Intelligent Financial Fraud Detection Practices: An Investigation

Financial fraud is an issue with far reaching consequences in the finance industry, government, corporate sectors, and for ordinary consumers. Increasing dependence on new technologies such as cloud and mobile computing in recent years has compounded the problem. Traditional methods of detection involve extensive use of auditing, where a trained individual manually observes reports or transactions in an attempt to discover fraudulent behaviour. This method is not only time consuming, expensive and inaccurate, but in the age of big data it is also impractical. Not surprisingly, financial institutions have turned to automated processes using statistical and computational methods. This paper presents a comprehensive investigation on financial fraud detection practices using such data mining methods, with a particular focus on computational intelligence-based techniques. Classification of the practices based on key aspects such as detection algorithm used, fraud type investigated, and success rate have been covered. Issues and challenges associated with the current practices and potential future direction of research have also been identified.Comment: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks (SecureComm 2014

Computer-aided financial fraud detection: Promise and applicability in monitoring financial transaction fraud

Anti-money Laundering (AML) and Financial Fraud Detection (FFD) have been receiving increasing attention in the past few years, especially in light of the global financial crisis. Closer systems integration and a number of latest steep technological developments in areas like Big Data; High Frequency Trading; e-payments; and mobile payment systems, to name a few, are now promising enhanced risk management through superior decision support for the global financial industry. At the same time, however, resident regulatory frameworks, national and international, appear to lack the connectivity and flexibility required to support integrated AML and FFD approaches. This is strongly testified by the disparate technological approaches to FFD across different Financial Institutions and their reluctance to share practice within the industry. Focusing on Financial Transaction Fraud, this paper draws on the authors’ past research work which presented a prototype system that uses a workflow approach to identify abnormal financial transactions and applies Artificial Intelligence for classification. That work has shown successful applicability at short scale experiments, limited by the wide concern that information sharing should be achieved within the broader sector in order to achieve improved results. Drawing from there, this paper proposes that extending that approach across transaction infrastructure will deliver higher quality intelligent monitoring against Financial Transaction Fraud. Following from that, we argue that the necessary technological maturity does exist to support full-scale operable FFD systems working on large disparate datasets. We then discuss the evidence in favour of the view that such systems can only be realised in the presence of wider regulatory consensus. There is, therefore, the need for a framework within which the technical infrastructure, business architecture and regulatory rules will harness that technological capability to deliver superior fraud prevention. The paper first reviews computer-aided techniques and approaches for FFD available to the financial sector and discusses the business value of their application. It then addresses the main impediments for their full-scale applicability and uses an analytical framework for assessing their significance, in technological, business-specific and regulatory terms. A brief account of the authors’ workflow-based approach is then provided and its capabilities are outlined

Losing the War Against Dirty Money: Rethinking Global Standards on Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing

Following a brief overview in Part I.A of the overall system to prevent money laundering, Part I.B describes the role of the private sector, which is to identify customers, create a profile of their legitimate activities, keep detailed records of clients and their transactions, monitor their transactions to see if they conform to their profile, examine further any unusual transactions, and report to the government any suspicious transactions. Part I.C continues the description of the preventive measures system by describing the government\u27s role, which is to assist the private sector in identifying suspicious transactions, ensure compliance with the preventive measures requirements, and analyze suspicious transaction reports to determine those that should be investigated. Parts I.D and I.E examine the effectiveness of this system. Part I.D discusses successes and failures in the private sector\u27s role. Borrowing from theory concerning the effectiveness of private sector unfunded mandates, this Part reviews why many aspects of the system are failing, focusing on the subjectivity of the mandate, the disincentives to comply, and the lack of comprehensive data on client identification and transactions. It notes that the system includes an inherent contradiction: the public sector is tasked with informing the private sector how best to detect launderers and terrorists, but to do so could act as a road map on how to avoid detection should such information fall into the wrong hands. Part I.D discusses how financial institutions do not and cannot use scientifically tested statistical means to determine if a particular client or set of transactions is more likely than others to indicate criminal activity. Part I.D then turns to a discussion of a few issues regarding the impact the system has but that are not related to effectiveness, followed by a summary and analysis of how flaws might be addressed. Part I.E continues by discussing the successes and failures in the public sector\u27s role. It reviews why the system is failing, focusing on the lack of assistance to the private sector in and the lack of necessary data on client identification and transactions. It also discusses how financial intelligence units, like financial institutions, do not and cannot use scientifically tested statistical means to determine probabilities of criminal activity. Part I concludes with a summary and analysis tying both private and public roles together. Part II then turns to a review of certain current techniques for selecting income tax returns for audit. After an overview of the system, Part II first discusses the limited role of the private sector in providing tax administrators with information, comparing this to the far greater role the private sector plays in implementing preventive measures. Next, this Part turns to consider how tax administrators, particularly the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, select taxpayers for audit, comparing this to the role of both the private and public sectors in implementing preventive measures. It focuses on how some tax administrations use scientifically tested statistical means to determine probabilities of tax evasion. Part II then suggests how flaws in both private and public roles of implementing money laundering and terrorism financing preventive measures might be theoretically addressed by borrowing from the experience of tax administration. Part II concludes with a short summary and analysis that relates these conclusions to the preventive measures system. Referring to the analyses in Parts I and II, Part III suggests changes to the current preventive measures standard. It suggests that financial intelligence units should be uniquely tasked with analyzing and selecting clients and transactions for further investigation for money laundering and terrorism financing. The private sector\u27s role should be restricted to identifying customers, creating an initial profile of their legitimate activities, and reporting such information and all client transactions to financial intelligence units