in self-control. I also discuss various implications of the access theory of self-control. implications span assessments of responsibility for failures of self-control; accounting for individual differences in self-control, including when these differences are connected to diagnoses such as Attention Deficit /Hyperactivity Disorder; and the prospects of self-control neuroenhancement
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