A Unified Formalism for Physical Attacks

Technical reportThe security of cryptographic algorithms can be considered in two contexts. On the one hand, these algorithms can be proven secure mathematically. On the other hand, physical attacks can weaken the implementation of an algorithm yet proven secure. Under the common name of physical attacks, different attacks are regrouped: side channel attacks and fault injection attacks. This paper presents a common formalism for these attacks and highlights their underlying principles. All physical attacks on symmetric algorithms can be described with a 3-step process. Moreover it is possible to compare different physical attacks, by separating the theoretical attack path and the experimental parts of the attacks

Quantum secret sharing with qudit graph states

We present a unified formalism for threshold quantum secret sharing using graph states of systems with prime dimension. We construct protocols for three varieties of secret sharing: with classical and quantum secrets shared between parties over both classical and quantum channels.Comment: 13 pages, 12 figures. v2: Corrected to reflect imperfections of (n,n) QQ protocol. Also changed notation from $(n,m)$ to $(k,n)$, corrected typos, updated references, shortened introduction. v3: Updated acknowledgement

On the Duality of Probing and Fault Attacks

In this work we investigate the problem of simultaneous privacy and integrity protection in cryptographic circuits. We consider a white-box scenario with a powerful, yet limited attacker. A concise metric for the level of probing and fault security is introduced, which is directly related to the capabilities of a realistic attacker. In order to investigate the interrelation of probing and fault security we introduce a common mathematical framework based on the formalism of information and coding theory. The framework unifies the known linear masking schemes. We proof a central theorem about the properties of linear codes which leads to optimal secret sharing schemes. These schemes provide the lower bound for the number of masks needed to counteract an attacker with a given strength. The new formalism reveals an intriguing duality principle between the problems of probing and fault security, and provides a unified view on privacy and integrity protection using error detecting codes. Finally, we introduce a new class of linear tamper-resistant codes. These are eligible to preserve security against an attacker mounting simultaneous probing and fault attacks

Formalizing Cyber--Physical System Model Transformation via Abstract Interpretation

Model transformation tools assist system designers by reducing the labor--intensive task of creating and updating models of various aspects of systems, ensuring that modeling assumptions remain consistent across every model of a system, and identifying constraints on system design imposed by these modeling assumptions. We have proposed a model transformation approach based on abstract interpretation, a static program analysis technique. Abstract interpretation allows us to define transformations that are provably correct and specific. This work develops the foundations of this approach to model transformation. We define model transformation in terms of abstract interpretation and prove the soundness of our approach. Furthermore, we develop formalisms useful for encoding model properties. This work provides a methodology for relating models of different aspects of a system and for applying modeling techniques from one system domain, such as smart power grids, to other domains, such as water distribution networks.Comment: 8 pages, 4 figures; to appear in HASE 2019 proceeding

Review of: Nick Zangwill, Music and Aesthetic Reality. Formalism and the Limits of Description, Routledge, 2015,

Review of: Nick Zangwill, Music and Aesthetic Reality: Formalism and the Limits of Descriptio