91 research outputs found
Recommended from our members
Challenges and examples of in-situ memory content extraction techniques
We present embedded devices memory elements -
from core registers to off chip-use, type and architecture before
summarising their features regarding extraction techniques at
scale. We list recent and on-going attack platform methodologies
prior analysing their pros and cons. Particularly of importance,
we address combined attack approaches, signal processing techniques and the challenges of low cost extraction methodologies.
Above all, we characterise beam-based extraction techniques,
starting from sample preparation before concluding on in-situ
memory content extraction limits and countermeasures
On the application of Two-Photon Absorption for Laser Fault Injection attacks
Laser Fault Injection (LFI) is considered to be the most powerful semiinvasive fault injection method for implementation attacks on security devices. In this work we discuss for the first time the application of the nonlinear Two-Photon Absorption (TPA) effect for the purpose of LFI. Though TPA is an established technique in other areas, e.g. fluorescence microscopy, so far it did not receive any attention in the field of physical attack methods on integrated circuits. We show that TPA has several superior properties over the regular linear LFI method. The TPA effect allows to work on non-thinned devices without increasing the induced energy and hence the stress on the device. In contrast to regular LFI, the nonlinearity of the TPA effect leads to increased precision due to the steeper descent in intensity and also a vertically restricted photoelectric effect. By practical experiments, we demonstrate the general applicability of the method for a specific device and that unlike a regular LFI setup, TPA-LFI is capable to inject faults without triggering a latch-up effect. In addition we discuss the possible implications of TPA-LFI on various sensor-based countermeasures
Dynamic Laser Fault Injection Aided by Quiescent Photon Emissions in Embedded Microcontrollers: Apparatus, Methodology and Attacks
Internet of Things (IoT) is becoming more integrated in our daily life with the increasing number of embedded electronic devices interacting together. These electronic devices are often controlled by a Micro-Controller Unit (MCU). As an example, it is estimated that today’s well-equipped automobile uses more than 50 MCUs. Some MCUs contain cryptographic co-processors to enhance the security of the exchanged and stored data with a common belief that the data is secured and safe. However many MCUs have been shown to be vulnerable to Fault Injection (FI) attacks. These attacks can reveal shared secrets, firmware, and other confidential information. In addition, this extracted information obtained by attacks can lead to identification of new vulnerabilities which may scale to attacks on many devices. In general, FI on MCUs corrupt data or corrupt instructions. Although it is assumed that only authorized personnel with access to cryptographic secrets will gain access to confidential information in MCUs, attackers in specialized labs nowadays may have access to high-tech equipment which could be used to attack these MCUs. Laser Fault Injection (LFI) is gaining more of a reputation for its ability to inject local faults rather than global ones due to its precision, thus providing a greater risk of breaking security in many devices.
Although publications have generally discussed the topic of security of MCUs, attack techniques are diverse and published LFI provides few and superficial details about the used experimental setup and methodology. Furthermore, limited research has examined the combination of both LFI and Photo-Emission Microscopy (PEM), direct modification of instructions using the LFI, control of embedded processor resets using LFI, and countermeasures which simultaneously thwart other aspects including decapsulation and reverse engineering (RE).
This thesis contributes to the study of the MCUs’ security by analyzing their susceptibility to LFI attacks and PEM. The proposed research aims to build a LFI bench from scratch allowing maximum control of laser parameters. In addition, a methodology for analysis of the Device Under Attack (DUA) in preparation for LFI is proposed, including frontside/backside decapsulation methods, and visualization of the structure of the DUA. Analysis of attack viability of different targets on the DUA, including One-Time Programmable (OTP) memory, Flash memory and Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) was performed. A realistic attack of a cryptographic algorithm, such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) using LFI was conducted. On the other hand, countermeasures to the proposed attack techniques, including decapsulation/RE, LFI and PEM, were discussed. This dissertation provides a summary for the necessary background and experimental setup to study the possibility of LFI and PEM in different DUAs of two different technologies, specifically PIC16F687 and ARM Cortex-M0 LPC1114FN28102. Attacks performed on on-chip peripherals such as Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART) and debug circuity reveal new vulnerabilities. This research is important for understanding attacks in order to design countermeasures for securing future hardware
Recommended from our members
Practical Partial Hardware Reverse Engineering Analysis
Funder: Isaac Newton Trust; doi: https://doi.org/10.13039/501100004815Abstract: Reverse engineering typically requires expensive equipment, skilled technicians, time, a cross section of the component to be sliced out and a dedicated reconstruction software. In this paper, we present a low-cost alternative, combining fast frontside sample preparation, electron microscopy imaging, error-free standard cell recognition and within and between-die standard cell statistical analysis (SCSA). Step-by-step, we depict the process to access the transistor’s drain/source area, to acquire the full area of a single chip layer, to adapt pattern recognition for standard cells and to analyze the standard cell width, local/global location and occurrences number. The inner workings of each step are accompanied by results on 45–65-nm FCBGA devices enabling to locate specific areas (e.g. registers, hardware accelerator). We particularly point out the importance of such design information extraction for local fault injection and hardware assurance. The primary goal is to analyze how much design information of a complex integrated circuit can be retrieved with minimal costs and without outsourcing
