Energy-efficiency evaluation of Intel KNL for HPC workloads

Energy consumption is increasingly becoming a limiting factor to the design of faster large-scale parallel systems, and development of energy-efficient and energy-aware applications is today a relevant issue for HPC code-developer communities. In this work we focus on energy performance of the Knights Landing (KNL) Xeon Phi, the latest many-core architecture processor introduced by Intel into the HPC market. We take into account the 64-core Xeon Phi 7230, and analyze its energy performance using both the on-chip MCDRAM and the regular DDR4 system memory as main storage for the application data-domain. As a benchmark application we use a Lattice Boltzmann code heavily optimized for this architecture and implemented using different memory data layouts to store its lattice. We assessthen the energy consumption using different memory data-layouts, kind of memory (DDR4 or MCDRAM) and number of threads per core

Software Grand Exposure: SGX Cache Attacks Are Practical

Side-channel information leakage is a known limitation of SGX. Researchers have demonstrated that secret-dependent information can be extracted from enclave execution through page-fault access patterns. Consequently, various recent research efforts are actively seeking countermeasures to SGX side-channel attacks. It is widely assumed that SGX may be vulnerable to other side channels, such as cache access pattern monitoring, as well. However, prior to our work, the practicality and the extent of such information leakage was not studied. In this paper we demonstrate that cache-based attacks are indeed a serious threat to the confidentiality of SGX-protected programs. Our goal was to design an attack that is hard to mitigate using known defenses, and therefore we mount our attack without interrupting enclave execution. This approach has major technical challenges, since the existing cache monitoring techniques experience significant noise if the victim process is not interrupted. We designed and implemented novel attack techniques to reduce this noise by leveraging the capabilities of the privileged adversary. Our attacks are able to recover confidential information from SGX enclaves, which we illustrate in two example cases: extraction of an entire RSA-2048 key during RSA decryption, and detection of specific human genome sequences during genomic indexing. We show that our attacks are more effective than previous cache attacks and harder to mitigate than previous SGX side-channel attacks

VLSI implementation of a multi-mode turbo/LDPC decoder architecture

Flexible and reconfigurable architectures have gained wide popularity in the communications field. In particular, reconfigurable architectures for the physical layer are an attractive solution not only to switch among different coding modes but also to achieve interoperability. This work concentrates on the design of a reconfigurable architecture for both turbo and LDPC codes decoding. The novel contributions of this paper are: i) tackling the reconfiguration issue introducing a formal and systematic treatment that, to the best of our knowledge, was not previously addressed; ii) proposing a reconfigurable NoCbased turbo/LDPC decoder architecture and showing that wide flexibility can be achieved with a small complexity overhead. Obtained results show that dynamic switching between most of considered communication standards is possible without pausing the decoding activity. Moreover, post-layout results show that tailoring the proposed architecture to the WiMAX standard leads to an area occupation of 2.75 mm2 and a power consumption of 101.5 mW in the worst case