SISTEM PEMILU ONLINE BERBASIS PROTOKOL TWO CENTRAL FACILITIES

An election is an simple example of a scenario where security and confidentiality of data  between parties is critical. General election system that used in Indonesia as it long still use conventional trick that evokes a lot of problem as elector of double, voice distension and another fault and also long time for vote count. This conventional trick also require big costs and resources. To settle that thing, one of solution which can be done is use electronic voting ( e-voting ) with arrange general election system online  that building to use a safe protocol.System that is made has default pock secure voting reguirements to get settles and secure security each threat which will happen. One of protocol which can accomplish partly criterion default secure voting reguirements  and has security zoom that passably is Two Central Facilities Protocol , where consisting of Central Legitimazation Agency  (CLA) for elector validation and Central Tabulating Facility (CTF) for vote count

A Simple Cast-as-Intended E-Voting Protocol by Using Secure Smart Cards

We propose a simple cast-as-intended remote e-voting protocol where the security is based on the use of secure (and trusted) smart cards that incorporate incard numeric keyboards and LCD displays, and can perform a limited number of cryptographic operations (like encryption, signing, and random number generation). The protocol, while very simple, is significantly more secure (in the sense of ``cast-as-intended\u27\u27) and convenient to use than the e-voting protocol currently used in Norway. The protocol is developed primarily with the idea of deploying it in Estonia within the next $3$ to $10$ years. Since in Estonia, a vast majority of the population already has ID-cards with digital signing and authentication functionality, and the use of ID-cards is a required prerequisite to participate in Estonian e-voting anyway, our assumption of every voter having a secure hardware token makes sense in this concrete context

On the Possibility of Non-Interactive E-Voting in the Public-key Setting

In 2010 Hao, Ryan and Zielinski proposed a simple decentralized e-voting protocol that only requires 2 rounds of communication. Thus, for k elections their protocol needs 2k rounds of communication. Observing that the first round of their protocol is aimed to establish the public-keys of the voters, we propose an extension of the protocol as a non-interactive e-voting scheme in the public-key setting (NIVS) in which the voters, after having published their public-keys, can use the corresponding secret-keys to participate in an arbitrary number of one-round elections. We first construct a NIVS with a standard tally function where the number of votes for each candidate is counted. Further, we present constructions for two alternative types of elections. Specifically in the first type (dead or alive elections) the tally shows if at least one voter cast a vote for the candidate. In the second one (elections by unanimity), the tally shows if all voters cast a vote for the candidate. Our constructions are based on bilinear groups of prime order. As definitional contribution we provide formal computational definitions for privacy and verifiability of NIVSs. We conclude by showing intriguing relations between our results, secure computation, electronic exams and conference management systems

LNCS

Composable notions of incoercibility aim to forbid a coercer from using anything beyond the coerced parties’ inputs and outputs to catch them when they try to deceive him. Existing definitions are restricted to weak coercion types, and/or are not universally composable. Furthermore, they often make too strong assumptions on the knowledge of coerced parties—e.g., they assume they known the identities and/or the strategies of other coerced parties, or those of corrupted parties— which makes them unsuitable for applications of incoercibility such as e-voting, where colluding adversarial parties may attempt to coerce honest voters, e.g., by offering them money for a promised vote, and use their own view to check that the voter keeps his end of the bargain. In this work we put forward the first universally composable notion of incoercible multi-party computation, which satisfies the above intuition and does not assume collusions among coerced parties or knowledge of the corrupted set. We define natural notions of UC incoercibility corresponding to standard coercion-types, i.e., receipt-freeness and resistance to full-active coercion. Importantly, our suggested notion has the unique property that it builds on top of the well studied UC framework by Canetti instead of modifying it. This guarantees backwards compatibility, and allows us to inherit results from the rich UC literature. We then present MPC protocols which realize our notions of UC incoercibility given access to an arguably minimal setup—namely honestly generate tamper-proof hardware performing a very simple cryptographic operation—e.g., a smart card. This is, to our knowledge, the first proposed construction of an MPC protocol (for more than two parties) that is incoercibly secure and universally composable, and therefore the first construction of a universally composable receipt-free e-voting protocol

Cast-as-Intended Mechanism with Return Codes Based on PETs

We propose a method providing cast-as-intended verifiability for remote electronic voting. The method is based on plaintext equivalence tests (PETs), used to match the cast ballots against the pre-generated encrypted code tables. Our solution provides an attractive balance of security and functional properties. It is based on well-known cryptographic building blocks and relies on standard cryptographic assumptions, which allows for relatively simple security analysis. Our scheme is designed with a built-in fine-grained distributed trust mechanism based on threshold decryption. It, finally, imposes only very little additional computational burden on the voting platform, which is especially important when voters use devices of restricted computational power such as mobile phones. At the same time, the computational cost on the server side is very reasonable and scales well with the increasing ballot size

Quantum protocols for anonymous voting and surveying

We describe quantum protocols for voting and surveying. A key feature of our schemes is the use of entangled states to ensure that the votes are anonymous and to allow the votes to be tallied. The entanglement is distributed over separated sites; the physical inaccessibility of any one site is sufficient to guarantee the anonymity of the votes. The security of these protocols with respect to various kinds of attack is discussed. We also discuss classical schemes and show that our quantum voting protocol represents a N-fold reduction in computational complexity, where N is the number of voters.Comment: 8 pages. V2 includes the modifications made for the published versio

Public Evidence from Secret Ballots

Elections seem simple---aren't they just counting? But they have a unique, challenging combination of security and privacy requirements. The stakes are high; the context is adversarial; the electorate needs to be convinced that the results are correct; and the secrecy of the ballot must be ensured. And they have practical constraints: time is of the essence, and voting systems need to be affordable and maintainable, and usable by voters, election officials, and pollworkers. It is thus not surprising that voting is a rich research area spanning theory, applied cryptography, practical systems analysis, usable security, and statistics. Election integrity involves two key concepts: convincing evidence that outcomes are correct and privacy, which amounts to convincing assurance that there is no evidence about how any given person voted. These are obviously in tension. We examine how current systems walk this tightrope.Comment: To appear in E-Vote-Id '1