10 research outputs found
A Tamper and Leakage Resilient von Neumann Architecture
We present a universal framework for tamper and leakage resilient computation on a von
Neumann Random Access Architecture (RAM in short). The RAM has one CPU that accesses
a storage, which we call the disk. The disk is subject to leakage and tampering. So is the bus
connecting the CPU to the disk. We assume that the CPU is leakage and tamper-free. For
a fixed value of the security parameter, the CPU has constant size. Therefore the code of the
program to be executed is stored on the disk, i.e., we consider a von Neumann architecture. The
most prominent consequence of this is that the code of the program executed will be subject to
tampering.
We construct a compiler for this architecture which transforms any keyed primitive into a
RAM program where the key is encoded and stored on the disk along with the program to
evaluate the primitive on that key. Our compiler only assumes the existence of a so-called
continuous non-malleable code, and it only needs black-box access to such a code. No further
(cryptographic) assumptions are needed. This in particular means that given an information
theoretic code, the overall construction is information theoretic secure.
Although it is required that the CPU is tamper and leakage proof, its design is independent
of the actual primitive being computed and its internal storage is non-persistent, i.e., all secret
registers are reset between invocations. Hence, our result can be interpreted as reducing the
problem of shielding arbitrary complex computations to protecting a single, simple yet universal
component
The chaining lemma and its application
We present a new information-theoretic result which we call the Chaining Lemma. It considers a so-called âchainâ of random variables, defined by a source distribution X(0)with high min-entropy and a number (say, t in total) of arbitrary functions (T1,âŠ, Tt) which are applied in succession to that source to generate the chain (Formula presented). Intuitively, the Chaining Lemma guarantees that, if the chain is not too long, then either (i) the entire chain is âhighly randomâ, in that every variable has high min-entropy; or (ii) it is possible to find a point j (1 †j †t) in the chain such that, conditioned on the end of the chain i.e. (Formula presented), the preceding part (Formula presented) remains highly random. We think this is an interesting information-theoretic result which is intuitive but nevertheless requires rigorous case-analysis to prove. We believe that the above lemma will find applications in cryptography. We give an example of this, namely we show an application of the lemma to protect essentially any cryptographic scheme against memory tampering attacks. We allow several tampering requests, the tampering functions can be arbitrary, however, they must be chosen from a bounded size set of functions that is fixed a prior
Non-malleable codes for space-bounded tampering
Non-malleable codesâintroduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs at ICS 2010âare key-less coding schemes in which mauling attempts to an encoding of a given message, w.r.t. some class of tampering adversaries, result in a decoded value that is either identical or unrelated to the original message. Such codes are very useful for protecting arbitrary cryptographic primitives against tampering attacks against the memory. Clearly, non-malleability is hopeless if the class of tampering adversaries includes the decoding and encoding algorithm. To circumvent this obstacle, the majority of past research focused on designing non-malleable codes for various tampering classes, albeit assuming that the adversary is unable to decode. Nonetheless, in many concrete settings, this assumption is not realistic
Predictable arguments of knowledge
We initiate a formal investigation on the power of predictability for argument of knowledge systems for NP. Specifically, we consider private-coin argument systems where the answer of the prover can be predicted, given the private randomness of the verifier; we call such protocols Predictable Arguments of Knowledge (PAoK).
Our study encompasses a full characterization of PAoK, showing that such arguments can be made extremely laconic, with the prover sending a single bit, and assumed to have only one round (i.e., two messages) of communication without loss of generality.
