Beyond Earthquakes: The New Directions of Expected Utility Theory

Over the past two decades or so, an enormous amount of work has been done to improve the Expected Utility model. Two areas have attracted major attention: the possibility of describing unforeseen contingencies and the need to accommodate the kind of behavior referred to in Ellsberg’s paradox. This essay surveys both.

Mission Impracticable: The Impossibility of Commercial Impracticability

[Excerpt] “Residents of Chicago’s Streeterville neighborhood certainly cannot forget the recent financial crisis thanks to a gaping hole in their midst. That hole is to be the home of the Spire, the tallest building in the Northern Hemisphere, at 2,000 feet high with 1,194 residences ranging in price from $750,000 for a studio to$40 million for the penthouse. The developer, Shelbourne Development Group, Inc., began construction in 2007 using its own funds. It also obtained “starter” funds from Bank of America via a loan agreement that required Shelbourne to demonstrate proof of a construction loan by November 1, 2008. Although Shelbourne sold thirty percent of the building, it could not obtain construction financing due to the worsening global financial and credit crisis. Bank of America declared the loan in default and sued Shelbourne for the outstanding principal, interest, and fees. As part of its defense, Shelbourne argued that the court should excuse it (temporarily) from providing proof of a construction loan, due to the ‘unforeseeable and unprecedented economic downturn and recession, particularly in the real estate market.’

Bounded Rationality in the Economics of Organization Present Use and (Some) Future Possibilities

The way in which bounded rationality enters contemporary organizational economics theorizing is examined. It is argued that, as it is being used, bounded rationality is neither necessary nor sufficient for producing the results of organizational economics. It is at best a rhetorical device, used for the purpose of loosely explaining incomplete contracts. However, it is possible to incorporate much richer notions of bounded rationality, founded on research in cognitive psychology, and to illuminate the study of economic organization by means of such notions. A number of examples are provided.Varieties of bounded rationality, incomplete contracts, economic organization, cognitive psychology

SOCIAL CAPITAL, TRUST, AND THE AGRIBUSINESS OF ECONOMICS

Economists, including agricultural economists, have a long history of recognizing the importance of the behavioral foundations in decision making while ignoring these observable human dimensions in their economic models. The economics of social capital and trust, two important human characteristics influencing decisions, have captured the attention of economists in recent years. Recent empirical work demonstrates that social capital and trust considerations are prevalent and economically significant, especially in business. Trust alters the terms of trade, generates decision flexibility, reduces transaction costs, and creates additional time resources for management.Institutional and Behavioral Economics,

Authority in the Context of Distributed Knowledge

The notion of distributed knowledge is increasingly often invoked in discussions of economic organization. In particular, the claim that authority is inefficient as a means of coordination in the context of distributed knowledge has become widespread. However, very little analysis has been dedicated to the relation between economic organization and distributed knowledge. In this paper, we concentrate on the role of authority as a coordination mechanism under conditions of distributed knowledge, and also briefly discuss other issues of economic organization. We clarify the meanings of authority and distributed knowledge, and criticize the above claim by arguing that authority may be a superior mechanism of coordination under distributed knowledge. We also discuss how distributed knowledge influences the boundaries of firms. Our arguments rely on insights in problem-solving and on ideas from organizational economics.Distributed knowledge, existence of authority, problem-solving, the boundaries of the firm

Rationality, decisions and large worlds

Taking Savage's (1954) subjective expected utility theory as a starting point, this thesis distinguishes three types of uncertainty which are incompatible with Savage's theory for small worlds: ambiguity, option uncertainty and state space uncertainty. Under ambiguity agents cannot form a unique and additive probability function over the state space. Option uncertainty exists when agents cannot assign unique consequences to every state. Finally, state space uncertainty arises when the state space the agent constructs is not exhaustive, such that unforeseen contingencies can occur. Chapter 2 explains Savage's notions of small and large worlds, and shows that ambiguity, option and state space uncertainty are incompatible with the small world representation. The chapter examines whether it is possible to reduce these types of uncertainty to one another. Chapter 3 suggests a definition of objective ambiguity by extending Savage's framework to include an exogenous likelihood ranking over events. The definition allows for a precise distinction between ambiguity and ambiguity attitude. The chapter argues that under objective ambiguity, ambiguity aversion is normatively permissible. Chapter 4 gives a model of option uncertainty. Using the two weak assumptions that the status quo is not uncertain, and that agents are option uncertainty averse, we derive status quo bias, the empirical tendency for agents to choose the status quo over other available alternatives. The model can be seen as rationalising status quo bias. Chapter 5 gives an axiomatic characterisation and corresponding representation theorem for the priority heuristic, a heuristic which predicts binary decisions be- tween lotteries particularly well. The chapter analyses the normative implications of this descriptive model. Chapter 6 defends the pluralist view of decision theory this thesis assumes. The chapter discusses possible applications of the types of uncertainty defined in the thesis, and concludes

Marketing co-operatives

Marketing co-operatives (MCs) are analysed from an incomplete contracting perspective. The requirement of the domination of control by the members of a MC is a threat to the survival of a MC in markets where the level of asset specificity at the processing stage of production is increasing. However, a MC may remain an efficient governance structure when the increasing level of asset specificity is compensated for by a sufficient increase in the extent of product differentiation.incomplete contracts;marketing cooperatives