A MIP framework for non-convex uniform price day-ahead electricity auctions

It is well-known that a market equilibrium with uniform prices often does not exist in non-convex day-ahead electricity auctions. We consider the case of the non-convex, uniform-price Pan-European day-ahead electricity market "PCR" (Price Coupling of Regions), with non-convexities arising from so-called complex and block orders. Extending previous results, we propose a new primal-dual framework for these auctions, which has applications in both economic analysis and algorithm design. The contribution here is threefold. First, from the algorithmic point of view, we give a non-trivial exact (i.e. not approximate) linearization of a non-convex 'minimum income condition' that must hold for complex orders arising from the Spanish market, avoiding the introduction of any auxiliary variables, and allowing us to solve market clearing instances involving most of the bidding products proposed in PCR using off-the-shelf MIP solvers. Second, from the economic analysis point of view, we give the first MILP formulations of optimization problems such as the maximization of the traded volume, or the minimization of opportunity costs of paradoxically rejected block bids. We first show on a toy example that these two objectives are distinct from maximizing welfare. We also recover directly a previously noted property of an alternative market model. Third, we provide numerical experiments on realistic large-scale instances. They illustrate the efficiency of the approach, as well as the economics trade-offs that may occur in practice

Market design

Europe is liberalising electricity in accordance with the European Commission’s Electricity Directives. Different countries have responded differently, notably in the extent of restructuring, treatment of mergers, market power, and vertical unbundling. While Britain and Norway have achieved effective competition, others like Germany, Spain and France are still struggling to deal with dominant and sometimes vertically integrated companies. The Netherlands offers an interesting intermediate case, where good economic analysis has sometimes been thwarted by legalistic interpretations. Investment under the new Emissions Trading system could further transform the electricity industry but may be hampered by slow progress in liberalising European gas markets

Bid price-based revenue management approaches in manufacturing industries

Whenever demand exceeds capacity, the available resources must be allocated to the incoming demand. A simple first-come-first-served allocation can lead to rather poor results if the demand is heterogeneous, i.e., if orders differ in their strategic importance for a company, their willingness to pay, their lead time requirements, etc. In addition, the decisions must be made under uncertainty because demand is often stochastic. If too many low value orders are rejected, capacity might remain unused. On the other hand, if too many low value orders are accepted, there might be not enough capacity to accept all high value orders. Apart from the order acceptance decision, it might also be preferable to delay the order release of already accepted orders, even if capacity is available, to reserve capacity for future high value orders. This thesis considers the demand management decisions in different order-driven production environments. Orders are accepted or rejected immediately upon arrival, and at the beginning of each planning period, the set of orders to be released is selected. As exact solution methods are computationally intractable, bid price-based revenue management approaches are applied to maximize the contribution margin gained by accepted orders minus holding and backlog costs. The first essay considers a deterministic single-stage assembly process, where both capacity and intermediate materials are scarce resources. In this essay, for each accepted order a due date is quoted and the accepted orders are scheduled such that the quoted due dates are kept. The second essay considers a deterministic multi-stage make-to-order production system. In this study, intermediate materials are assumed to be unlimited available. The third essay considers a multi-stage make-to-order production system with stochastic influences. To take into account that in these production systems, lead times depend non-linearly on the load of the system, clearing functions are used to model the production system

Local Market Mechanisms: how Local Markets can shape the Energy Transition

Europe has embarked on a journey towards a zero-emission system, with the power system at its core. From electricity generation to electric vehicles, the European power system must transform into an interconnected, intelligent network. To achieve this vision, active user participation is crucial, ensuring transparency, efficiency, and inclusivity. Thus, Europe has increasingly focused on the concept of markets in all their facets. This thesis seeks to answer the following questions: How can markets, often considered abstract and accessible only to high-level users, be integrated for end-users? How can market mechanisms be leveraged across various phases of the electrical system? Why is a market- driven approach essential for solving network congestions and even influencing planning? These questions shape the core of this research. The analysis unfolds in three layers, each aligned with milestones leading to 2050. The first explores how market mechanisms can be integrated into system operator development plans, enhancing system resilience in the face of changes. In this regard, this step addresses the question of how a market can be integrated into the development plans of a network and how network planning can account for uncertainties. Finally, the analysis highlights the importance of sector coupling in network planning, proposing a study in which various energy vectors lead to a multi-energy system. According to the roadmap to 2030, this layer demonstrates how markets can manage several components of the gas and electrical network. Finally, even though the robust optimisation increases the final cost in the market, it allows to cover the system operator from uncertainties. The second step delves into the concept of network congestion. While congestion management is primarily the domain of operators, it explores how technical and economic collaboration between operators and system users, via flexibility markets, can enhance resilience amid demand uncertainties and aggressive market behaviours. In addition to flexibility markets, other congestion markets are proposed, some radically different, like locational marginal pricing, and others more innovative, such as redispatching markets for distribution. Building upon the first analysis, this section addresses questions of how various energy vectors can be used not only to meet demand but also to manage the uncertainties associated with each resource. Consequently, this second part revisits the concept of sector coupling, demonstrating how various energy vectors can be managed through flexibility markets to resolve network congestion while simultaneously handling uncertainties related to different vectors. The results demonstrate the usefulness of the flexibility market in managing the sector coupling and the uncertainties related to several energy vectors. The third and most innovative step proposes energy and service markets for low-voltage users, employing distributed ledger technology. Since this step highlights topics that are currently too innovative to be realized, this third section offers a comparative study between centralised and decentralised markets using blockchain technology, highlighting which aspects of distributed ledger technology deserve attention and which aspects of low-voltage markets need revision. The results show that the blockchain technology is still in the early stage of its evolution, and several improvements are needed to fully apply this technology into real-world applications. To sum up, this thesis explores the evolving role of markets in the energy transition. Its insights are aimed at assisting system operators and network planners in effectively integrating market mechanisms at all levels of

