Decomposition by Partial Linearization: Parallel Optimization of Multi-Agent Systems

We propose a novel decomposition framework for the distributed optimization of general nonconvex sum-utility functions arising naturally in the system design of wireless multiuser interfering systems. Our main contributions are: i) the development of the first class of (inexact) Jacobi best-response algorithms with provable convergence, where all the users simultaneously and iteratively solve a suitably convexified version of the original sum-utility optimization problem; ii) the derivation of a general dynamic pricing mechanism that provides a unified view of existing pricing schemes that are based, instead, on heuristics; and iii) a framework that can be easily particularized to well-known applications, giving rise to very efficient practical (Jacobi or Gauss-Seidel) algorithms that outperform existing adhoc methods proposed for very specific problems. Interestingly, our framework contains as special cases well-known gradient algorithms for nonconvex sum-utility problems, and many blockcoordinate descent schemes for convex functions.Comment: submitted to IEEE Transactions on Signal Processin

Local Convergence of Gradient Methods for Min-Max Games under Partial Curvature

We study the convergence to local Nash equilibria of gradient methods for two-player zero-sum differentiable games. It is well-known that such dynamics converge locally when $S \succ 0$ and may diverge when $S=0$, where $S\succeq 0$ is the symmetric part of the Jacobian at equilibrium that accounts for the "potential" component of the game. We show that these dynamics also converge as soon as $S$ is nonzero (partial curvature) and the eigenvectors of the antisymmetric part $A$ are in general position with respect to the kernel of $S$. We then study the convergence rates when $S \ll A$ and prove that they typically depend on the average of the eigenvalues of $S$, instead of the minimum as an analogy with minimization problems would suggest. To illustrate our results, we consider the problem of computing mixed Nash equilibria of continuous games. We show that, thanks to partial curvature, conic particle methods -- which optimize over both weights and supports of the mixed strategies -- generically converge faster than fixed-support methods. For min-max games, it is thus beneficial to add degrees of freedom "with curvature": this can be interpreted as yet another benefit of over-parameterization.Comment: 37 pages, 2 figures, 2 table

Consensus Multiplicative Weights Update: Learning to Learn using Projector-based Game Signatures

Cheung and Piliouras (2020) recently showed that two variants of the Multiplicative Weights Update method - OMWU and MWU - display opposite convergence properties depending on whether the game is zero-sum or cooperative. Inspired by this work and the recent literature on learning to optimize for single functions, we introduce a new framework for learning last-iterate convergence to Nash Equilibria in games, where the update rule's coefficients (learning rates) along a trajectory are learnt by a reinforcement learning policy that is conditioned on the nature of the game: \textit{the game signature}. We construct the latter using a new decomposition of two-player games into eight components corresponding to commutative projection operators, generalizing and unifying recent game concepts studied in the literature. We compare the performance of various update rules when their coefficients are learnt, and show that the RL policy is able to exploit the game signature across a wide range of game types. In doing so, we introduce CMWU, a new algorithm that extends consensus optimization to the constrained case, has local convergence guarantees for zero-sum bimatrix games, and show that it enjoys competitive performance on both zero-sum games with constant coefficients and across a spectrum of games when its coefficients are learnt