We additionally explore PAoK satisfying additional properties (including zero-knowledge and the possibility of re-using the same challenge across multiple executions with the prover), present several constructions of PAoK relying on different cryptographic tools, and discuss applications to cryptography
Continuously non-malleable codes with split-state refresh
Non-malleable codes for the split-state model allow to encode a message into two parts, such that arbitrary independent tampering on each part, and subsequent decoding of the corresponding modified codeword, yields either the same as the original message, or a completely unrelated value. Continuously non-malleable codes further allow to tolerate an unbounded (polynomial) number of tampering attempts, until a decoding error happens. The drawback is that, after an error happens, the system must self-destruct and stop working, otherwise generic attacks become possible. In this paper we propose a solution to this limitation, by leveraging a split-state refreshing procedure. Namely, whenever a decoding error happens, the two parts of an encoding can be locally refreshed (i.e., without any interaction), which allows to avoid the self-destruct mechanism. An additional feature of our security model is that it captures directly security against continual leakage attacks. We give an abstract framework for building such codes in the common reference string model, and provide a concrete instantiation based on the external Diffie-Hellman assumption. Finally, we explore applications in which our notion turns out to be essential. The first application is a signature scheme tolerating an arbitrary polynomial number of split-state tampering attempts, without requiring a self-destruct capability, and in a model where refreshing of the memory happens only after an invalid output is produced. This circumvents an impossibility result from a recent work by Fuijisaki and Xagawa (Asiacrypt 2016). The second application is a compiler for tamper-resilient RAM programs. In comparison to other tamper-resilient compilers, ours has several advantages, among which the fact that, for the first time, it does not rely on the self-destruct feature
(Continuous) Non-malleable Codes for Partial Functions with Manipulation Detection and Light Updates
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Practical Non-Malleable Codes from -more Extractable Hash Functions
In this work, we significantly improve the efficiency of non-malleable codes in the split state model, by constructing a code with codeword length , where is the length of the message, and is the security parameter. This is a substantial improvement over previous constructions, both asymptotically and concretely.
Our construction relies on a new primitive which we define and study, called
-more extractable hash functions. This notion, which may be of
independent interest, guarantees that any adversary that is given access to
precomputed hash values , and
produces a new valid hash value , then it must know a pre-image of
. This is a stronger notion that the one by Bitansky et al. (Eprint
\u2711) and Goldwasser et al. (ITCS \u2712, Eprint \u2714), which considers adversaries
that get no access to precomputed hash values prior to producing their own
value. By appropriately relaxing the extractability requirement
(without hurting the applicability of the primitive)
we instantiate -more extractable hash functions under the same
assumptions used for the previous extractable hash functions by Bitansky et al. and Goldwasser et al. (a variant of the
Knowledge of Exponent Assumption)
Continuous NMC Secure Against Permutations and Overwrites, with Applications to CCA Secure Commitments
Non-Malleable Codes (NMC) were introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs in ICS 2010 as a relaxation of error correcting codes and error detecting codes. Faust, Mukherjee, Nielsen, and Venturi in TCC 2014 introduced an even stronger notion of non-malleable codes called continuous non-malleable codes where security is achieved against continuous tampering of a single codeword without re-encoding. We construct information theoretically secure CNMC resilient to bit permutations and overwrites, this is the first Continuous NMC constructed outside of the split-state model. In this work we also study relations between the CNMC and parallel CCA commitments. We show that the CNMC can be used to bootstrap a self-destruct parallel CCA bit commitment to a self-destruct parallel CCA string commitment, where self-destruct parallel CCA is a weak form of parallel CCA security. Then we can get rid of the self-destruct limitation obtaining a parallel CCA commitment, requiring only one-way functions
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Dialogues in cybernetics: a model for understanding critical thinking construction in the digital age
This thesis study examines the Critical Thinking construction from students while using the digital technologies for web-based activities at school. At the end, we propose a model that explains Critical Thinking based on the Science of Cybernetics.
Critical learning opportunities within schools are needed urgently. Critical thinkers will be adaptable to technologies and therefore will present essential qualities for the Digital Age. The scientific literature is full of arguments to support this approach, however, apart from some studies that propose a linear model for this matter, not much has been proposed concerning a complex model for Critical Thinking in the Digital Age.
