New financial order : recommendations by the Issing Committee ; preparing G-20 – London, April 2, 2009

Content A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, INCLUDING MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS B. COMPLETE REPORT 1. INTRODUCTION 2. RISK MAP 2.1 Why a Risk Map is needed, and for what purpose 2.1.1 Creating a unified data base 2.1.2 Assessing systemic risk 2.1.3 Allowing for coordinated policy action 2.2 Recommendations 3. GLOBAL REGISTER FOR LOANS (CREDIT REGISTER) AND BONDS (SECURITIES REGISTER) 3.1 Objectives of a credit register 3.2 Credit registers in Europe (and beyond) 3.3 Suggestions for a supra-national Credit Register 3.4 Integrating a supra-national Securities Register 3.5 Recommendations 4. HEDGE FUNDS: REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 4.1 What are hedge funds (activities, location, size, regulation)? 4.2 What are the risks posed by hedge funds (systematic risks, interaction with prime brokers)? 4.3 Routes to better regulation (direct, indirect) 4.4 Recommendations 5. RATING AGENCIES: REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 5.1 The role of ratings in bond and structured finance markets, past and present 5.2 Elements of rating integrity (independence, compensation and incentives, transparency) 5.3 Recommendations (registration, transparency, annual report on rating performance) 6. PROCYCLICALITY: PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 6.1 What is meant by “procyclicality” and why is it a problem? 6.2 The roots of procyclicality and the lessons it suggests for policymakers 6.2.1 Underpinnings of the phenomenon 6.2.2 Lessons to be learned 6.3 Characteristics of a macrofinancial stability framework 6.4 Recommendations 7. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND FORA, IN PARTICULAR THE IMF, BIS AND FSF 7.1 Legitimacy 7.2 Re-focusing the work 7.3 Recommendation

More Than One Step to Financial Stability

Visiting Scholar Garry Schinasi examines the European proposals for the creation of both a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) to oversee macroprudential regulation and a European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) to strengthen microprudential supervision. He argues that structural vulnerabilities of this regulatory framework need to be addressed to ensure that the early-warning systems will be adequate to avoid future crises. Specifically, Schinasi points to the fact that the ESRB lacks binding powers to enforce regulation as well as the lack of a legislative framework to resolve the insolvency of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs).

Financial Market Supervision: European Perspectives

[Excerpt] The global financial crisis has sparked a debate over the cause and impact of the crisis. Academics and policymakers are searching for changes in the financial system that can correct any perceived weaknesses in the structure of regulation, the content of regulations, and the coverage of financial instruments and activities. Since the onset of the crisis, numerous proposals have been advanced to reform or amend the current financial system to help restore economic growth. In the United States, the Obama Administration has proposed a plan to overhaul supervision of the U.S. financial services sector. The proposal would give new authority to the Federal Reserve, create a new Financial Services Oversight Council, create a Consumer Financial Protection Agency, and create a new National Bank Supervisor to replace the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Office of Thrift Supervision. In contrast, Senator Collins introduced S. 664, the Financial System Stabilization and Reform Act of 2009, with a companion measure, H.R. 1754, that was introduced by Representative Castle in the House of Representatives. The measures would create a Financial Stability Council and grant the Federal Reserve the authority to examine the soundness and safety of the financial system posed by bank holding companies. Other measures include: S. 1682 (Senator Cantwell), the Derivatives Market Manipulation Prevention Act of 2009; S. 1803 (Senator Merkley), the Federal Reserve Accountability Act of 2009; S. 2756 (Senator Warner) the Financial Services Systemic Risk Oversight Council Act of 2009; H.R. 3795 (Representative Frank), the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Acts of 2009; H.R. 3968 (Representative Ellison), to amend the Bank Holding Company Act; and H.R. 3996 (Frank), to improve financial stability. The crisis has underscored the fact that national and international financial markets have become highly integrated, and problems in one market can trigger contagion that can spread both among countries and into economic sectors to affect businesses, employment, and household well being. Similarly, governments in Europe are considering what, if any, changes they should make to their national financial systems. Along with the United States and other countries, European countries also are considering changes to the international systems of financial supervision and regulation in order to ensure prosperity through the smooth operation of domestic and international financial systems. This process may include reconsidering the roles and responsibility of the central banks in the post-financial crisis era. Various organizations and groups are advancing a large number of recommendations and prescriptions. Some goals for any such adjustments may include providing an institutional structure for oversight and regulation that is robust, comprehensive, flexible, and politically feasible while providing appropriate incentive structures to preclude excessive risk-taking. Of course, there are no guarantees that amending the current system or employing a different regulatory and supervisory structure will preclude a repeat of the most recent financial crisis given that financial markets and institutions are continually growing, innovating, and responding to government- and market-imposed constraints. This report addresses the European perspectives on a number of proposals that are being advanced for financial oversight and regulation in Europe. The European experience may be instructive because financial markets in Europe are well developed, European firms often are competitors of U.S. firms, and European governments have faced severe problems of integration and consistency across the various financial structures that exist in Europe

