A strategyproof mechanism for scheduling divisible loads in distributed systems

Divisible Load Theory (DLT) considers the scheduling of arbitrarily partitionable loads in distributed systems. The underlying assumption of DLT is that the processors are obedient (i.e., they do not “cheat ” the protocol), which is unrealistic when the processors are owned by autonomous, self-interested organizations that have no a priori motivation for cooperation and which strive to maximize their own welfare. In this scenario, they will manipulate the algorithm if it is beneficial to so. In this paper we propose a strategyproof mechanism for scheduling divisible loads in bus networks without control processors. We augment DLT with incentives so that it is to the benefit of a processor to truthfully report its processing capacity and to process its assignment at full capacity. The mechanism provide incentives to processors for reporting deviants and issue fines to deviants, resulting in abated willingness to deviate. 1