A networked voting rule for democratic representation

We introduce a general framework for exploring the problem of selecting a committee of representatives with the aim of studying a networked voting rule based on a decentralized large-scale platform, which can assure a strong accountability of the elected. The results of our simulations suggest that this algorithm-based approach is able to obtain a high representativeness for relatively small committees, performing even better than a classical voting rule based on a closed list of candidates. We show that a general relation between committee size and representatives exists in the form of an inverse square root law and that the normalized committee size approximately scales with the inverse of the community size, allowing the scalability to very large populations. These findings are not strongly influenced by the different networks used to describe the individuals interactions, except for the presence of few individuals with very high connectivity which can have a marginally negative effect in the committee selection process.Comment: Submitted for publicatio

Improving Candidate-Quality Preference-Specification Mechanisms: Incorporating (Gender-Empowering) Voter-Chosen Quotas

I conceptualize the informal outlines of a new voting system/mechanism that is more holistic and democratically just; the proposed alternative would incorporate (gender) quotas amongst other fundamental, important aspects. This conceptual outline seeks to resolve the primary (intellectual) obstacles for the adoption of quotas in their current form which, I contend, is their discordance with mainstream conceptions of democratic justice. More precisely, the conceptualized voting system/mechanism seeks to increase the sophistication of preference-specification in voting procedures (thereby presenting an alternative to the prevailing, privileged paradigm of geospatial-constituency representation). I do not present results in the conventional sense; no data was analysed, no experiments run, and no software implemented. A rationale is provided for why this proposed voting system/mechanism, in addition to potentially solving/tackling some problems identified by feminist scholarship, could also solve an even larger class of fundamental political and democratic problems related to intersectionality (e.g., race, ethnicity, income, class, caste, disability, sexuality, education, age, occupation etc.) through enhancing the translation, representation, and implementation of voters’ interests. In terms of conclusions within the paper, they are largely intermediate conclusions as they relate to the investigation of problems as well as the informal conceptual outline of the proposed voting system/mechanism

Aligning Political Options and Aggregated Personal Opinions on the Issues

Much work has been done in studying how to aggregate voter opinions to decide a fair election. These models presuppose that each voter has a solid understanding of their choices and can express that opinion in the election process. We discuss why this is not always the case. Further, we explore some of the issues that arise when considering the multidimensional nature of both voter preference, with respect to the slate of issues in an election, and the platforms of the various candidates, with respect to the same slate of issues. In light of the complications we encounter and with full apologies to Jonathan Swift, a modest proposal is made for conducting future elections in a way that offers all of the voters a true chance to find a voice

Identification of voting systems for the identification of preferences in public participation. Case Study: application of the Borda Count system for collective decision making at the Salonga National Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Abstract:The aim of this paper is to review the literature on voting systems based on Condorcet and Borda. We compared and classified them. Also we referred to some strengths and weaknesses of voting systems and finally in a case study, we made use of the Borda voting system for collective decision making in the Salonga National Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Resumen: el objetivo de este trabajo es hacer una revisión bibliográfica de los sistemas de votación basados en Condorcet y Borda. Se ha comparado y clasificado los mismos. Así mismo se ha hecho referencia a algunas debilidades y fortalezas de los sistemas de votación y por último en un caso de estudio, se ha hecho uso del sistema de votación de Borda para la toma de decisión colectiva en el Parque Nacional de Salonga en la República Democrática del Congo