Financial Stability, New Macro Prudential Arrangements and Shadow Banking: Regulatory Arbitrage and Stringent Basel I I I Regulations

Despite Basel III’s efforts to address capital and liquidity requirements, will the risks linked to regulatory arbitrage increase as a result of Basel III’s more stringent capital and liquidity rules? As well as Basel III reforms which are geared towards greater facilitation of financial stability on a macro prudential basis, further efforts and initiatives aimed at mitigating systemic risks – hence fostering financial stability, have been promulgated through the establishment of the De Larosiere Group, the European Systemic Risk Board, and a working group comprising of “international standard setters and authorities responsible for the translation of G20 commitments into standards.” This paper aims to investigate the impact of Basel III on shadow banking and its facilitation of regulatory arbitrage as well as consider the response of various jurisdictions and standard setting bodies to aims and initiatives aimed at improving their macro prudential frameworks. Furthermore, it will also aim to illustrate why immense work is still required at European level – as regards efforts to address systemic risks on a macro prudential basis. This being the case even though significant efforts and steps have been taken to address the macro prudential framework. In so doing, the paper will also attempt to address how coordination within the macro prudential framework – as well as between micro and macro prudential supervision could be enhanced

Fuzzy Logic and Its Uses in Finance: A Systematic Review Exploring Its Potential to Deal with Banking Crises

The major success of fuzzy logic in the field of remote control opened the door to its application in many other fields, including finance. However, there has not been an updated and comprehensive literature review on the uses of fuzzy logic in the financial field. For that reason, this study attempts to critically examine fuzzy logic as an effective, useful method to be applied to financial research and, particularly, to the management of banking crises. The data sources were Web of Science and Scopus, followed by an assessment of the records according to pre-established criteria and an arrangement of the information in two main axes: financial markets and corporate finance. A major finding of this analysis is that fuzzy logic has not yet been used to address banking crises or as an alternative to ensure the resolvability of banks while minimizing the impact on the real economy. Therefore, we consider this article relevant for supervisory and regulatory bodies, as well as for banks and academic researchers, since it opens the door to several new research axes on banking crisis analyses using artificial intelligence techniques

Reform of the International Financial Architecture: An Asian Perspective

The paper attempts to evaluate whether the international financial architecture is adequate for maintaining the financial stability of the East Asian economies by summarizing the lessons learned from the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 and the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and reviewing the progress being made to enhance the effectiveness of the international financial architecture in crisis prevention, management and resolution. The paper finds that the international community had to experience the two crises before seriously starting to work on the reform of the international financial architecture. Facing the global financial crisis, the international community has responded by making the G20 Summit the premier forum for international economic and financial cooperation, creating a potentially more powerful Financial Stability Board, and augmenting the financial resources of the IMF. The paper concludes, however, that the international financial architecture remains inadequate for the needs of many emerging market economies, including in East Asia. International Monetary Fund surveillance—particularly that of systemically important economies (such as the United States, the United Kingdom and the Euro Area)—is ineffective and its governance structure is heavily biased towards Europe and the United States. International liquidity support is insufficient in assisting countries with sound economic and financial management that are hit by externally driven crises. No international agreements exist on external (sovereign) debt restructuring, or on the cross-border resolution of insolvent, internationally active financial firms for fair burden sharing of losses between creditors and debtors, or among different national authorities. The paper emphasizes the importance of a well-functioning regional financial architecture to complement and strengthen the global financial architecture. It offers advice for East Asian authorities to focus on: (i) the establishment of resilient national financial systems, including local-currency bond markets; (ii) integration of national financial markets to facilitate the mobilization of regional savings for regional investment (in infrastructure and small- and medium-sized enterprises); (iii) enhancement of regional liquidity (Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization) and economic surveillance mechanisms; and (iv) regional exchange rate policy coordination to achieve sustained economic growth without creating macroeconomic and financial instability.asian financial crisis; global financial crisis; crisis prevention; management and resolution; the imf; the financial stability board; regional financial architecture

