Game Theory Meets Network Security: A Tutorial at ACM CCS

The increasingly pervasive connectivity of today's information systems brings up new challenges to security. Traditional security has accomplished a long way toward protecting well-defined goals such as confidentiality, integrity, availability, and authenticity. However, with the growing sophistication of the attacks and the complexity of the system, the protection using traditional methods could be cost-prohibitive. A new perspective and a new theoretical foundation are needed to understand security from a strategic and decision-making perspective. Game theory provides a natural framework to capture the adversarial and defensive interactions between an attacker and a defender. It provides a quantitative assessment of security, prediction of security outcomes, and a mechanism design tool that can enable security-by-design and reverse the attacker's advantage. This tutorial provides an overview of diverse methodologies from game theory that includes games of incomplete information, dynamic games, mechanism design theory to offer a modern theoretic underpinning of a science of cybersecurity. The tutorial will also discuss open problems and research challenges that the CCS community can address and contribute with an objective to build a multidisciplinary bridge between cybersecurity, economics, game and decision theory

Adversarial Risk Análysis for Counterterrorism Modelling

Recent large scale terrorist attacks have raised interest in models for resource allocation against terrorist threats. The unifying theme in this area is the need to develop methods for the analysis of allocation decisions when risks stem from the intentional actions of intelligent adversaries. Most approaches to these problems have a game theoretic flavor although there are also several interesting decision analytic based proposals. One of them is the recently introduced framework for adversarial risk analysis, which deals with decision making problems that involve intelligent opponents and uncertain outcomes. We explore how adversarial risk analysis addresses some standard counterterrorism models: simultaneous defend-attack models, sequential defend-attack-defend models and sequential defend-attack models with private information. For each model, we first assess critically what would be a typical game theoretic approach and then provide the corresponding solution proposed by the adversarial risk analysis framework, emphasizing how to coherently assess a predictive probability model of the adversary’s actions, in a context in which we aim at supporting decisions of a defender versus an attacker. This illustrates the application of adversarial risk analysis to basic counterterrorism models that may be used as basic building blocks for more complex risk analysis of counterterrorism problems

Smart Grid Security: Threats, Challenges, and Solutions

The cyber-physical nature of the smart grid has rendered it vulnerable to a multitude of attacks that can occur at its communication, networking, and physical entry points. Such cyber-physical attacks can have detrimental effects on the operation of the grid as exemplified by the recent attack which caused a blackout of the Ukranian power grid. Thus, to properly secure the smart grid, it is of utmost importance to: a) understand its underlying vulnerabilities and associated threats, b) quantify their effects, and c) devise appropriate security solutions. In this paper, the key threats targeting the smart grid are first exposed while assessing their effects on the operation and stability of the grid. Then, the challenges involved in understanding these attacks and devising defense strategies against them are identified. Potential solution approaches that can help mitigate these threats are then discussed. Last, a number of mathematical tools that can help in analyzing and implementing security solutions are introduced. As such, this paper will provide the first comprehensive overview on smart grid security

A Cost-effective Shuffling Method against DDoS Attacks using Moving Target Defense

Moving Target Defense (MTD) has emerged as a newcomer into the asymmetric field of attack and defense, and shuffling-based MTD has been regarded as one of the most effective ways to mitigate DDoS attacks. However, previous work does not acknowledge that frequent shuffles would significantly intensify the overhead. MTD requires a quantitative measure to compare the cost and effectiveness of available adaptations and explore the best trade-off between them. In this paper, therefore, we propose a new cost-effective shuffling method against DDoS attacks using MTD. By exploiting Multi-Objective Markov Decision Processes to model the interaction between the attacker and the defender, and designing a cost-effective shuffling algorithm, we study the best trade-off between the effectiveness and cost of shuffling in a given shuffling scenario. Finally, simulation and experimentation on an experimental software defined network (SDN) indicate that our approach imposes an acceptable shuffling overload and is effective in mitigating DDoS attacks