A theoretical and computational basis for CATNETS

The main content of this report is the identification and definition of market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. These build the theoretical foundation for the work within the following two years of the CATNETS project. --Grid Computing

Environmental analysis for application layer networks

Die zunehmende Vernetzung von Rechnern über das Internet lies die Vision von Application Layer Netzwerken aufkommen. Sie umfassen Overlay Netzwerke wie beispielsweise Peer-to-Peer Netzwerke und Grid Infrastrukturen unter Verwendung des TCP/IP Protokolls. Ihre gemeinsame Eigenschaft ist die redundante, verteilte Bereitstellung und der Zugang zu Daten-, Rechen- und Anwendungsdiensten, während sie die Heterogenität der Infrastruktur vor dem Nutzer verbergen. In dieser Arbeit werden die Anforderungen, die diese Netzwerke an ökonomische Allokationsmechanismen stellen, untersucht. Die Analyse erfolgt anhand eines Marktanalyseprozesses für einen zentralen Auktionsmechanismus und einen katallaktischen Markt. --Grid Computing

Spectrum Trading: An Abstracted Bibliography

This document contains a bibliographic list of major papers on spectrum trading and their abstracts. The aim of the list is to offer researchers entering this field a fast panorama of the current literature. The list is continually updated on the webpage \url{http://www.disp.uniroma2.it/users/naldi/Ricspt.html}. Omissions and papers suggested for inclusion may be pointed out to the authors through e-mail (\textit{[email protected]})

Theoretical and Computational Basis for Economical Ressource Allocation in Application Layer Networks - Annual Report Year 1

This paper identifies and defines suitable market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. --Grid Computing

SIZE AND HETEROGENEITY MATTER. A MICROSTRUCTURE-BASED ANALYSIS OF REGULATION OF SECONDARY MARKETS FOR GOVERNMENT BONDS.

This paper deals with the economics of secondary markets for government bonds. Ultimately, the analysis is shaped by a public policy goal: assessing the elements of a regulatory framework for these markets. In that regard, the decisive role of market structure leads to a critical review of microstructure conclusions relevant specifically for government debt markets. It is argued that the nature of information asymmetries and matching costs in government debt markets determines a bias towards a fragmented microstructure at odds both with exchange-like arrangements and with ordinary regulatory approaches. Hence, a generic conclusion highlights the risks of blindly transposing regulatory principles from the equity markets area without due regard to the specifics of the bond market. As a specific application of this idea, the paper critically reviews electronic trading platforms that emulate exchange-like order execution solutions. More specifically, the paper opposes the hybrid microstructure (pure limit order book plus affirmative quoting obligation) faced by European primary dealers and the arbitrage-based approach to market-making found in US inter-dealer markets. The Citigroup disruptive trade in August 2004 is analyzed from this perspective. Government bond regulation is argued to necessarily depart from ordinary approaches also because it captures the diverse interests of various governmental agencies. As an application of this principle, the paper discusses repo and short-selling regulation in government bond markets. The atypical market structure and the multi- agency endeavour around government bond markets raise the chances of regulatory failures. Nevertheless, it is argued that a reliance on competition, integrative infrastructure and basic systemic protections as over-arching principles for regulation is consistent with recommendations from relevant economic theory. Finally, political economy issues arising in implementation of transparency, disclosure or retail investor protection will be addressed in the context of selected country cases.government bonds, microstructure, regulation