4,063 research outputs found
Optimal Broadcast Encryption from Pairings and LWE
Boneh, Waters and Zhandry (CRYPTO 2014) used multilinear maps to provide a solution to the long-standing problem of public-key broadcast encryption (BE) where all parameters in the system are small. In this work, we improve their result by providing a solution that uses only bilinear maps and Learning With Errors (LWE). Our scheme is fully collusion-resistant against any number of colluders, and can be generalized to an identity-based broadcast system with short parameters. Thus, we reclaim the problem of optimal broadcast encryption from the land of “Obfustopia”.
Our main technical contribution is a ciphertext policy attribute based encryption (CP-ABE) scheme which achieves special efficiency properties – its ciphertext size, secret key size, and public key size are all independent of the size of the circuits supported by the scheme. We show that this special CP-ABE scheme implies BE with optimal parameters; but it may also be of independent interest. Our constructions rely on a novel interplay of bilinear maps and LWE, and are proven secure in the generic group model
Remarks on the Cryptographic Primitive of Attribute-based Encryption
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) which allows users to encrypt and decrypt
messages based on user attributes is a type of one-to-many encryption. Unlike
the conventional one-to-one encryption which has no intention to exclude any
partners of the intended receiver from obtaining the plaintext, an ABE system
tries to exclude some unintended recipients from obtaining the plaintext
whether they are partners of some intended recipients. We remark that this
requirement for ABE is very hard to meet. An ABE system cannot truly exclude
some unintended recipients from decryption because some users can exchange
their decryption keys in order to maximize their own interests. The flaw
discounts the importance of the cryptographic primitive.Comment: 9 pages, 4 figure
Enabling Confidentiality in Content-Based Publish/Subscribe Infrastructures
Content-Based Publish/Subscribe (CBPS) is an interaction model where the interests of subscribers are stored in a content-based forwarding infrastructure to guide routing of notifications to interested parties. In this paper, we focus on answering the following question: Can we implement content-based publish/subscribe while keeping subscriptions and notifications confidential from the forwarding brokers? Our contributions include a systematic analysis of the problem, providing a formal security model and showing that the maximum level of attainable security in this setting is restricted. We focus on enabling provable confidentiality for commonly used applications and subscription languages in CBPS and present a series of practical provably secure protocols, some of which are novel and others adapted from existing work. We have implemented these protocols in SIENA, a popular CBPS system. Evaluation results show that confidential content-based publish/subscribe is practical: A single broker serving 1000 subscribers is able to route more than 100 notifications per second with our solutions
Shared and Searchable Encrypted Data for Untrusted Servers
Current security mechanisms pose a risk for organisations that outsource their data management to untrusted servers. Encrypting and decrypting sensitive data at the client side is the normal approach in this situation but has high communication and computation overheads if only a subset of the data is required, for example, selecting records in a database table based on a keyword search. New cryptographic schemes have been proposed that support encrypted queries over encrypted data but all depend on a single set of secret keys, which implies single user access or sharing keys among multiple users, with key revocation requiring costly data re-encryption. In this paper, we propose an encryption scheme where each authorised user in the system has his own keys to encrypt and decrypt data. The scheme supports keyword search which enables the server to return only the encrypted data that satisfies an encrypted query without decrypting it. We provide two constructions of the scheme giving formal proofs of their security. We also report on the results of a prototype implementation.
This research was supported by the UK’s EPSRC research grant EP/C537181/1. The authors would like to thank the members of the Policy Research Group at Imperial College for their support
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