2,565 research outputs found
Ecosystem services auctions: the last decade of research
ReviewAuctions offer potential cost-effectiveness improvements over other mechanisms for
payments for ecosystem services (PES) contract allocation. However, evidence-based guidance for
matching design to application is scarce and research priorities are unclear. To take stock of the current
state of the art, we conducted a systematic review and thematic content analysis of 56 peer-reviewed
journal articles discussing ES auctions published in the last decade. Auctions were approached from
three overlapping perspectives: mechanism design, PES, and policy analysis. Five major themes
emerged: (1) performance, including measures like cost-effectiveness and PES criteria like additionality;
(2) information dynamics like price discovery and communication effects; (3) design innovations like
risk-integrating and spatially coordinated mechanisms; (4) contextual variables like policy context and
cultural values; and (5) participation factors. Additional attention from policymakers and continued
efforts to coordinate research in this diverse and interdisciplinary subfield may be beneficialinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio
Increasing Competition and the Winner's Curse: Evidence from Procurement
We assess empirically the effects of the winner's curse which, in common-value auctions, counsels more conservative bidding as the number of competitors increases. First, we construct an econometric model of an auction in which bidders' preferences have both common- and private-value components, and propose a new monotone quantile approach which facilitates estimation of this model. Second, we estimate the model using bids from procurement auctions held by the State of New Jersey. For a large subset of these auctions, we find that median procurement costs rise as competition intensifies. In this setting, then, asymmetric information overturns the common economic wisdom that more competition is always desirable
Structured Preference Representation and Multiattribute Auctions
Handling preferences over multiple objectives (or attributes) poses serious challenges to
the development of automated solutions to complex decision problems. The number of
decision outcomes grows exponentially with the number of attributes, and that makes elicitation,
maintenance, and reasoning with preferences particularly complex. This problem can potentially be alleviated by using a factored representation of preferences based on
independencies among the attributes. This work has two main components.
The first component focuses on development of graphical models for multiattribute
preferences and utility functions. Graphical models take advantage of factored utility, and
yield a compact representation for preferences. Specifically, I introduce CUI networks, a
compact graphical representation of utility functions over multiple attributes. CUI networks
model multiattribute utility functions using the well studied utility independence concept.
I show how conditional utility independence leads to an effective functional decomposition
that can be exhibited graphically, and how local conditional utility functions, depending on
each node and its parents, can be used to calculate joint utility.
The second main component deals with the integration of preference structures and
graphical models in trading mechanisms, and in particular in multiattribute auctions. I first
develop multiattribute auctions that accommodate generalized additive independent (GAI)
preferences. Previous multiattribute mechanisms generally either remain agnostic about
traders’ preference structures, or presume highly restrictive forms, such as full additivity. I present an approximately efficient iterative auction mechanism that maintains prices on potentially overlapping GAI clusters of attributes, thus decreasing elicitation and computation burden while allowing for expressive preference representation.
Further, I apply preference structures and preference-based constraints to simplify the
particularly complex, but practically useful domain of multi-unit multiattribute auctions
and exchanges. I generalize the iterative multiattribute mechanism to a subset of this domain, and investigate the problem of finding an optimal set of trades in multiattribute call
markets, given restrictions on preference expression. Finally, I apply preference structures to simplify the modeling of user utility in sponsored-search auctions, in order to facilitate ranking mechanisms that account for the user experience from advertisements. I provide short-term and long-term simulations showing the effect on search-engine revenues.PhDComputer Science & EngineeringUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/61670/1/yagil_1.pd
Agent-Based Computational Economics: A Constructive Approach to Economic Theory
This chapter explores the potential advantages and disadvantages of Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) for the study of economic systems. General points are concretely illustrated using an ACE model of a two-sector decentralized market economy. Six issues are highlighted: Constructive understanding of production, pricing, and trade processes; the essential primacy of survival; strategic rivalry and market power; behavioral uncertainty and learning; the role of conventions and organizations; and the complex interactions among structural attributes, behaviors, and institutional arrangements. Extensive annotated pointers to ACE surveys, research, course materials, and software can be accessed here: http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/ace.htmagent-based computational economics; Learning; network formation; decentralized market economy
Empirical Models of Auctions
Many important economic questions arising in auctions can be answered only with knowledge of the underlying primitive distributions governing bidder demand and information. An active literature has developed aiming to estimate these primitives by exploiting restrictions from economic theory as part of the econometric model used to interpret auction data. We review some highlights of this recent literature, focusing on identification and empirical applications. We describe three insights that underlie much of the recent methodological progress in this area and discuss some of the ways these insights have been extended to richer models allowing more convincing empirical applications. We discuss several recent empirical studies using these methods to address a range of important economic questions.Auctions, Identification, Estimation, Testing
Framing for incentive compatibility in choice modelling
The incentives that motivate respondents to reveal their preferences truthfully have been a long-standing area of research in the non-market valuation literature. A number of studies have been undertaken to investigate incentive compatibility in nonmarket valuation. Most of these used laboratory environments rather than field surveys (e.g. Carson and Burton, 2008, Harrison, 2007, Lusk and Schroeder, 2004, Racevskis and Lupi, 2008). Only a few studies investigating incentive compatibility have considered multi-attribute public goods with an explicit provision rule in a choice experiment (Carson and Groves, 2007, Collins and Vossler, 2009, Carson and Burton, 2008). The design of a choice modelling study that avoids strategic behaviour has proven particularly difficult because of multiple choices and difficulties in developing a majority voting provision rule. This study investigates the impact of the inclusion of a framing statement for incentive compatibility in a field survey choice modelling study. An incentive compatible statement (provision rule) that sets out to respondents the rule relating to when the good under consideration will be provided was employed. The impact of a provision rule across three alternative choice modelling multiple choice questionnaires was tested by comparing results between split samples with and without a provision rule. Four split samples were used to test the impact of a provision rule on preferences across different communities including local/rural residents and distant/urban residents. A choice modelling analysis that involved a conditional logit model and a random parameter model was used to elicit household willingness to pay for improvements in environmental quality in the Hawkesbury-Nepean catchment. The results of the study show that the inclusion of a provision rule had an effect on preferences in the distant/urban communities. However, the impact of a provision rule in the local/rural community sub-samples was negligible. This study suggests that the impact of a provision rule should be analysed in the context of different community characteristics.Choice modelling, Incentive comparability, Provision rule, Non-market valuation, Environment, Environmental Economics and Policy,
Agent-Based Computational Modeling And Macroeconomics
Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) is the computational study of economic processes modeled as dynamic systems of interacting agents. This essay discusses the potential use of ACE modeling tools for the study of macroeconomic systems. Points are illustrated using an ACE model of a two-sector decentralized market economy. Related work can be accessed here: http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/amulmark.htmagent-based computational economics
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