OPTIMAL LEADER-FOLLOWER FORMATION CONTROL USING DYNAMIC GAMES

Formation control is one of the salient features of multi-agent robotics. The main goal of this field is to develop distributed control methods for interconnected multi-robot systems so that robots will move with respect to each other in order to keep a formation throughout their joint mission. Numerous advantages and vast engineering applications have drawn a great deal of attention to the research in this field. Dynamic game theory is a powerful method to study dynamic interactions among intelligent, rational, and self-interested agents. Differential game is among the most important sub-classes of dynamic games, because many important problems in engineering can be modeled as differential games. The underlying goal of this research is to develop a reliable formation control algorithm for multi-robot systems based on differential games. The main idea is to benefit from powerful machinery provided by dynamic games, and design an improved formation control scheme with careful attention to practical control design requirements, namely state feedback, and computation costs associated to implementation. In this work, results from algebraic graph theory is used to develop a quasi-static optimal control for heterogeneous leader{follower formation problem. The simulations are provided to study capabilities as well as limitations associated to this approach. Based on the obtained results, a finite horizon open-loop Nash differential game is developed as adaptation of differential games methodology to formation control problems in multi-robot systems. The practical control design requirements dictate state-feedback; therefore, proposed controller is complimented by adding receding horizon approach to its algorithm. It leads to a closed loop state-feedback formation control. The simulation results are presented to show the effectiveness of proposed control scheme

Differential Game Strategies for Social Networks with Self-Interested Individuals

A social network population engages in collective actions as a direct result of forming a particular opinion. The strategic interactions among the individuals acting independently and selfishly naturally portray a noncooperative game. Nash equilibrium allows for self-enforcing strategic interactions between selfish and self-interested individuals. This paper presents a differential game approach to the opinion formation problem in social networks to investigate the evolution of opinions as a result of a Nash equilibrium. The opinion of each individual is described by a differential equation, which is the continuous-time Hegselmann-Krause model for opinion dynamics with a time delay in input. The objective of each individual is to seek optimal strategies for her own opinion evolution by minimizing an individual cost function. Two differential game problems emerge, one for a population that is not stubborn and another for a population that is stubborn. The open-loop Nash equilibrium actions and their associated opinion trajectories are derived for both differential games using Pontryagin's principle. Additionally, the receding horizon control scheme is used to practice feedback strategies where the information flow is restricted by fixed and complete social graphs as well as the second neighborhood concept. The game strategies were executed on the well-known Zachary's Karate Club social network. The resulting opinion trajectories associated with the game strategies showed consensus, polarization, and disagreement in final opinions.Comment: Journal submission under review. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:2310.0309

Differential Games For Multi-agent Systems Under Distributed Information

In this dissertation, we consider differential games for multi-agent systems under distributed information where every agent is only able to acquire information about the others according to a directed information graph of local communication/sensor networks. Such games arise naturally from many applications including mobile robot coordination, power system optimization, multiplayer pursuit-evasion games, etc. Since the admissible strategy of each agent has to conform to the information graph constraint, the conventional game strategy design approaches based upon Riccati equation(s) are not applicable because all the agents are required to have the information of the entire system. Accordingly, the game strategy design under distributed information is commonly known to be challenging. Toward this end, we propose novel open-loop and feedback game strategy design approaches for Nash equilibrium and noninferior solutions with a focus on linear quadratic differential games. For the open-loop design, approximate Nash/noninferior game strategies are proposed by integrating distributed state estimation into the open-loop global-information Nash/noninferior strategies such that, without global information, the distributed game strategies can be made arbitrarily close to and asymptotically converge over time to the global-information strategies. For the feedback design, we propose the best achievable performance indices based approach under which the distributed strategies form a Nash equilibrium or noninferior solution with respect to a set of performance indices that are the closest to the original indices. This approach overcomes two issues in the classical optimal output feedback approach: the simultaneous optimization and initial state dependence. The proposed open-loop and feedback design approaches are applied to an unmanned aerial vehicle formation control problem and a multi-pursuer single-evader differential game problem, respectively. Simulation results of several scenarios are presented for illustration

A differential game approach to urban drainage systems control

© 20xx IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.Urban drainage systems (UDSs) are complex large-scale systems that carry stormwater and wastewater throughout urban areas. During heavy rain scenarios, UDSs are not able to handle the amount of extra water that enters the network and flooding occurs. Usually, this might happen because the network is not being used efficiently, i.e., some structures remain underused while many others are overused. This paper proposes a control methology based on differential game theory that aims to efficiently use the existing network elements in order to minimize overflows and properly manage the water resource. The proposed controller is tested on a typical UDS and is compared with a centralized MPC achieving similar results in terms of flooding minimization and network usage, but only using local information on distributed controllers.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

Cooperative Pursuit with Multi-Pursuer and One Faster Free-moving Evader

This paper addresses a multi-pursuer single-evader pursuit-evasion game where the free-moving evader moves faster than the pursuers. Most of the existing works impose constraints on the faster evader such as limited moving area and moving direction. When the faster evader is allowed to move freely without any constraint, the main issues are how to form an encirclement to trap the evader into the capture domain, how to balance between forming an encirclement and approaching the faster evader, and what conditions make the capture possible. In this paper, a distributed pursuit algorithm is proposed to enable pursuers to form an encirclement and approach the faster evader. An algorithm that balances between forming an encirclement and approaching the faster evader is proposed. Moreover, sufficient capture conditions are derived based on the initial spatial distribution and the speed ratios of the pursuers and the evader. Simulation and experimental results on ground robots validate the effectiveness and practicability of the proposed method

Quadratic Mean Field Games

Mean field games were introduced independently by J-M. Lasry and P-L. Lions, and by M. Huang, R.P. Malham\'e and P. E. Caines, in order to bring a new approach to optimization problems with a large number of interacting agents. The description of such models split in two parts, one describing the evolution of the density of players in some parameter space, the other the value of a cost functional each player tries to minimize for himself, anticipating on the rational behavior of the others. Quadratic Mean Field Games form a particular class among these systems, in which the dynamics of each player is governed by a controlled Langevin equation with an associated cost functional quadratic in the control parameter. In such cases, there exists a deep relationship with the non-linear Schr\"odinger equation in imaginary time, connexion which lead to effective approximation schemes as well as a better understanding of the behavior of Mean Field Games. The aim of this paper is to serve as an introduction to Quadratic Mean Field Games and their connexion with the non-linear Schr\"odinger equation, providing to physicists a good entry point into this new and exciting field.Comment: 62 pages, 4 figure