To this end, the research question is as follows: How is the critical thinking process fostered at the Cognition Level in the Digital Age? This is addressed by considering the process of critical thinking as an open system, according to principles of Cybernetics.
Data for the study was collected twice. The initial Pilot Study revealed unexpected phenomena which current theories in Education could not explain. In the Main Study, a Cybernetic approach was used preserving identical research techniques and data analysis instruments from the initial study. Both studies used a Research Protocol Activity executed by participants and, after that, a clinical interview. Data were analysed and a Cybernetic Model for Critical Thinking proposed, applying the principles of Entropy and of Selective Retention, to explain how critical thinking is built in the Cognitive level. The Model has been built from the exploratory Pilot Study and the Main Theoretical Study.
This thesis presents the background of Critical Thinking, with a theory and concepts that will help to stimulate critical thoughts, suggesting the path that must be taken to stimulate and develop critical thinking in students. This work has a significant contribution to the existing critical thinking literature, proposing a holistic approach that includes Cybernetics and Cognition. The developed concepts of âEntropyâ, âDeterrenceâ, and the Model itself can help assessing learning and cognition in another dimension. We proposed the concept of Entropy to critical thinking (see Chapter 5) fostered from a large literature review that involved Philosophy, Sociology, Education and Cybernetics. The concept will be helpful to researchers who want to dedicate their project to cognitive phenomena, or to Human-machine interaction. Similarly, the concept of Deterrence can equally be used for areas where cognition, education society and Cybernetics can be helpful.
However, further work is needed to extend this study for other populations, such as adults and university undergraduates. By validating the model in such populations, it could be successfully applied to foster critical thinking in most human beings, while involving digital technologies
Cryptographic techniques for hardware security
Traditionally, cryptographic algorithms are designed under the so-called black-box model, which considers adversaries that receive black-box access to the hardware implementation. Although a "black-box" treatment covers a wide range of attacks, it fails to capture reality adequately, as real-world adversaries can exploit physical properties of the implementation, mounting attacks that enable unexpected, non-black-box access, to the components of the cryptographic system. This type of attacks is widely known as physical attacks, and has proven to be a significant threat to the real-world security of cryptographic systems. The present dissertation is (partially) dealing with the problem of protecting cryptographic memory against physical attacks, via the use of non-malleable codes, which is a notion introduced in a preceding work, aiming to provide privacy of the encoded data, in the presence of adversarial faults. In the present thesis we improve the current state-of-the-art on non-malleable codes and we provide practical solutions for protecting real-world cryptographic implementations against physical attacks. Our study is primarily focusing on the following adversarial models: (i) the extensively studied split-state model, which assumes that private memory splits into two parts, and the adversary tampers with each part, independently, and (ii) the model of partial functions, which is introduced by the current thesis, and models adversaries that access arbitrary subsets of codeword locations, with bounded cardinality. Our study is comprehensive, covering one-time and continuous, attacks, while for the case of partial functions, we manage to achieve a stronger notion of security, that we call non-malleability with manipulation detection, that in addition to privacy, it also guarantees integrity of the private data. It should be noted that, our techniques are also useful for the problem of establishing, private, keyless communication, over adversarial communication channels. Besides physical attacks, another important concern related to cryptographic hardware security, is that the hardware fabrication process is assumed to be trusted. In reality though, when aiming to minimize the production costs, or whenever access to leading-edge manufacturing facilities is required, the fabrication process requires the involvement of several, potentially malicious, facilities. Consequently, cryptographic hardware is susceptible to the so-called hardware Trojans, which are hardware components that are maliciously implanted to the original circuitry, having as a purpose to alter the device's functionality, while remaining undetected. Part of the present dissertation, deals with the problem of protecting cryptographic hardware against Trojan injection attacks, by (i) proposing a formal model for assessing the security of cryptographic hardware, whose production has been partially outsourced to a set of untrusted, and possibly malicious, manufacturers, and (ii) by proposing a compiler that transforms any cryptographic circuit, into another, that can be securely outsourced