A system of relational syllogistic incorporating full Boolean reasoning

We present a system of relational syllogistic, based on classical propositional logic, having primitives of the following form: Some A are R-related to some B; Some A are R-related to all B; All A are R-related to some B; All A are R-related to all B. Such primitives formalize sentences from natural language like `All students read some textbooks'. Here A and B denote arbitrary sets (of objects), and R denotes an arbitrary binary relation between objects. The language of the logic contains only variables denoting sets, determining the class of set terms, and variables denoting binary relations between objects, determining the class of relational terms. Both classes of terms are closed under the standard Boolean operations. The set of relational terms is also closed under taking the converse of a relation. The results of the paper are the completeness theorem with respect to the intended semantics and the computational complexity of the satisfiability problem.Comment: Available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10849-012-9165-

The Psychological Dimension of the Lottery Paradox

The lottery paradox involves a set of judgments that are individually easy, when we think intuitively, but ultimately hard to reconcile with each other, when we think reflectively. Empirical work on the natural representation of probability shows that a range of interestingly different intuitive and reflective processes are deployed when we think about possible outcomes in different contexts. Understanding the shifts in our natural ways of thinking can reduce the sense that the lottery paradox reveals something problematic about our concept of knowledge. However, examining these shifts also raises interesting questions about how we ought to be thinking about possible outcomes in the first place

Individual differences and strategies for human reasoning

Theories of human reasoning have tended to assume cognitive universality, i. e. that all individuals reason in basically the same way. However, some research (e. g. that of Ford. 1995) has found evidence of individual differences in the strategies people use for syllogistic reasoning. This thesis presents a series of experiments which aimed to identify individual differences in strategies for human reasoning and investigate their nature and aetiology. Experiment 1 successfully replicated and extended Ford (1995) and provided further evidence that most individuals prefer to reason with either verbal-propositional or visuo-spatial representations. Data from verbal and written protocols showed that verbal reasoners tended to use a method of substitution whereby they obtain a value for the common term from one premise and then simply substitute it in the other premise to obtain a conclusion. Spatial reasoners, on the other hand, presented protocols which resembled Euler circles and described the syllogistic premises in terms of sets and subsets. Experiment 2 provided some further qualitative evidence about the nature of such strategies, especially the verbal reasoners, showing that within strategy variations occurred. Experiment 3 extended this line of research, identifying a strong association between verbal and spatial strategies for syllogistic reasoning and abstract and concrete strategies for transitive inference (the latter having originally been identified by Egan and Grimes- Farrow, 1982). Experiments 1-3 also showed that inter-strategic differences in accuracy are generally not observed, hence, reasoners present an outward appearance of ubiquity despite underlying differences in reasoning processes. Experiments 5 and 6 investigated individual differences in cognitive factors which may underpin strategy preference. Whilst no apparent effects of verbal and spatial ability or cognitive style were found, reasoners did appear to draw differentially on the verbal and spatial components of working memory. Confirmatory factor analysis showed that whilst verbal reasoners draw primarily on the verbal memory resource, spatial reasoners draw both on this and on spatial resource. Overall, these findings have important implications for theories of human reasoning, which need to take into account possible individual differences in strategies if they are to present a truly comprehensive account of how people reason.Economic and Social Research Counci

Exploiting conceptual spaces for ontology integration

The widespread use of ontologies raises the need to integrate distinct conceptualisations. Whereas the symbolic approach of established representation standards – based on first-order logic (FOL) and syllogistic reasoning – does not implicitly represent semantic similarities, ontology mapping addresses this problem by aiming at establishing formal relations between a set of knowledge entities which represent the same or a similar meaning in distinct ontologies. However, manually or semi-automatically identifying similarity relationships is costly. Hence, we argue, that representational facilities are required which enable to implicitly represent similarities. Whereas Conceptual Spaces (CS) address similarity computation through the representation of concepts as vector spaces, CS rovide neither an implicit representational mechanism nor a means to represent arbitrary relations between concepts or instances. In order to overcome these issues, we propose a hybrid knowledge representation approach which extends FOL-based ontologies with a conceptual grounding through a set of CS-based representations. Consequently, semantic similarity between instances – represented as members in CS – is indicated by means of distance metrics. Hence, automatic similarity detection across distinct ontologies is supported in order to facilitate ontology integration

Information enforcement in learning with graphics : improving syllogistic reasoning skills

