Security problems with a chaos-based deniable authentication scheme

Recently, a new scheme was proposed for deniable authentication. Its main originality lied on applying a chaos-based encryption-hash parallel algorithm and the semi-group property of the Chebyshev chaotic map. Although original and practicable, its insecurity and inefficiency are shown in this paper, thus rendering it inadequate for adoption in e-commerce.Comment: 8 pages, 1 figure, latex forma

Cryptanalysis of a computer cryptography scheme based on a filter bank

This paper analyzes the security of a recently-proposed signal encryption scheme based on a filter bank. A very critical weakness of this new signal encryption procedure is exploited in order to successfully recover the associated secret key.Comment: 6 pages, 1 figur

Cryptographic requirements for chaotic secure communications

In recent years, a great amount of secure communications systems based on chaotic synchronization have been published. Most of the proposed schemes fail to explain a number of features of fundamental importance to all cryptosystems, such as key definition, characterization, and generation. As a consequence, the proposed ciphers are difficult to realize in practice with a reasonable degree of security. Likewise, they are seldom accompanied by a security analysis. Thus, it is hard for the reader to have a hint about their security. In this work we provide a set of guidelines that every new cryptosystems would benefit from adhering to. The proposed guidelines address these two main gaps, i.e., correct key management and security analysis, to help new cryptosystems be presented in a more rigorous cryptographic way. Also some recommendations are offered regarding some practical aspects of communications, such as channel noise, limited bandwith, and attenuation.Comment: 13 pages, 3 figure

Cryptanalysis of two chaotic encryption schemes based on circular bit shift and XOR operations

Recently two encryption schemes were proposed by combining circular bit shift and XOR operations, under the control of a pseudorandom bit sequence (PRBS) generated from a chaotic system. This paper studies the security of these two encryption schemes and reports the following findings: 1) there exist some security defects in both schemes; 2) the underlying chaotic PRBS can be reconstructed as an equivalent key by using only two chosen plaintexts; 3) most elements in the underlying chaotic PRBS can be obtained by a differential known-plaintext attack using only two known plaintexts. Experimental results are given to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed attack.Comment: 17 pages, 8 figure