4 research outputs found
E-Business Oriented Optimal Online Auction Design
Online auctions, in the absence of spatial, temporal and geographic constraints, provide an alternative supply chain channel for the distribution of goods and services. This channel differs from the common posted-price mechanism that is typically used in the retail sector. In consumer-oriented markets, buyers can now experience the thrill of ‘winning’ a product, potentially at a bargain, as opposed to the typically more tedious notion of ‘buying’ it. Sellers, on the other hand, have an additional channel to distribute their goods, and the opportunity to liquidate rapidly aging goods at greater than salvage values. The primary facilitator of this phenomenon is the widespread adoption of electronic commerce over an open-source, ubiquitous Internet Protocol (IP) based network. In this paper, we derive an optimal bidding strategy in sequential auctions that incorporates option value assessment. Furthermore, we establish that our optimal bidding strategy is tractable since it is independent of the bidding strategies of other bidders in the current auction and is only dependent on the option value assessmen
The Development of an Internet Reverse Auction; an Alternative to e-Procurement
E-commerce is expected to growth tremendously as the economic shifted into global
market. This has encouraged Small and Medium sized Enterprise (SME) to use the
changes in the way they procured goods and services and should not miss the emergence
of technology. The aim o f this research is to understand and analyze the principles of
online reverse auction, to design online reverse auction website and to develop a
prototype called W eb b ased Intermediary R everse A uction (WIRA). T he m ethodology
that been adopted in order to develop this project are the planning phase, analysis phase,
design and development phase, testing and debugging phase and implementation phase.
The prototype of the online reverse auction is developed based on the research and
analysis conducted by using several important tools. Tools that being used in this project
are, Macromedia Dreamweaver, Adobe Photoshop, Macromedia Flash MX, Microsoft
Access, ASP and IIS. By having this website, SMEs should realized that they can gained
much profits as the product's price is much cheaper then they can get in e-procurement
Analysis of multi-attribute multi-unit procurement auctions and capacity-constrained sequential auctions
This dissertation examines an iterative multi-attribute auction for multi-unit procurement in the first part. A multi-unit allocation problem that allows order split among suppliers is formulated to improve the market efficiency. Suppliers are allowed to provide discriminative prices over units based on their marginal costs. A mechanism called Iterative Multiple-attribute Multiple-unit Reverse Auction (IMMRA) is proposed based on the assumption of the modified myopic best-response strategies. Numerical experiment results show that the IMMRA achieves market efficiency in most instances. The inefficiency occurs occasionally on the special cases when cost structures are significantly different among suppliers. Numerical results also show that the IMMRA results in lower buyer payments than the Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) payments in most cases. In the second part, two sequential auctions with the Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) mechanism are proposed for two buyers to purchase multiple units of an identical item. The invited suppliers are assumed to have capacity constraints of providing the required demands. Three research problems are raised for the analysis of the sequential auctions: the suppliers\u27 expected payoff functions, the suppliers\u27 bidding strategies in the first auction, and the buyers\u27 procurement costs. Because of the intrinsic complexity of the problems, we limit our study to a duopoly market environment with two suppliers. Both suppliers’ dominant bidding strategies are theoretically derived. With numerical experiments, suppliers’ expected profits and buyers’ expected procurement costs are empirically analyzed
Analysis of multi-attribute multi-unit procurement auctions and capacity-constrained sequential auctions
This dissertation examines an iterative multi-attribute auction for multi-unit procurement in the first part. A multi-unit allocation problem that allows order split among suppliers is formulated to improve the market efficiency. Suppliers are allowed to provide discriminative prices over units based on their marginal costs. A mechanism called Iterative Multiple-attribute Multiple-unit Reverse Auction (IMMRA) is proposed based on the assumption of the modified myopic best-response strategies. Numerical experiment results show that the IMMRA achieves market efficiency in most instances. The inefficiency occurs occasionally on the special cases when cost structures are significantly different among suppliers. Numerical results also show that the IMMRA results in lower buyer payments than the Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) payments in most cases. In the second part, two sequential auctions with the Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) mechanism are proposed for two buyers to purchase multiple units of an identical item. The invited suppliers are assumed to have capacity constraints of providing the required demands. Three research problems are raised for the analysis of the sequential auctions: the suppliers\u27 expected payoff functions, the suppliers\u27 bidding strategies in the first auction, and the buyers\u27 procurement costs. Because of the intrinsic complexity of the problems, we limit our study to a duopoly market environment with two suppliers. Both suppliers’ dominant bidding strategies are theoretically derived. With numerical experiments, suppliers’ expected profits and buyers’ expected procurement costs are empirically analyzed