A Smooth Transition from Powerlessness to Absolute Power

We study the phase transition of the coalitional manipulation problem for generalized scoring rules. Previously it has been shown that, under some conditions on the distribution of votes, if the number of manipulators is $o(\sqrt{n})$, where $n$ is the number of voters, then the probability that a random profile is manipulable by the coalition goes to zero as the number of voters goes to infinity, whereas if the number of manipulators is $\omega(\sqrt{n})$, then the probability that a random profile is manipulable goes to one. Here we consider the critical window, where a coalition has size $c\sqrt{n}$, and we show that as $c$ goes from zero to infinity, the limiting probability that a random profile is manipulable goes from zero to one in a smooth fashion, i.e., there is a smooth phase transition between the two regimes. This result analytically validates recent empirical results, and suggests that deciding the coalitional manipulation problem may be of limited computational hardness in practice.Comment: 22 pages; v2 contains minor changes and corrections; v3 contains minor changes after comments of reviewer

Generalized polymorphisms

We find all functions $f_0,f_1,\dots,f_m\colon \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}$ and $g_0,g_1,\dots,g_n\colon \{0,1\}^m \to \{0,1\}$ satisfying the following identity for all $n \times m$ matrices $(z_{ij}) \in \{0,1\}^{n \times m}$: $$f_0(g_1(z_{11},\dots,z_{1m}),\dots,g_n(z_{n1},\dots,z_{nm})) = g_0(f_1(z_{11},\dots,z_{n1}),\dots,f_m(z_{1m},\dots,z_{nm})).$$ Our results generalize work of Dokow and Holzman (2010), which considered the case $g_0 = g_1 = \cdots = g_n$, and of Chase, Filmus, Minzer, Mossel and Saurabh (2022), which considered the case $g_0 \neq g_1 = \cdots = g_n$.Comment: 19 page

Acyclic Games and Iterative Voting

We consider iterative voting models and position them within the general framework of acyclic games and game forms. More specifically, we classify convergence results based on the underlying assumptions on the agent scheduler (the order of players) and the action scheduler (which better-reply is played). Our main technical result is providing a complete picture of conditions for acyclicity in several variations of Plurality voting. In particular, we show that (a) under the traditional lexicographic tie-breaking, the game converges for any order of players under a weak restriction on voters' actions; and (b) Plurality with randomized tie-breaking is not guaranteed to converge under arbitrary agent schedulers, but from any initial state there is \emph{some} path of better-replies to a Nash equilibrium. We thus show a first separation between restricted-acyclicity and weak-acyclicity of game forms, thereby settling an open question from [Kukushkin, IJGT 2011]. In addition, we refute another conjecture regarding strongly-acyclic voting rules.Comment: some of the results appeared in preliminary versions of this paper: Convergence to Equilibrium of Plurality Voting, Meir et al., AAAI 2010; Strong and Weak Acyclicity in Iterative Voting, Meir, COMSOC 201

Voting with Coarse Beliefs

The classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem says that every strategy-proof voting rule with at least three possible candidates must be dictatorial. Similar impossibility results hold even if we consider a weaker notion of strategy-proofness where voters believe that the other voters' preferences are i.i.d.~(independent and identically distributed). In this paper, we take a bounded-rationality approach to this problem and consider a setting where voters have "coarse" beliefs (a notion that has gained popularity in the behavioral economics literature). In particular, we construct good voting rules that satisfy a notion of strategy-proofness with respect to coarse i.i.d.~beliefs, thus circumventing the above impossibility results

The Probability of Intransitivity in Dice and Close Elections

We study the phenomenon of intransitivity in models of dice and voting. First, we follow a recent thread of research for $n$-sided dice with pairwise ordering induced by the probability, relative to $1/2$, that a throw from one die is higher than the other. We build on a recent result of Polymath showing that three dice with i.i.d. faces drawn from the uniform distribution on $\{1,\ldots,n\}$ and conditioned on the average of faces equal to $(n+1)/2$ are intransitive with asymptotic probability $1/4$. We show that if dice faces are drawn from a non-uniform continuous mean zero distribution conditioned on the average of faces equal to $0$, then three dice are transitive with high probability. We also extend our results to stationary Gaussian dice, whose faces, for example, can be the fractional Brownian increments with Hurst index $H\in(0,1)$. Second, we pose an analogous model in the context of Condorcet voting. We consider $n$ voters who rank $k$ alternatives independently and uniformly at random. The winner between each two alternatives is decided by a majority vote based on the preferences. We show that in this model, if all pairwise elections are close to tied, then the asymptotic probability of obtaining any tournament on the $k$ alternatives is equal to $2^{-k(k-1)/2}$, which markedly differs from known results in the model without conditioning. We also explore the Condorcet voting model where methods other than simple majority are used for pairwise elections. We investigate some natural definitions of "close to tied" for general functions and exhibit an example where the distribution over tournaments is not uniform under those definitions.Comment: Ver3: 45 pages, additional details and clarifications; Ver2: 43 pages, additional co-author, major revision; Ver1: 23 page