Common Information Approach for Static Team Problems with Polish Spaces and Existence of Optimal Policies

In this paper, we demonstrate the existence of team-optimal strategies for static teams under observation-sharing information structures. Assuming that agents can access shared observations, we begin by converting the team problem into an equivalent centralized stochastic control problem through the introduction of a topology on policies. We subsequently apply conventional methods from stochastic control to prove the existence of team-optimal strategies. This study expands upon the widely recognized common information approach for team problems, originally designed for discrete scenarios, and adapts it to a more abstract continuous framework. The primary difficulty in this context is to establish the appropriate topology on policies.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1711.0063

Quadratic Multi-Dimensional Signaling Games and Affine Equilibria

This paper studies the decentralized quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problems when an encoder and a decoder, viewed as two decision makers, have misaligned objective functions. The main contributions of this study are the extension of Crawford and Sobel's cheap talk formulation to multi-dimensional sources and to noisy channel setups. We consider both (simultaneous) Nash equilibria and (sequential) Stackelberg equilibria. We show that for arbitrary scalar sources, in the presence of misalignment, the quantized nature of all equilibrium policies holds for Nash equilibria in the sense that all Nash equilibria are equivalent to those achieved by quantized encoder policies. On the other hand, all Stackelberg equilibria policies are fully informative. For multi-dimensional setups, unlike the scalar case, Nash equilibrium policies may be of non-quantized nature, and even linear. In the noisy setup, a Gaussian source is to be transmitted over an additive Gaussian channel. The goals of the encoder and the decoder are misaligned by a bias term and encoder's cost also includes a penalty term on signal power. Conditions for the existence of affine Nash equilibria as well as general informative equilibria are presented. For the noisy setup, the only Stackelberg equilibrium is the linear equilibrium when the variables are scalar. Our findings provide further conditions on when affine policies may be optimal in decentralized multi-criteria control problems and lead to conditions for the presence of active information transmission in strategic environments.Comment: 15 pages, 4 figure