An Ordinal View of Independence with Application to Plausible Reasoning

An ordinal view of independence is studied in the framework of possibility theory. We investigate three possible definitions of dependence, of increasing strength. One of them is the counterpart to the multiplication law in probability theory, and the two others are based on the notion of conditional possibility. These two have enough expressive power to support the whole possibility theory, and a complete axiomatization is provided for the strongest one. Moreover we show that weak independence is well-suited to the problems of belief change and plausible reasoning, especially to address the problem of blocking of property inheritance in exception-tolerant taxonomic reasoning.Comment: Appears in Proceedings of the Tenth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI1994

Rationality of Belief Or: Why Savage's axioms are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality, Second Version

Economic theory reduces the concept of rationality to internal consistency. The practice of economics, however, distinguishes between rational and irrational beliefs. There is therefore an interest in a theory of rational beliefs, and of the process by which beliefs are generated and justified. We argue that the Bayesian approach is unsatisfactory for this purpose, for several reasons. First, the Bayesian approach begins with a prior, and models only a very limited form of learning, namely, Bayesian updating. Thus, it is inherently incapable of describing the formation of prior beliefs. Second, there are many situations in which there is not sufficient information for an individual to generate a Bayesian prior. It follows that the Bayesian approach is neither sufficient not necessary for the rationality of beliefs.Decision making, Bayesian, Behavioral Economics

Rationality of Belief Or: Why Savage's axioms are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality, Second Version

Economic theory reduces the concept of rationality to internal consistency. As far as beliefs are concerned, rationality is equated with having a prior belief over a “Grand State Space”, describing all possible sources of uncertainties. We argue that this notion is too weak in some senses and too strong in others. It is too weak because it does not distinguish between rational and irrational beliefs. Relatedly, the Bayesian approach, when applied to the Grand State Space, is inherently incapable of describing the formation of prior beliefs. On the other hand, this notion of rationality is too strong because there are many situations in which there is not sufficient information for an individual to generate a Bayesian prior. It follows that the Bayesian approach is neither sufficient not necessary for the rationality of beliefs.Decision making, Bayesian, Behavioral Economics

Characterizing perfect recall using next-step temporal operators in S5 and sub-S5 Epistemic Temporal Logic

We review the notion of perfect recall in the literature on interpreted systems, game theory, and epistemic logic. In the context of Epistemic Temporal Logic (ETL), we give a (to our knowledge) novel frame condition for perfect recall, which is local and can straightforwardly be translated to a defining formula in a language that only has next-step temporal operators. This frame condition also gives rise to a complete axiomatization for S5 ETL frames with perfect recall. We then consider how to extend and consolidate the notion of perfect recall in sub-S5 settings, where the various notions discussed are no longer equivalent

A THEORY OF RATIONAL CHOICE UNDER COMPLETE IGNORANCE

This paper contributes to a theory of rational choice under uncertainty for decision-makers whose preferences are exhaustively described by partial orders representing ""limited information."" Specifically, we consider the limiting case of ""Complete Ignorance"" decision problems characterized by maximally incomplete preferences and important primarily as reduced forms of general decision problems under uncertainty. ""Rationality"" is conceptualized in terms of a ""Principle of Preference-Basedness,"" according to which rational choice should be isomorphic to asserted preference. The main result characterizes axiomatically a new choice-rule called ""Simultaneous Expected Utility Maximization"" which in particular satisfies a choice-functional independence and a context-dependent choice-consistency condition; it can be interpreted as the fair agreement in a bargaining game (Kalai-Smorodinsky solution) whose players correspond to the different possible states (respectively extermal priors in the general case).

Decision-Making in the Context of Imprecise Probabilistic Beliefs

Coherent imprecise probabilistic beliefs are modelled as incomplete comparative likelihood relations admitting a multiple-prior representation. Under a structural assumption of Equidivisibility, we provide an axiomatization of such relations and show uniqueness of the representation. In the second part of the paper, we formulate a behaviorally general axiom relating preferences and probabilistic beliefs which implies that preferences over unambiguous acts are probabilistically sophisticated and which entails representability of preferences over Savage acts in an Anscombe-Aumann-style framework. The motivation for an explicit and separate axiomatization of beliefs for the study of decision-making under ambiguity is discussed in some detail.