International financial contagion: what do we know?

This paper attempts a synthesis of theoretical and empirical work on international financial contagion. Although a professional consensus on the appropriate definitions of contagion has yet to emerge, we document substantial research progress towards this goal. On the empirical front, determining when returns are ‘excessive’ is a pre-condition for designing effective policy response to crises. At the theoretical level, tracing the observed herding behavior to market participants’ uncertain beliefs and information asymmetries is a key element for understanding how contagious effects arise. It is argued that the recent focus on better understanding of high-frequency financial returns data and decision making at the market microstructure level are promising avenues for understanding the transmission of shocks across markets and countries

How has the macroeconomic imbalances procedure worked in practice to improve the resilience of the euro area? March 24 2020

This paper shows how the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) could be streamlined and its underlying conceptual framework clarified. Implementation of the country-specific recommendations is low; their internal consistency is sometimes missing; despite past reforms, the MIP remains largely a countryby-country approach running the risk of aggravating the deflationary bias in the euro area. We recommend to streamline the scoreboard around a few meaningful indicators, involve national macro-prudential and productivity councils, better connect the various recommendations, simplify the language and further involve the Commission into national policy discussions. This document was prepared for the Economic Governance Support Unit at the request of the ECON Committee

Comparing early warning systems for banking crises

Despite the extensive literature on prediction of banking crises by Early Warning Systems (EWS), their practical use by policy makers is limited, even in the international financial institutions. This is a paradox since the changing nature of banking risks as more economies liberalise and develop their financial systems, as well as ongoing innovation, makes the use of EWS for crisis prevention more necessary than ever. In this context, we assess the logit and signal extraction EWS for banking crises on a comprehensive common dataset. We suggest that logit is the most appropriate approach for global EWS and signal extraction for country specific EWS. Furthermore it is important to consider the policy maker s objectives when designing predictive models and setting related thresholds since there is a sharp trade-off between correctly calling crises and false alarms

How to restructure the international financial architecture

To lower the likelihood of financial crises: Securitisation should be regulated to restore proper incentives for banks. The euro area should adopt a regulatory system based on objectives. The short-comings of the Basel II accord should be addressed. While difficult, ways must be found to incentivise financial firms to change the way they compensate employees. The euro area should have a single supervisor and regulator charged with ensuring financial stability. To prevent liquidity crises: There should be good systems of deposit insurance. Countries without important reserve currencies should not have large internationally exposed banking systems. To decrease the likelihood of exchange rate crises, the powers in Brussels and Frankfurt should allow potential future members of the euro area to unilaterally adopt the euro without jeopardising their chances of future membership in the euro area. should not enforce the exchange rate criterion of the Maastricht Treaty. Early warning of a financial crisis is unlikely to be best provided by the IMF might be provided by an independent committee of experts and individual market participants International cooperation in developing crisis management measures and disseminating this knowledge is desirable; funding these measures must be left to the national governments. Managing a crisis Requires writing off bad assets: Central banks should learn how use auctions to value non-traded securities. Requires short-term liquidity provision to and recapitalisation of viable financial firms: Countries should not have banking sectors that are to big to rescue. International coordination to avoid beggar-thy-neighbour regulatory anpolicies and exchange rate policies