10 research outputs found
Compilation Method for the Verification of Temporal-Epistemic Properties of Cryptographic Protocols
We present a technique for automatically verifying cryptographic protocols specified in the mainstream specification language CAPSL. Our work is based on model checking multi-agent systems against properties given in AI logics. We present PC2IS, a compiler from CAPSL to ISPL, the input language of MCMAS, a symbolic model checker for MAS. The technique also reduces automatically the state space to be considered by the model checker, thereby maximising the number of protocols and sessions that can be verified. We evaluate the technique on protocols in the Clark-Jacobs library against custom secrecy and authentication requirements as well as against more advanced properties that are expressible in this epistemic-based approach
Access control via belnap logic: intuitive, expressive, and analyzable policy composition
Access control to IT systems increasingly relies on the ability to compose policies. There is thus bene t in any framework for policy composition that is intuitive, formal (and so \an- alyzable" and \implementable"), expressive, independent of speci c application domains, and yet able to be extended to create domain-speci c instances. Here we develop such a framework based on Belnap logic. An access-control policy is interpreted as a four-valued predicate that maps access requests to either grant, deny, con ict, or unspeci ed { the four values of the Bel- nap bilattice. We de ne an expressive access-control policy language PBel, having composition operators based on the operators of Belnap logic. Natural orderings on policies are obtained by lifting the truth and information orderings of the Belnap bilattice. These orderings lead to a query language in which policy analyses, e.g. con ict freedom, can be speci ed. Policy analysis is supported through a reduction of the validity of policy queries to the validity of propositional formulas on predicates over access requests. We evaluate our approach through rewall policy and RBAC policy examples, and discuss domain-speci c and generic extensions of our policy language
Model Checking Security Protocols: A Multiagent System Approach
Security protocols specify the communication required to achieve security objectives, e.g., data-privacy. Such protocols are used in electronic media: e-commerce, e-banking, e-voting, etc. Formal verification is used to discover protocol-design flaws. In this thesis, we use a multiagent systems approach built on temporal-epistemic logic to model and analyse a bounded number of concurrent sessions of authentication and key-establishment protocols executing in a Dolev-Yao environment. We increase the expressiveness of classical, trace-based frameworks by mapping each protocol requirement into a hierarchy of temporal-epistemic formulae. To automate our methodology, we design and implement a tool called PD2IS. From a high-level protocol description, PD2IS produces our protocol model and the temporal-epistemic specifications of the protocol’s goals. This output is verified with the model checker MCMAS. We benchmark our methodology on various protocols drawn from standard repositories. We extend our approach to formalise protocols described by equations of cryptographic primitives. The core of this extension is an indistinguishability relation to accommodate the underlying protocol equations. Based on this relation, we introduce a knowledge modality and an algorithm to model check multiagent systems against it. These techniques are applied to verify e-voting protocols. Furthermore, we develop our methodology towards intrusion-detection techniques. We introduce the concept of detectability, i.e., the ability of protocol participants to detect jointly that the protocol is being attacked. We extend our formalisms and PD2IS to support detectability analysis. We model check several attack-prone protocols against their detectability specifications
Model checking security protocols : a multiagent system approach
Security protocols specify the communication required to achieve security objectives, e.g.,
data-privacy. Such protocols are used in electronic media: e-commerce, e-banking, e-voting,
etc. Formal verification is used to discover protocol-design flaws.
In this thesis, we use a multiagent systems approach built on temporal-epistemic logic
to model and analyse a bounded number of concurrent sessions of authentication and
key-establishment protocols executing in a Dolev-Yao environment. We increase the expressiveness
of classical, trace-based frameworks by mapping each protocol requirement into a
hierarchy of temporal-epistemic formulae.
To automate our methodology, we design and implement a tool called PD2IS. From a
high-level protocol description, PD2IS produces our protocol model and the temporal-epistemic
specifications of the protocol’s goals. This output is verified with the model checker MCMAS.
We benchmark our methodology on various protocols drawn from standard repositories.
We extend our approach to formalise protocols described by equations of cryptographic
primitives. The core of this extension is an indistinguishability relation to accommodate the
underlying protocol equations. Based on this relation, we introduce a knowledge modality and
an algorithm to model check multiagent systems against it. These techniques are applied to
verify e-voting protocols.
Furthermore, we develop our methodology towards intrusion-detection techniques. We
introduce the concept of detectability, i.e., the ability of protocol participants to detect
jointly that the protocol is being attacked. We extend our formalisms and PD2IS to support
detectability analysis. We model check several attack-prone protocols against their detectability
specifications