This thesis is an investigation into the factors that contribute to good choices among graphical systems used in teaching, and the feasibility of implementing teaching software that uses this knowledge.The thesis describes a mathematical metric derived from a cognitive theory of human diagram processing. The theory characterises differences among representations by their ability to express information. The theory provides the factors and relationships needed to build the metric. It says that good representations are easily processed because they are more vivid, more tractable and less expressive, than poor representations.The metric is applied to abstract systems for teaching and learning syllogistic reasoning, TARSKI'S WORLD, EULER CIRCLES, VENN DIAGRAMS and CARROLL'S GAME OF LOGIC. A rank ordering reflects the value of each system predicted by the theory and the metric. The theory, the metric and the systems are then tested in empirical studies. Five studies involving sixty-eight learners, examined the benefit of software based on these abstract systems.Studies showed the theory correctly predicted learners' success with the circle systems and poorer performance with TARSKI'S WORLD. The metric showed small but clear differences in expressivity between the circle systems. Differences between results of the learners using the circle systems contradicted the predictions of the metric.Learners with mathematical training were better equipped and more successful at learning syllogistic reasoning with the systems. Performance of learners without mathematical training declined after using the software systems. Diagrams drawn by learners together with video footage collected during problem solving, led to a catalogue of errors, misconceptions and some helpful strategies for learning from graphical systems.A cognitive style test investigated the poor performance of non-mathematically trained learners. Learners with mathematics training showed serialist and versatile learning styles while learners without this training showed a holist learning style. This is consistent with the hypothesis that non-mathematically trained learners emphasise the use of semantic cues during learning and problem solving.A card-sorting task investigated learners' preferences for parts of the graphical lexicon used in the diagram systems. Preferences for the EULER lexicon increased difficulty in explaining the system's poor results in earlier studies. Video footage of learners using the systems in the final study illustrated useful learning strategies and improved performance with EULER while individual instruction was available.Further work describes a preliminary design for an adaptive syllogism tutor and other related work

Using forced choice to test belief bias in syllogistic reasoning.

In deductive reasoning, believable conclusions are more likely to be accepted regardless of their validity. Although many theories argue that this belief bias reflects a change in the quality of reasoning, distinguishing qualitative changes from simple response biases can be difficult (Dube, Rotello, & Heit, 2010). We introduced a novel procedure that controls for response bias. In Experiments 1 and 2, the task required judging which of two simultaneously presented syllogisms was valid. Surprisingly, there was no evidence for belief bias with this forced choice procedure. In Experiment 3, the procedure was modified so that only one set of premises was viewable at a time. An effect of beliefs emerged: unbelievable conclusions were judged more accurately, supporting the claim that beliefs affect the quality of reasoning. Experiments 4 and 5 replicated and extended this finding, showing that the effect was mediated by individual differences in cognitive ability and analytic cognitive style. Although the positive findings of Experiments 3-5 are most relevant to the debate about the mechanisms underlying belief bias, the null findings of Experiments 1 and 2 offer insight into how the presentation of an argument influences the manner in which people reason

Conceptual thinking in Hegel’s Science of logic

Filozofia analityczna po logicyzmie Fregego i atomizmie logicznym Russella odziedziczyła szereg założeń związanych z istnieniem rodzajowej dziedziny bytów indywidualnych, których tożsamość i elementarne określenia już mamy zdefiniowane. Te „indywidua” istnieją tylko w idealnych „światach możliwych” i nie są niczym innym jak zbiorami posiadającymi strukturę bądź czystymi zbiorami matematycznymi. W przeciwieństwie do takich czysto abstrakcyjnych modeli, Hegel analizuje rolę pojęciowych rozróżnień i odpowiednich brakujących inferencji w rzeczywistym świecie. Tutaj wszystkie obiekty są przestrzennie i czasowo skończone. Nawet jeśli rzeczywiste rzeczy poruszają się zgodnie z pewnymi formami, są tylko momentami w całościowym procesie. Wszelako, formy te nie są przedmiotami bezpośredniej, empirycznej obserwacji, lecz zakładają udane i powtarzalne działania i akty mowy. W rezultacie żadna semantyka odnoszącej się do świata referencji nie może obyć się bez kategorii Heglowskich, które wykraczają daleko poza narzędzia opartej wyłącznie na relacjach logiki matematycznej