Secure Physical Design
An integrated circuit is subject to a number of attacks including information leakage, side-channel attacks, fault-injection, malicious change, reverse engineering, and piracy. Majority of these attacks take advantage of physical placement and routing of cells and interconnects. Several measures have already been proposed to deal with security issues of the high level functional design and logic synthesis. However, to ensure end-to-end trustworthy IC design flow, it is necessary to have security sign-off during physical design flow. This paper presents a secure physical design roadmap to enable end-to-end trustworthy IC design flow. The paper also discusses utilization of AI/ML to establish security at the layout level. Major research challenges in obtaining a secure physical design are also discussed
Investigation into Photon Emissions as a Side-Channel Leakage in Two Microcontrollers: A Focus on SRAM Blocks
Microcontrollers are extensively utilized across a diverse range of applications. However, with the escalating usage of these devices, the risk to their security and the valuable data they process correspondingly intensifies. These devices could potentially be susceptible to various security threats, with side channel leakage standing out as a notable concern. Among the numerous types of side-channel leakages, photon emissions from active devices emerge as a potentially significant concern. These emissions, a characteristic of all semiconductor devices including microcontrollers, occur during their operation. Depending on the operating point and the internal state of the chip, these emissions can reflect the device’s internal operations. Therefore, a malicious individual could potentially exploit these emissions to gain insights into the computations being performed within the device.
This dissertation delves into the investigation of photon emissions from the SRAM blocks of two distinct microcontrollers, utilizing a cost-effective setup. The aim is to extract information from these emissions, analyzing them as potential side-channel leakage points.
In the first segment of the study, a PIC microcontroller variant is investigated. The quiescent photon emissions from the SRAM are examined. A correlation attack was successfully executed on these emissions, which led to the recovery of the AES encryption key. Furthermore, differential analysis was used to examine the location of SRAM bits. The combination of this information with the application of an image processing method, namely the Structural Similarity Index (SSIM), assisted in revealing the content of SRAM cells from photon emission images.
The second segment of this study, for the first time, emphasizes on a RISC-V chip, examining the photon emissions of the SRAM during continuous reading. Probing the photon emissions from the row and column detectors led to the identification of a target word location, which is capable of revealing the AES key. Also, the content of target row was retrieved through the photon emissions originating from the drivers and the SRAM cells themselves. Additionally, the SSIM technique was utilized to determine the address of a targeted word in RISC-V photon emissions which cannot be analyzed through visual inspection.
The insights gained from this research contribute to a deeper understanding of side-channel leakage via photon emissions and demonstrate its potential potency in extracting critical information from digital devices. Moreover, this information significantly contributes to the development of innovative security measures, an aspect becoming increasingly crucial in our progressively digitized world
Recommended from our members
Design of Hardware with Quantifiable Security against Reverse Engineering
Semiconductors are a 412 billion dollar industry and integrated circuits take on important roles in human life, from everyday use in smart-devices to critical applications like healthcare and aviation. Saving today\u27s hardware systems from attackers can be a huge concern considering the budget spent on designing these chips and the sensitive information they may contain. In particular, after fabrication, the chip can be subject to a malicious reverse engineer that tries to invasively figure out the function of the chip or other sensitive data. Subsequent to an attack, a system can be subject to cloning, counterfeiting, or IP theft. This dissertation addresses some issues concerning the security of hardware systems in such scenarios.
First, the issue of privacy risks from approximate computing is investigated in Chapter 2. Simulation experiments show that the erroneous outputs produced on each chip instance can reveal the identity of the chip that performed the computation, which jeopardizes user privacy.
The next two chapters deal with camouflaging, which is a technique to prevent reverse engineering from extracting circuit information from the layout. Chapter 3 provides a design automation method to protect camouflaged circuits against an adversary with prior knowledge about the circuit\u27s viable functions. Chapter 4 provides a method to reverse engineer camouflaged circuits. The proposed reverse engineering formulation uses Boolean Satisfiability (SAT) solving in a way that incorporates laser fault injection and laser voltage probing capabilities to figure out the function of an aggressively camouflaged circuit with unknown gate functions and connections.
Chapter 5 addresses the challenge of secure key storage in hardware by proposing a new key storage method that applies threshold-defined behavior of memory cells to store secret information in a way that achieves a high degree of protection against invasive reverse engineering. This approach requires foundry support to encode the secrets as threshold voltage offsets in transistors. In Chapter 6, a secret key storage approach is introduced that does not rely on a trusted foundry. This approach only relies on the foundry to fabricate the hardware infrastructure for key generation but not to encode the secret key. The key is programmed by the IP integrator or the user after fabrication via directed accelerated aging of transistors. Additionally, this chapter presents the design of a working hardware prototype on PCB that demonstrates this scheme.
Finally, chapter 7 concludes the dissertation and summarizes possible future research
- …