Formulating Consciousness: A Comparative Analysis of Searle’s and Dennett’s Theory of Consciousness

This research will argue about which theory of mind between Searle’s and Dennett’s can better explain human consciousness. Initially, distinctions between dualism and materialism will be discussed ranging from substance dualism, property dualism, physicalism, and functionalism. In this part, the main issue that is tackled in various theories of mind is revealed. It is the missing connection between input stimulus (neuronal reactions) and behavioral disposition: consciousness. Then, the discussion will be more specific on Searle’s biological naturalism and Dennett’s multiple drafts model as the two attempted to answer the issue. The differences between them will be highlighted and will be analyzed according to their relation to their roots: dualism and materialism. The two theories will be examined on how each answer the questions on consciousness

Sensitivity to Hand Path Curvature during Reaching

People optimize reaching to make straight and smooth movements. We performed experiments characterizing human sensitivity to hand path deviations from a straight reach. Vision of the arm was blocked. Subjects either moved the hand along paths of constrained curvature, or a robot moved the relaxed limb along similar trajectories (active and passive conditions, respectively). Subjects responded after each trial whether or not they thought the movement curved convex right. In a series of three experiments, we tested the effects of modifying visual feedback of hand position to suppress curvature, isotonic muscle activation, and a distracter task on subjects ability to detect curvature during reaching. We found that both active reaching and artificial minimization of visual hand path deviations significantly decreased proprioceptive curvature sensitivity. Specifically, isotonic contraction of muscles antagonistic to the movement decreased sensitivity to curvature while agonistic contraction had no effect. The distracter task did not significantly affect proprioceptive sensitivity, though it did interfere with the detrimental effect of minimizing visual error feedback. These findings demonstrate that: 1) antagonist muscle activation decreases efficacy of proprioceptive feedback during hand path curvature estimation, and 2) vision\u27s dominance over proprioception can be manipulated by altering the attentional demands of the task

From Biological to Synthetic Neurorobotics Approaches to Understanding the Structure Essential to Consciousness (Part 3)

This third paper locates the synthetic neurorobotics research reviewed in the second paper in terms of themes introduced in the first paper. It begins with biological non-reductionism as understood by Searle. It emphasizes the role of synthetic neurorobotics studies in accessing the dynamic structure essential to consciousness with a focus on system criticality and self, develops a distinction between simulated and formal consciousness based on this emphasis, reviews Tani and colleagues' work in light of this distinction, and ends by forecasting the increasing importance of synthetic neurorobotics studies for cognitive science and philosophy of mind going forward, finally in regards to most- and myth-consciousness

Moral Psychology and Artificial Agents (Part Two) : The Transhuman Connection

Part 1 concluded by introducing the concept of the new ontological category – explaining how our cognitive machinery does not have natural and intuitive understanding of robots and AIs, unlike we have for animals, tools, and plants. Here the authors review findings in the moral psychology of robotics and transhumanism. They show that many peculiarities arise from the interaction of human cognition with robots, AIs, and human enhancement technologies. Robots are treated similarly, but not completely, like humans. Some such peculiarities are explained by mind perception mechanisms. On the other hand, it seems that transhumanistic technologies like brain implants and mind uploading are condemned, and the condemnation is motivated by our innate sexual disgust sensitivity mechanisms.Peer reviewe

The \u27Uncanny\u27 and The Android

The character of the android is found widely in film and literature. While she appears across the entire spectrum of genres, she most often makes her appearance in the uncanny text. This appearance is nearly always accompanied by some variation of the vision motif. Despite wide spread interest in both the Uncanny\u27 and the android, to date, there is not a theory which accounts for the uncanny nature of the android and the prevalence of the vision motif in the android text. This paper will attempt to develop just such a theory. Any paper that addresses the \u27Uncanny\u27 must begin with Freud\u27s 1919 essay, The Uncanny. While this paper does not propose a psychoanalytic reading of the android, Freud\u27s work establishes the relationship between the android and the binary oppositions of strange/familiar, alive/dead and animate/inanimate. This discussion of binary oppositions leads to Ernst Jentsch\u27s 1909 publication, \u27On the Psychology of the Uncanny. Jentsch\u27s work is used to develop the uncanniness of the mechanical nature of life. Following Jentsch, Masahiro Mori\u27s 1970 publication, \u27The Uncanny Valley,\u27 places the human and the android on the same continuum, thus eliminating the opposition of man/machine. This, in turn, leads into a discussion of Donna Haraway\u27s The Cyborg Manifesto. Haraway\u27s model of the cyborg moves the discussion even further from dichotomous thought. The \u27Uncanny,\u27 it is concluded, is located at the midpoint of the binary pair. The android is uncanny because of her pivotal role in the dissolution of such pairs. Specifically, she compromises the mechanical/organic dichotomy. The android illustrates the mechanical nature of all life, thus making all life uncanny. The absolute foregrounding of vision in the android text requires a rethinking of the android. While android life is no different than human life in its mechanical qualities, the android nonetheless retains one fundamental difference: the android is designed. Thus androids, through an adaptation of Laura Mulvey\u27s \u27Visual Pleasure in Narrative Cinema,\u27 can be thought of as to-be-looked-at-ness machines. This enters the android into a reciprocal relationship with the camera, the looking-at-machine. It is this reciprocal machine-machine relationship which explains the ubiquitous pairing of the android with themes of vision

Perceiving Sociable Technology: Exploring the Role of Anthropomorphism and Agency Perception on Human-Computer Interaction (HCI)

With the arrival of personal assistants and other AI-enabled autonomous technologies, social interactions with smart devices have become a part of our daily lives. Therefore, it becomes increasingly important to understand how these social interactions emerge, and why users appear to be influenced by them. For this reason, I explore questions on what the antecedents and consequences of this phenomenon, known as anthropomorphism, are as described in the extant literature from fields ranging from information systems to social neuroscience. I critically analyze those empirical studies directly measuring anthropomorphism and those referring to it without a corresponding measurement. Through a grounded theory approach, I identify common themes and use them to develop models for the antecedents and consequences of anthropomorphism. The results suggest anthropomorphism possesses both conscious and non-conscious components with varying implications. While conscious attributions are shown to vary based on individual differences, non-conscious attributions emerge whenever a technology exhibits apparent reasoning such as through non-verbal behavior like peer-to-peer mirroring or verbal paralinguistic and backchanneling cues. Anthropomorphism has been shown to affect users’ self-perceptions, perceptions of the technology, how users interact with the technology, and the users’ performance. Examples include changes in a users’ trust on the technology, conformity effects, bonding, and displays of empathy. I argue these effects emerge from changes in users’ perceived agency, and their self- and social- identity similarly to interactions between humans. Afterwards, I critically examine current theories on anthropomorphism and present propositions about its nature based on the results of the empirical literature. Subsequently, I introduce a two-factor model of anthropomorphism that proposes how an individual anthropomorphizes a technology is dependent on how the technology was initially perceived (top-down and rational or bottom-up and automatic), and whether it exhibits a capacity for agency or experience. I propose that where a technology lays along this spectrum determines how individuals relates to it, creating shared agency effects, or changing the users’ social identity. For this reason, anthropomorphism is a powerful tool that can be leveraged to support future interactions with smart technologies