7 research outputs found
Isoelastic Agents and Wealth Updates in Machine Learning Markets
Recently, prediction markets have shown considerable promise for developing
flexible mechanisms for machine learning. In this paper, agents with isoelastic
utilities are considered. It is shown that the costs associated with
homogeneous markets of agents with isoelastic utilities produce equilibrium
prices corresponding to alpha-mixtures, with a particular form of mixing
component relating to each agent's wealth. We also demonstrate that wealth
accumulation for logarithmic and other isoelastic agents (through payoffs on
prediction of training targets) can implement both Bayesian model updates and
mixture weight updates by imposing different market payoff structures. An
iterative algorithm is given for market equilibrium computation. We demonstrate
that inhomogeneous markets of agents with isoelastic utilities outperform state
of the art aggregate classifiers such as random forests, as well as single
classifiers (neural networks, decision trees) on a number of machine learning
benchmarks, and show that isoelastic combination methods are generally better
than their logarithmic counterparts.Comment: Appears in Proceedings of the 29th International Conference on
Machine Learning (ICML 2012
Proportional Dynamics in Exchange Economies
We study the Proportional Response dynamic in exchange economies, where each
player starts with some amount of money and a good. Every day, the players
bring one unit of their good and submit bids on goods they like, each good gets
allocated in proportion to the bid amounts, and each seller collects the bids
received. Then every player updates the bids proportionally to the contribution
of each good in their utility. This dynamic models a process of learning how to
bid and has been studied in a series of papers on Fisher and production
markets, but not in exchange economies. Our main results are as follows:
- For linear utilities, the dynamic converges to market equilibrium utilities
and allocations, while the bids and prices may cycle. We give a combinatorial
characterization of limit cycles for prices and bids.
- We introduce a lazy version of the dynamic, where players may save money
for later, and show this converges in everything: utilities, allocations, and
prices.
- For CES utilities in the substitute range , the dynamic converges
for all parameters.
This answers an open question about exchange economies with linear utilities,
where tatonnement does not converge to market equilibria, and no natural
process leading to equilibria was known. We also note that proportional
response is a process where the players exchange goods throughout time (in
out-of-equilibrium states), while tatonnement only explains how exchange
happens in the limit.Comment: 25 pages, 6 figure
Prediction Markets for Machine Learning: Equilibrium Behaviour through Sequential Markets
Prediction markets which trade on contracts representing unknown future outcomes
are designed specifically to aggregate expert predictions via the market price. While
there are some existing machine learning interpretations for the market price and
connections to Bayesian updating under the equilibrium analysis of such markets,
there is less of an understanding of what the instantaneous price in sequentially
traded markets means. In this thesis I show that the prices generated in sequentially
traded prediction markets are stochastic approximations to the price given by
an equilibrium analysis. This is done by showing that the equilibrium price is a
solution to a stochastic optimisation problem which is solved by stochastic mirror
descent (SMD) by a class of sequential pricing mechanisms. This connection leads to
proposing a scheme called âmini-tradingâ which introduces a parameter related to
the learning rate in SMD. I prove several properties of this scheme and show that it
can improve the stability of prices in sequentially traded prediction markets.
Also I analyse two popular trading models (namely the Maximum Expected Utility
model and the Risk-measure model) in respect to an assumption on the class of
traders I required to interpret sequential markets as SMD. I derive a sufficient condition
for when the Maximum Expected Utility traders satisfy this assumption, but
show that risk-measure based traders naturally satisfy this assumption for the type
of markets I consider. Then I show that the âregretâ of mini-trading markets (with
respect to equilibrium markets) depend on the mini-trade parameter.
Finally I attempt to compare the wealth updates of traders in sequential markets
to the wealth updates in equilibrium markets, since this would help to extend the
interpretation of equilibrium markets as performing Bayesian updates to sequential
markets. For this I present preliminary results